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Introduction

Understanding Narrative 
JAMES PHELAN 
PETER J. RABINOWITZ 
From Understanding to Self-Consciousness, from Fiction 
to Narrative 
By design, our title refers to Brooks and Warren's influential 
textbooks, especially Understanding Fiction. In establishing this 
intertextuality, we are neither claiming kinship with Brooks and 
Warren's 1943 volume nor launching yet another assault on New 
Criticism. Instead, we are invoking their familiar title in order to fix 
a point of orientation in an increasingly complicated critical land­
scape, a point that will help us define the ways that the terms 
understanding, fiction, and narrative—as well as the institutional 
practices to which they are tied—have altered in the past fifty years. 
In the most general sense, understanding fiction and its signifieds 
have weathered this period the way that any social construct (a 
string quartet, a baseball franchise, a family, an English depart­
ment) survives a half-century: the signifiers have remained intact 
while the signifieds have been continuously transformed. But the 
trajectory of the relations between signifier and signified in the 
phrase understanding fiction is especially complex, partly because 
the signifier-signified relation of each separate term has evolved 
differently, partly because these divergent changes have led to a 
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change in their relation to each other. Adapting Umberto Eco's 
metaphor of semiotic space, we can say that, while the two terms 
have remained in each other's gravitational field, each has, in its 
own way, been realigning its relationships to numerous other 
signifiers and signifieds in nearby orbits. 
On the one hand, understanding has been adding signifieds as 
theorists have developed new ways of reading, new ideas about the 
interconnectedness of reading and writing, new theories about the 
difficulty, even impossibility, of reading, and, indeed, new under­
standings of understanding itself. That is, not only are there now 
multiple, noncompatible theories claiming to offer the best account 
of the way the particulars of a text form—or resist forming—a 
larger gestalt; but theorizing about understanding by everyone 
from Hirsch to Irigaray has also profoundly altered our relation to 
the activity. In short, our understanding of understanding has been 
pluralized, and one increasingly important use of the term holds 
that understanding is a self-reflexive and self-questioning act, one 
in which the process and the subject matter are inextricably tan­
gled. In this use of the term, understanding entails not only the 
interpreter's translation of the object into other terms but also the 
critic's self-conscious awareness of her relation to the "terministic 
screen" or "critical framework" or "metaphysical assumptions" or 
"situated subjectivity" or "horizon of expectations" that mediate 
between her and the object. Wayne Booth's essay exemplifies both 
dimensions of the shift in our understanding of understanding. 
Booth distinguishes several different kinds of reading, each entail­
ing a different kind of understanding: "reading-with" (accepting 
the apparent demands made upon us by the text), "reading-against" 
(seeking what is unintended or even "banned" by the text), and 
"critical rereading," which searches a text anew, either for "deeper 
meaning" or for "an understanding of structure " Despite certain 
echoes in its terminology, Booth's third category is clearly distinct 
f rom Brooks and Warren's notion of understanding as an account of 
the "organic relation" existing among a text's elements, for it 
inevitably reflects back on the act of reading itself: it can lead us, for 
instance, to "deplore" what we have done before or, alternatively, to 
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acquire a "heightened admiration" through a heightened question­
ing of the ethical quality of our reading experience. In particular, 
the assumptions about the values of structural understanding that 
serve as the basis for Brooks and Warren's analyses become the 
subject of Booth's inquiry into Henry James's Wings of the Dove. 
Susan McClary's analysis of Mozart's Prague Symphony similarly 
builds from one kind of understanding to another: her investiga­
tion of Mozart's structures leads into an interrogation of the reign­
ing assumptions about their ideological neutrality. 
While understanding has been adding signifieds, fiction has been 
expanding its borders, invading the space formerly controlled by 
other signifiers. Indeed, the borders have been changing in at least 
two ways at once. First, border-crossings have become bolder and 
more frequent, as theorists such as Hayden White and narrative 
artists such as Joan Didion, Tom Wolfe, Ishmael Reed, and Don 
DeLillo have called attention to the fictionalizing that they regard 
as inevitably a part of such nonfiction genres as history, biography, 
and autobiography. Second, the location of the borders has also 
changed: fiction has moved out from its home base in the province 
of prose to annex pieces of such surrounding territories as poetry, 
film, painting, music, and performance art. Indeed, as the signifier 
has stretched to cover all these different signifieds, its work of 
signification has increasingly been shouldered by another member 
of its family. Just as television sets, given their broadened func­
tions, have been increasingly referred to as monitors, so the term 
fiction has increasingly been replaced by narrative. 
Some theorists, of course, have called for resistance to what they 
see as a kind of imperialism in these expansionist tendencies, an 
imperialism that has led to a loss of attention to the special qualities 
of the individual domains that are being merged in the larger entity 
of narrative. The decreased differentiation between history and 
fiction has been particularly troubling. But for the moment we do 
not want to engage the question of whether these changes are for 
the better, for the worse, or-—as is more likely—have mixed results. 
Our point is that these alterations in the landscape cannot be 
ignored. To take just one consequence, the realignment of relations 
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among fiction, nonfiction, history, and narrative means that apparent 
similarities of terminology between old and new critical texts on 
these subjects frequently mask significant differences in their 
conceptual territories. Future theoretical discussions will no doubt 
further change the terrain in which we work, but it seems unlikely 
that the old map of the territory will ever be restored. 
The superseding of fiction (with its silent partner prose) by 
narrative is reflected most clearly in this collection by the essays of 
Judith Mayne, Susan McClary, and Mary Louise Pratt. In her essay 
on the film version of The Picture of Dorian Gray, Mayne proposes a 
reconceptualization of the notion of spectatorship and then shows 
how attention to acts of spectatorship within the film raises previ­
ously submerged elements of its exploration of male/female and 
straight/gay relations. The essay is a self-sufficient contribution to 
film theory and practical criticism; but in the context of this 
collection it also invites questions about the similarities and differ­
ences between representations of spectatorship in film and repre­
sentations of reading in the novel. 
In her essay, McClary peels away "the polished surfaces and 
assuring reconciliations that characterize the public veneer" of 
Mozart's music. In particular, she demonstrates how what she calls 
"narrative inflections" intervene in the structure of Mozart's Prague 
Symphony, and how an examination of these inflections on two 
fronts (public and private) can reveal the ways in which he was 
"wrestling" with the historical tensions (including tensions over 
class, gender, and identity) of late eighteenth-century bourgeois 
culture. In so doing, McClary suggests how the music reveals "the 
contradictions bound up with subject formation" and provides 
"models for how bourgeois sensitivity might be constructed in the 
face of both oppressive authority and the temptation to regress into 
nostalgia" 
Mary Louise Pratt's essay is, on the surface, more traditionally 
literary. But she too moves beyond the borders of a volume on 
"understanding fiction" as it was conceived by Brooks, Warren, and 
most of their contemporaries. Indeed, because the relatively straight­
forward travel narratives of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
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European explorers in the Americas and Africa appear not to 
"answer fully enough our basic interest about human action" in the 
way that such contemporaneous canonical fictions as Clarissa and 
Wuthering Heights do, they would seem perfect exemplars of the 
class of anecdotal texts that Brooks and Warren cast out in the 
opening pages of their book (1-4). Without denying this difference, 
Pratt establishes that these texts, too, have a great deal to offer to 
serious students of narrative, revealing through her careful analy­
sis of the travel narratives' techniques of description and narration 
the ways they imply, reinforce, and promulgate their imperialist 
ideology. Just as Pratt's analyses of these narratives are partially 
informed by the work done on more canonical works and genres in 
the last fifteen years, so too does her analysis offer a fresh way to 
think about the subtle and not-so-subtle communication of ideol­
ogies in canonical fictional texts. More challenging still, her analy­
sis invites us to question the very bases on which we sort out our 
literary categories. 
Theory practice: Rewriting the "New Reading" 
The changes in the meanings of and relations between understand­
ing and fiction are only a small part of much broader changes in 
narrative studies since the breakdown of the widespread New 
Critical orthodoxy established by such books as Understanding 
Fiction. To take one example, consider the issue of organic unity. 
Where Brooks and Warren could once proclaim with utter author­
ity and confidence that "A piece of fiction is a unity, in so far as the 
piece of fiction is successful" (xx), contemporary critics of narrative 
share no such agreement about the relation between unity and 
success. This change is not simply the substitution of one dogma 
for another; that is, it is not simply the consequence of the rise of 
some monolithic "poststructuralism/7 or even of a clan of related 
poststructuralisms, that proclaims the impossibility of organic 
unity. Rather, even many individual critics who embrace few of the 
principles of poststructuralism find the search for organic unity a 
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decreasingly rewarding critical pursuit. For example, Phelan's anal­
ysis of the relation between present tense narration and Coetzee's 
positioning of his implied audience in Waiting for the Barbarians has 
an unexpected side effect. In tracing the course of the audience's 
positionings, Phelan claims that Coetzee's narrative lacks one of 
the standard features of the coherent, unified text: the implied 
author's final judgment of the protagonist. In a traditional analysis, 
this lack would move to the center of the study: the critic would 
have to address the question of whether Coetzee had created a new 
kind of unity or frustrated the reader's desire for unity—or whether 
he had simply failed as an artist. For Phelan, however, this question 
is beside the point because he has shifted attention away from the 
form-in-itself and focused instead on the dynamics of the audi-
ence's response without worrying about the overall coherence of 
those dynamics. Thus Phelan's attention to the formal element of 
present tense narration implicitly throws into question what we 
mean by formal analysis. Similarly, Rabinowitz's essay is specifi­
cally focused on the way that the ending of The Maltese Falcon 
surreptitiously betrays the epistemological principles that had 
grounded the novel to that point. But here too the traditional 
questions about the narrative's unity drop out of the analysis as 
Rabinowitz seeks instead to interrogate the sources of this epis­
temological rupture in the intersection of narrative technique 
(specifically, the use of "second person narration") and ideology 
(specifically, that stemming from Hammett's anxieties about women). 
Rabinowitz first shows that Hammett's acceptance of his culture's 
dominant ideology of gender leads him to deny full subjectivity to 
Brigid O'Shaughnessey and, as a consequence, to choose a par­
ticular kind of second person narration at the climax. Rabinowitz 
then shows how this technical choice short-circuits the epistemo­
logical innovations Hammett was introducing into the evolving 
formula of the hard-boiled detective novel. In other words, rather 
than holding up unity as a goal to be achieved and a measure of 
aesthetic success, Rabinowitz focuses on how a rupture in organic 
unity allows us to read the novel as a site of conflict between 
ideologies. 
Introduction 
Not surprisingly, this collection represents more than just the 
general critical shift away from a concern for unity. It also indicates 
how far we have traveled away from the larger program implied in 
Brooks and Warren's "Letter to the Teacher" and exemplified in the 
rest of Understanding Fiction, Although we all still live with the 
powerful legacy of the New Criticism, there is probably no single 
critical principle of Understanding Fiction that some prominent 
theorist has not repudiated in the last fifty years. Even more 
significant than the breakdown of the New Critical hegemony is 
the institution's refusal to replace it with any New Orthodoxy. We 
therefore doubt that we could propose any new set of principles for 
understanding narrative to which all our contributors, let alone all 
contemporary students of narrative, would subscribe. And yet this 
critical ferment does not, we believe, lead to theoretical anarchy. 
Indeed, although we can't be sure that any of the individual contribu­
tors would agree, we view this volume as a chance to stake out a pro­
gram of critical activity—one quite different from that which followed 
in the wake of Understanding Fiction, not only in its particular 
critical principles, but also in its larger metatheoretical stance. 
For the past fifty years, the journals have been full of essays 
offering new readings of Masterpieces Ancient and Modern, new 
keys to their meaning or, more recently, to their contradictory 
meanings or even their unreadability. We contend that the contin­
ued production of such essays is less and less profitable—-in par­
ticular, that untheorized interpretation can make only a minor 
contribution to contemporary narrative studies. By untheorized, 
we mean interpretation that goes about proving its thesis without 
reflecting either on the principles informing its practice or on the 
relation of the essay's findings to more general issues in narrative 
theory. (By this definition, of course, many essays of the forties, 
fifties, and sixties were theorized; our aim is not to privilege a given 
theoretical content but rather to emphasize a kind of inquiry.) 
An untheorized contribution is necessarily limited, in part, for a 
reason that others before us have articulated: as the number of new 
readings increases, the distinctiveness of any single reading fades 
away. What more is there to say about Joyce's attitudes toward 
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Stephen in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man? But we believe that 
such critical practice is limited for a more serious reason as well: it 
leaves out a vital dimension of critical inquiry at a time when the 
concept of understanding has been pluralized and when, as a conse­
quence, many critics are engaged in an active and far-reaching 
conversation about the concepts underlying any proffered new 
understanding: author, audience, text, history, sign, structure, 
story, discourse, tense, character, style, ideology, politics, gender, 
ethics, and so forth. If we ignore this conversation, not only do we 
leave ourselves open to the possibility that the new reading has 
been undermined or recontextualized even before it is published. 
We also remain shut off from a significant dimension of our own 
practice—as if we were to announce from the outset that we are not 
interested in inquiring too closely into the underpinnings of our 
work. To put the point less negatively: if we ignore this conversa­
tion, we pass up, at the very least, opportunities to contribute to 
our own self-understanding and to an understanding of how our 
positions and practices relate to those of others in our critical 
community. In so doing, we miss the opportunity to transform the 
grounds of self-understanding, both for ourselves and others. 
Again, the essays in this collection exemplify our point. While 
all of them could be discussed according to their double attention, 
to interpretation and to the grounds of interpretation, we will 
single out just two. Elizabeth Langland's analysis of the intertex­
tual relations between Charlotte Bronte's Shirley and Thackeray's 
Vanity Fair also proposes a revisionary view of the concept of 
intertextuality, one that moves it away from traditional notions of 
influence and toward a postmodern conception of textuality in­
formed by the theories of Barthes, Bakhtin, Foucault, and Irigaray. 
As Langland illustrates how Bronte's relation to Thackeray gets 
variously played out as ''dialogue, discourse, theft, and mimicry/' 
she also varies the tone and style of her own text, thus suggesting 
an intertextual relation between her essay and those of the theo­
rists she is drawing upon. Barbara Foley's essay on the relation 
between the form of the bildungsroman and leftist politics in 
proletarian novels of the 1930s draws much of its strength from its 
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rigorous interrogation of the theoretical assumption that a given 
form implies a particular politics—an interrogation that includes, 
among other things, a historical examination of the way the key 
terms realism and bildungsroman have shifted their meanings. Foley's 
self-conscious and self-reflexive readings of Moscow Yankee and Yon­
nondio demonstrate just how complicated the relation between form 
and politics can be; and this demonstration, as Foley points out, has 
considerable importance to our understanding of other writers "who 
are variously termed 'oppositional,' 'marginalized/ and 'subaltern/ " 
At the same time that we are questioning the value of non-
theoretical interpretation, we are also (and this may be a less 
popular position) skeptical about the value of noninterpretive 
narrative theory. Despite the initial enthusiasm surrounding nar­
ratologists' claims in the 1970s that they would describe the gram­
mar of narrative and define (even quantify) the essence of nar­
rativity, their efforts have not borne much fruit—especially when 
these efforts have been divorced from concrete problems of inter-
pretation.1 This result is no accident. In part, the program has failed 
because the attempt to fix the rules for proper functioning of 
narrative cannot stand up in the face of the multiple and incompat­
ible principles of understanding that theorists have advanced. But 
more important, many critics have discovered that the task of inter­
pretation may itself lead to revisions of the theoretical principles 
brought to the task. If the untheorized interpretation is not worth 
reading, the untested theoretical proclamation is not worth believing. 
By "testing," we mean something more than application: our 
journals will not be significantly better if all those explications of 
Joyce's attitudes toward Stephen are replaced by Lacanian readings 
of Joyce's attitudes toward Stephen. Nor do we mean testing in the 
sense of simple confirmation. Indeed, as we have seen in thou­
sands of literary essays, the easiest part of hypothesis testing is 
confirmation. To choose one particularly famous example: in Is 
There a Text in This Class? Stanley Fish tells the story of how his class 
in seventeenth-century English religious poetry was able to inter­
pret a reading assignment left on the board from his previous class 
("Jacobs-Rosenbaum / Levin / Thorne / Hayes / Ohman(?)") as a 
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religious poem. Although Fish intends this example to persuade us 
that interpretive strategies wholly constitute texts, it functions 
much better as an example of the ease of hypothesis confirmation. 
Once one shifts the question from "Can the text be read as a 
poem?" to "Which hypothesis—that this 'text' is a poem or that it is 
a reading assignment—is more powerful?/' Fish's argument begins 
to founder. To take just the most obvious piece of evidence, the 
word "Hayes" resists being incorporated into the poem interpreta­
tion, while "Hayes" is readily incorporated into the assignment 
interpretation.2 Because hypothesis confirmation is typically easy, 
the critical essay whose theoretical principles are only being con­
firmed will be as unproductive as the untheorized new reading. 
On the other hand, when the critic allows the text to resist the 
theoretical principles she is bringing to bear upon it—that is, when 
the text is treated as something other than inert matter on which a 
theoretical position can be stamped—she is able not only to come 
to a stronger understanding of the text, but to reconceptualize her 
theoretical ground as well. Again we single out just two essays that 
exemplify this point. In his essay "Naturalizing Molloy? Thomas 
Pavel certainly offers a new reading of Beckett's novel. But by 
highlighting the contrast between hermeneutics and poetics and 
the relation between tradition and innovation, he contextualizes 
that reading by asking us to rethink, on theoretical grounds, the 
consensus that has grown up around Beckett. As a consequence, 
when he proposes a shift in our orientation away from the tradi­
tional apocalyptic readings of Molloy, he revises our received 
notions not only of the novel but also, more generally and more 
provocatively, of the activity of naturalizing the strange. Ross 
Chambers similarly shows how theory and practice can be recip­
rocally illuminating by proposing that we think of the "loiterature 
of travel" as a new genre that is recognizable more for its counter-
disciplinary functions than for any specific set of characters, 
events, or conventions. Chambers's conception of the new genre 
arises out of his adaptation of Foucault's concern with the relations 
among power, knowledge, and desire, along with his own ideas 
about how some narratives allow "room for maneuver" within the 
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dominant ideology. At the same time, it is his analysis of the 
narratives of "strolling, touring, and cruising" that operationally 
defines the genre. In other words, the diverse texts that Chambers 
analyzes are able to shed light on each other once Chambers 
theorizes their generic similarity, even as his particular readings of 
those narratives flesh out his definition of the genre. 
In calling for essays that combine theory and practice, then, we 
are calling for work that genuinely inquires into elements of both 
theory and text. The particular forms and purposes of such essays 
may be as plural as is understanding itself. As the essays in this 
collection show, some critics may give greater emphasis to theory, 
some to the text, some to historical context, some to formal struc­
ture, some to gender relations, some to technique. Foley and 
Chambers, for instance, have ends that are ultimately political. 
Others, such as Mayne, McClary, and Pavel, want to increase our 
cognitive knowlege of a text, both in its internal workings and in its 
relation to its sociohistorical situation. Phelan and Booth, for their 
part, focus on technique but emphasize the affective quality of the 
text, and thus attend to the way technique influences the emotional/ 
psychological/ethical experience of reading. Langland and Ra­
binowitz also attend to technique, but their purpose is to explore 
some of the differences gender makes in the construction of narra­
tive. Because of the diversity of the field of narrative studies, we do 
not claim to have representatives of all the voices in the current 
conversation; indeed, our metatheoretical claim about the nature of 
literary criticism today would be undermined were we able to do 
so. But each of these essays does represent one rich kind of 
exploration of theory and interpretation. 
Schools, Out! 
To this point, we have emphasized the pluralizing of understand­
ing and the diversity of current work on narrative, but we have not 
addressed the ways in which the essays in this collection might 
complicate or conflict with one another. Has our celebration of 
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diversity either deflected our attention from potentially fruitful 
disagreement or led us to gloss over unresolvable conflict? Rather 
than answer this question directly, we would like to leave it for our 
readers and to discuss instead how the kind of theorypractice we 
have been calling for also entails a new understanding of the 
relation between one critic's work and another's. 
As the theory revolution has developed, the "schools and move­
ments" model (originally developed to distinguish among artistic 
productions) has become an increasingly dominant means of char­
acterizing both individual critics and their relations to one another. 
This model charts out critical terrain by identifying a critic's alle­
giance to a school and then analyzing the convergences and diver­
gences of these larger groups. For example, we might say that 
Brooks and Warren are New Critics, Booth a neo-Aristotelian, 
Foley a Marxist, Mayne a poststructuralist feminist. We might 
further fill in the details of this mosaic by saying that Booth shares 
the New Critical belief in the power of the autonomous text but 
departs from New Critical beliefs about literature being a special 
kind of language; that Foley insists not on the text's autonomy but 
on its relations to its sociohistorical context and its ideological 
import; that Mayne emphasizes the way the complexities of signify­
ing in the film text reveal its gender ideologies. While this model 
helps sort out the diversity among critics—indeed, it may be a 
necessary step in any attempt to understand the larger critical 
landscape—it does so only by locking everyone into a predeter­
mined grid of possibilities by emphasizing the static (critical posi­
tions) rather than the dynamic (critical questions). We therefore 
prefer to sidestep this model and to attend instead to the dynamic 
nature of the work of individual critics and of the larger field. By 
saying "School's out" (or "Schools, out!") we liberate our percep­
tions from the predetermined slots provided by the standard maps 
of the field, and we allow ourselves to recognize that critics increas­
ingly draw upon the insights of different kinds of critical work as 
they formulate their questions, develop their methods, and reason 
to their answers. To take just one example, Foley's Marxist commit­
ments are in dialogical relation to her neo-Aristotelian commitments 
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to the power of genre; it is precisely this multiplicity that fuels her 
insightful analyses of Moscow Yankee and Yonnondio and her general 
reconfiguration of the relations between politics and form. 
Shifting away from a "schools and movements" approach does 
not mean that we thereby either eliminate or ignore conflicts. But it 
does allow us to distinguish between divergence and disagree­
ment: between the choice not to ask a question, for instance, and 
the belief that it shouldn't be asked—or between deciding not to 
make use of a particular theoretical insight and rejecting it entirely. 
Thus, for instance, neither of the two of us is committed, at the 
moment, to the search for unity; but neither of us would argue in 
principle against someone who is. That is, while unity may be a 
secondary, even tertiary concern in our respective projects, we do 
not thereby deem it a fallacy or a heresy to search for the principles 
of a given narrative's unity, as the more dogmatic New Critics were 
apt to cast out positions with which they did not agree. 
This shift in perspective clarifies what is most striking about our 
critical climate. Although the "schools and movements" popu­
larizers tend to obscure this fact, today's best practitioners do not 
stake out their arguments by opposition, but by interacting with 
different proportions of alternate methodologies in their eclectic 
mixes. That is, there inevitably are not only multiple sources of any 
critic's work, but also multiple dimensions to any critic's relation to 
another. Langland, for example, borrows heavily from Barthes, 
Bakhtin, Foucault, and Irigaray without fully endorsing their par­
ticular critical projects or, indeed, worrying about the possible 
compatibility or incompatibility of these theorists with each other. 
For her specific project of reconceptualizing intertextuality, she 
does not need to make any full endorsements or any totalizing 
synthesis of all their work. Instead, she needs to show that her 
eclectic conception of intertextuality has its own compelling logic 
and explanatory power—and here the practical criticism of her 
essay becomes crucial. 
In summary, then, our call for theorypractice is a call to attend 
and contribute to the powerful dynamics of contemporary narra­
tive studies. Unlike Theseus's famous boat, in which the planks, 
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sails, masts, and other parts are replaced without changing the 
essential structure of the boat, narrative studies changes its shape 
as it changes its parts. Sometimes the new planks fashioned in 
response to a particular cargo of issues and questions don't quite fit 
the old construction, and so a new design is developed. But after a 
while, this design too becomes inadequate for accommodating 
another new cargo of issues and questions, and yet another ren­
ovation takes place. As the essays in this volume show, the signi­
fieds of "understanding narrative" are plural—and always under 
construction. 
Notes 
We would like to thank Jane Greer for her editorial work, and especially 
for doing the index to this book. 
1. It is worth distinguishing this work from the apparently similar 
program of moving beyond interpretation outlined by Jonathan Culler in 
Structuralist Poetics and The Pursuit of Signs (especially the essay "Beyond 
Interpretation''). Because Culler's work proceeds by examining specific 
interpretations by other critics, it offers worthwhile insights into conven­
tions governing interpretive practice. Gerald Prince's Narratology', on the 
other hand, often proceeds by analyzing brief narratives that he devises 
specifically for analysis. Because these narratives are otherwise divorced 
from the social and historical contexts of both production and reception, 
the reach of Prince's conclusions remains limited to his own closed system. 
2. For a fuller discussion of this example and Fish's general position, see 
Phelan, "Data, Danda, and Disagreement." 
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Strolling, Touring, Cruising: 
Counter-Disciplinary Narrative 
and the Loiterature of Travel 
ROS S C H A M B E R  S 
Avec le temps, la passion des grands voyages s'eteint. 
Nerval, Les Nuits d'Octobre 
In a famous essay, Walter Benjamin tells a story of storytelling 
(Erzahlung) as an agent of Erfahrung, the "experience" the traveler 
brings home from distant parts. According to Benjamin, Erfahrung 
has been degraded in modern times as a result of being split into 
"information" (the already interpreted), and "fiction" (by implica­
tion the interpretable).1 But one can travel, of course, without 
leaving home; and Benjamin himself is clear that the value of Erfah­
rung is exclusively for a home audience and indeed that the category 
includes local experience. I want to look in what follows at a modern 
narrative genre—the genre of "loiterature"—that eludes definition 
as either "information" or "fiction" and has everything to do with 
forms of experience that are available without leaving home.2 
Narrative is intimately connected with the production of knowl­
edge, and so with effects of power and desire. Modern narratology, 
however, in defining itself very largely as a grammar and a rhetoric, 
has tended to elide these larger questions in favor of aspects of 
narrative that are amenable to more formal technical study, notably 
the analysis of narrative structure and of narration as a matter of 
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relational positions, such as those of narrator and narratee or 
author and reader. Both as a grammar and as a rhetoric, narrative 
theory has had to deal with the vexed question of closure. As Ian 
Reid insists,3 the closed structure of story is open to analysis, as a 
linear series of discursive substitutions or "exchanges"; the closed 
narrator-narratee relation coexists with an interpretive relation of 
reading that introduces all the effects of difference and deferral 
associated with textuality4 I propose that the questions of narra­
tive structure and of the rhetorical production of relational subjec­
tivity are themselves understandable as a function of narrative's 
status as a discourse of knowledge in which issues of power and 
desire are simultaneously at stake. For if narrative structure and 
narratorial relations each raise the problem of the relation of 
closure to discursive openness, there is also an epistemological 
issue of the same kind. This issue has to do with the ways 
disciplinary modes of knowledge can be seen as functioning in an 
exclusionary fashion and with the possibility of counterdisciplin­
ary modes5 as a less exclusionary, more open alternative. In the 
modern period (more specifically, since the latter part of the eigh­
teenth century) narrative literature has been split, not only be­
tween Benjamin's genres of "information" and "fiction," but also 
between a disciplined exposition of knowledge and modes of 
narrative disclosure that enact "experience" as a counterdisciplin­
ary event, with in each case correlative structural entailments and 
specific differences in the way narrative constructs subjectivity. 
The "loiterature" of travel will serve as my example of such counter-
disciplinary narrative. 
It is not my hypothesis that "disciplinary" and "counterdisci­
plinary" narrative constitute absolutely distinct genres: they are 
clearly locked in a relation of mutual entailment. Rather than 
showing that interrelationship, I will concentrate on exploring 
some features of loiterly narrative (on the assumption that narra-
tive's "disciplined" mode is familiar enough to be recognizable 
without lengthy analysis). I will try to present it, in a rather 
artificial point-by-point way, as the structural, intersubjective, and 
epistemological "other" of the disciplinary mode. To do this, I will 
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rely on Michel Foucault's analysis of discipline in Surveiller et punir, 
while pointing, by implication, to what is exclusionary in Foucault's 
own highly systematic and disciplined account of the emergence in 
the modern period of a society founded on discipline. That society 
was and is the site of counterdisciplinary impulses whose narrative 
manifestations are the subject of my own—also oversystematic— 
account. 
Discipline, as Foucault describes it, emerges as a structuring in 
space and time of the activity of work: schoolchildren, hospital 
patients, factory workers, and soldiers, for instance, occupy a space 
that is rigorously delimited and divided, and their daily life is 
subject to no less rigorous scheduling, while their institutional 
career may be structured as a movement through a hierarchy— 
from student to teacher, say, or from worker to supervisor—that 
gives narrative shape to the disciplined development of the isolated 
individual subject. But discipline seeks also to mold "souls" in this 
way through training the body: the disciplined subject is one 
whose actions and reactions have been so trained to regularity and 
reliability that they do not need to be specifically commanded, thus 
realizing previously undreamt-of efficiencies, economies, and ef­
fectiveness (for example, in the movement of troops or the produc­
tion of goods). This subject is, finally, a subject of knowledge, both 
in the sense of being subjected to a system of surveillance and 
examination that becomes progressively internalized, and in the 
sense that such a system presupposes an examining subject and a 
systematic body of knowledge about the examinees. Foucault shows 
how, in the form of pedagogy, criminology, psychiatry, psycho­
analysis, and so forth, the sciences humaines emerged historically as 
an epistemological offshoot of the disciplinary society, with, at its 
heart, the practice of the examination—and at the heart of the 
examination the construction of sets of norms against which indi­
viduals may be measured and found to be either in conformity or 
wanting. 
What this picture omits, however, is the degree to which, having 
become a norm in its own right, disciplinarity defines and pro­
duces, beyond the criminals and the criminality that are Foucault's 
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focus, various groups of marginalized and potentially oppositional 
misfits whose relation to delinquency is more ambiguous. What 
these groups have in common, I think, is an alienated relation to 
the world of work. Already in the famous opening pages of Balzac's 
La Fille aux yeux d'or [The Girl with the Golden Eyes], with its Dantean 
representation of Paris as a many-circled inferno of endless labor 
and relentless pleasure-seeking under the spur of ambition and 
gold, a few sentences are reserved for those—such as priests and 
those newly arrived from the provinces, the beautiful people of 
both sexes (society ladies and dandies) and "le peuple heureux des 
flaneurs"—who escape the frenzy. Balzac's major successor in the 
portrayal of urban modernity, Baudelaire, similarly distinguishes 
between an anonymous crowd given over to daily labor and the 
nightly burden of pleasure, and those isolated figures—denizens 
of the street such as beggars and rag-pickers, prostitutes and 
strolling entertainers, widows and "petites vieilles"—in whom he 
recognizes his own kin, his "congeneres," as an artist. The subordi­
nated subgroups of the bourgeoisie, such as artists (who are 
perceived as not working) and women (who are not permitted to 
work, their social function being purely ornamental), have in 
common with the street people (who are perceived as parasitic) a 
dubious, alienated status that derives from the sense that they are 
at once economically unproductive and, because not subject to disci­
plinary control, potentially rebellious. To these suspect groups can 
be added the sexual minorities whose identities emerged a little 
later, in part through their being identified as anomalous objects of 
the new disciplines of knowledge, and in part as an effect of the 
crisis in the system of gender identities that arose toward the end of 
the century. 
To the extent that middle-class members of such groups inclined 
to oppositionality (something first seen in the phenomenon of 
"Bohemia"), the narrative genre I call "loiterature" was available to 
them, initially in the practices of what Daniel Sangsue has called 
"eccentric narrative,"6 and of what is now generally called "flaneur 
realism," as a counterdisciplinary vehicle. Against disciplinary 
closure, loiterature proposes the values of the "writerly"—of differ­
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ence, deferral, and limitless supplementation—and it offers the 
occasion for a witty and entertainingly seductive performance of 
failure that comments on the disciplinary values of productivity 
and mastery. In coining the word loiterature I am translating a pun 
of Maurice Blanchot's.7 Blanchot uses the word desoeuvrement to 
describe the inability of writing, traversed as it is by a conscious­
ness of linguistic lack, to achieve the monumental, completed 
status of oeuvre. In appropriating the term, I want to keep the 
primary sense of desoeuvrement (i.e. idleness), but at the same time 
to draw attention to the difference between a certain metaphysical 
pathos of failure, much exploited by Blanchot, and the political 
implications of a certain failure to conform, in the context of a social 
formation oriented toward disciplined efficiency and the power of 
norms, and in a literary system that values sublimity and promotes 
the concept of the oeuvre as masterpiece. In short, by opposing the 
monumental, the sublime, and the "ideal" in the aesthetic sphere, 
loiterature was simultaneously situating itself, in social terms, as a 
discourse of counterdisciplinarity. In doing so, it was led specifi­
cally to attempt a transvaluation of the trivial—something that 
foreshadows, I think, contemporary attempts such as those of 
Michel de Certeau8 to deploy the concept of the "everyday" as a 
phenomenon of culture that can subvert from within—whether in 
art or in the domain of knowledge—the claims of techne. 
If the body is the vehicle of disciplinary training, it is also a site 
of potential resistance (consider the soldier who farts on parade); 
and the trivial asserts, above all, the claims of the body. But the 
word has an interesting etymology: it derives from Latin trivialis, 
designating a place where three roads meet and where, by implica­
tion, prostitutes, pimps, confidence-tricksters, and other unsavory 
types were wont to loiter in expectation of opportunity (opportun­
ism, as de Certeau has pointed out, is the defining characteristic of 
oppositional tactics, and it is the art of biding one's time).9 The 
modern sense of "insignificant/' however, seems to have attached 
to the word trivial as a result of the medieval division of the seven 
liberal arts into the quadrivium (which comprised the four number 
arts) and the trivium (which grouped the three language arts: 
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grammar, rhetoric, and logic). If suspicion of the trivial partakes of 
the Western tradition of privileging "mind" over "body," it also has 
to do with a no less complex social history of suspicion of loiterers, 
as tricky customers who can be assumed to be up to no good, and 
of discourse as a medium of knowledge less reliable and trickier 
than "sound" disciplines like mathematics and science. 
But the modern genre of loiterature began to emerge in the latter 
part of the eighteenth century. It has specific characteristics that 
can be opposed point by point to the features of disciplinarity I've 
mentioned. A narrative art of digression and episodicity, modeled 
after Sterne's overwhelmingly influential Tristram Shandy and A 
Sentimental Journey, disrupts the sense of narrative as structural 
closure and mimes an experience of linear temporality. In lieu of 
the disciplined subject, the loiterly narrator has the persona of an 
engaging conversationalist, interesting by virtue of a seductive 
performance of personality, like the parasitus of classical times, or 
the picaro of early modern times. Such a narrator produces knowl­
edge, finally, that has little to do with system or examination, 
dispensing random observations and striking insights seriatim, 
according to the haphazard logic of the "collection." The loiterly 
subject is less interested in conceptual systems than in memory, as 
the site of re-collection where the random experience (the Er­
fahrung) of a life attuned to the dimension of time becomes un­
systematically available. In addition to the founding texts of Sterne, 
let me randomly cite several others: Jacques le fataliste (for its 
identification of the discourse of fate with structural narrative 
closure, and for its counterpractice of interruption), early forms of 
flaneur realism such as Merder's Tableau de Paris or Restif's Les Nuits 
de Paris, the Reveries d'un promeneur solitaire, and finally X. de 
Maistre's Voyage autour de ma chambre, which brings me back to my 
specific subject through its witty exploitation of the theme of travel 
without leaving home, of idleness as a mode of Erfahrung. 
I would myself like to linger over some of these texts, but I will 
restrict myself instead to some observations about the destructur­
ing of narrative through an art of deferral, the situation of the 
loiterly narrative subject as a seductive performer, and the practice 
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of collection/recollection as a counterdisciplinary epistemological 
and narrative mode. I will do so by reading, respectively, a charac­
teristic work of flaneur realism written in the context of feuilleton 
culture (Nerval's Les Nuits d'Octobre [October Nights]), a novel of 
episodic construction, Colette's La Vagabonde [The Vagabond]), that is 
one of the few examples of loiterature by a woman writer, and a 
work in which the practice of gay history is figured as a form of 
cruising, Neil Bartlett's Who Was That Man? As the figure of 
cruising indicates, we will need to be sensitive to a subterranean 
thematic of desire that links these three texts: the subject of 
narrative knowledge is produced in Bartlett as a person of desire, as 
is Colette's narratee through a seductive act of narration, while in 
symptomatic fashion the dilatoriness of Nerval's belated narrator 
enacts the destructuring of narrative through digression as an art 
of deferral "founded" on lack. As an art of the trivial, loiterly 
writing deploys the tricky resources of desire as that which is 
capable of subverting simultaneously the claims of aesthetic monu­
mentality and the power of disciplinarity. 
Strolling 
In October Nights (1852)10 an originary lack (i.e. un manque) is 
figured as a missed train (un train manque), and the outcome of this 
critical delay, after three days and two nights of dallying in Paris 
and the neighboring Valois countryside, will be a missed otter 
hunt. Between this failed departure (depart manque) and the missed 
ending, the narrative is structured (if that is the word) by accumu­
lated delay and repeated lack in a way that is foreshadowed, en 
abyme, from the start: having missed his first train because of a 
lackadaisical approach to scheduling, the narrator also misses the 
second, having become involved while waiting in the pleasures of 
flanerie with a friend encountered on the boulevard. The two are 
thus anuites, as they say, "adjourned for the night" with time on 
their hands, and their response is to fill this potentially endless, 
Shandyan time of deferral with further flanerie. On the first night 
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this takes the typically Parisian form of strolling the streets in 
search of a likely place for a late-night supper, interminably putting 
off the decision until they end up in a low-class dive in the Halles 
("chez Paul Niquet"). Thus is launched a narrative in which events, 
observations, conversations, and subjective impressions follow 
one another in an aimless, nonteleological and nonhierarchized 
way—nothing is more important than anything else, nothing ad­
vances the narrative toward what is in any case its anticlimactic 
conclusion. 
Engaged in a story that borders on pointlessness, the narrator 
has a problem to deal with: how to attract and maintain his 
audience's attention for an account that has no point except its own 
insignificance. His solution will be an art of temporization, a 
technique characteristic of paid-by-the-column feuilleton writing 
which Nerval had already demonstrated, con brio, in "Les Faux-
Saulniers" (1850). Temporizing is the check-is-in-the-mail tactic: in 
lieu of what the audience expects and wants (in this case an ending-
oriented story leading to the closure of, as Nerval puts it, either a 
wedding or a death), a substitute satisfaction is provided, but of 
such a patently inadequate kind that it generates a whole series of 
such substitutes. The audience becomes prey to the "just one more" 
or the "bowl of cherries" syndrome: pointless and deficiently 
pleasurable as any given narrative moment may be, it offers just 
enough "satisfaction" to keep the reader reading. There is always 
hope (which always proves vain) that the next moment will bring a 
more substantial satisfaction. This is a narrative practice known to 
us these days through much radio and TV programming; and it has 
the characteristic feature of producing a strict equivalence between 
the experience of open, linear temporality and that of desire, 
structured by lack, as Lacan has it, into an endless metonymic 
chain of substitute "satisfactions." 
It is worth noting that the narrator has rather deliberately chosen 
to put himself in this situation. If one is invited to an otter hunt in 
Greil, one can take the Northern railroad direct (even though it 
describes a long curve that Nerval ascribes on other occasions to 
real estate speculation: modernity is efficient, but not direct enough 
• 24 • 
Strolling, Touring, Cruising 
to abolish time altogether).n It is quite willful, therefore, to choose, 
as this traveler does, to take the Strasbourg road to Meaux, with the 
idea of strolling through the Valois, traveling by coach to Dammar-
tin, through the forest of Ermenonville on foot for three hours, 
following the course of the Nonette to Senlis, and from there by 
coach again to Creil (chapter 22). This is a way of traveling without 
leaving home—the narrator insists from the start on the proximity 
of the Valois to Paris—while nevertheless generating something (an 
Erfahrung) to narrate. But as a narrator, too, this willful loiterer has 
deliberately opted for the difficulties of temporization over the 
easier, and expected, method of telling a suspenseful story. In this, 
he says, he is emulating a prolix orator described censoriously by 
Cicero who cannot say that his client left town without describing 
him waking, rising, setting forth, taking the right side of the via 
Flaminia and crossing the bath-house square—and never reaching 
the port. He has also been inspired by an account of London 
nightlife by Dickens: "How fortunate the English are to be able to 
write and to read chapters of observation completely unalloyed by 
fictional invention. . . . Our neighbors' sense of realism is content 
with truth in the absolute" (1). But Londoners, the narrator grum­
bles, are much freer than Parisians: they have a house key ("La clef 
de la rue" is the title of the Dickens piece) and so can wander their 
city at night without fear of having to affront a censorious con­
cierge. Our narrator is simply taking for himself la clef de la rue, 
and—since after the first night his story shifts to the country—la 
clef des champs as well. 
Expressing disapproval of the hated "portier" as a figure of 
social authority is not the only risk the narrator knows he is taking. 
Like Nodier in Le roi de Boheme et ses sept chateaux, he imagines the 
unfriendly review his trivial narrative is likely to draw from an 
idealist critic (the kind whose doctrine is that "truth lies in falsity" 
[21]). More alarmingly, he is arrested at Crespy by a gendarme who 
discovers that the man who culpably misses trains also absent­
mindedly leaves his travel passport at the hotel in Meaux, and who 
is unconvinced by the story that one might travel from Paris via 
Meaux to an otter hunt in Creil. Why travel east to reach the north? 
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Such a loiterly traveler is clearly suspect, and in the nightmare that 
attends his night in prison, he is hauled before what can only be 
described as a disciplinary tribunal that reminds him of sitting for 
the baccalaureate en Sorbonne ("the president looked uncannily like 
M. Nisard; the two assessors resembled M. Cousin and M. Guizot, 
my old teachers")* They hurl epithets at him: "Realist! Fantaisiste! 
Essayist!" until finally he cracks: 
"Confiteorl plangor! jurol . .  . —I swear to renounce these works 
accursed of the Sorbonne and the Institute: from now on I shall write 
only history, philosophy, philology and statistics. . . . You seem 
dubious. . . . Very well, I'll write virtuous bucolic romances, I'll try 
to win poetry prizes and prizes for good morals, I'll write children's 
books and abolitionist essays, didactic poems . . . tragedies!" (25) 
His crime is that of being simultaneously realistic and unserious; in 
another register, Nervate passionate apologia in Aurelia for the 
rights of madness against the strictures of psychiatric medicine is 
foreshadowed here. 
For this narrator is no examinee and even less an examiner, and 
his conversion to disciplined knowledge and structured plots takes 
place—revealingly enough—only in a dream. A simple observer, an 
impressionist, he has views, like his friend, de omnis rebus scibilis, 
but his attention span is short and his interest is easily diverted. 
Like Dante and Virgil, the two friends descend into the night world 
of Paris: we catch glimpses of various cafes, goguettes, and dives 
and snatches of slangy, trivial conversation. Brief streetscapes open 
up ("adultery, crime and weakness jostle without recognizing one 
another through the deceptive shadows" [10]; "on the right are the 
leech-sellers; the other side is taken up by Raspail pharmacies and 
cider-stands" [11]; "what a lot of cauliflower in this street" [14]). The 
initiatory motif of the descent into the underworld informs us that 
the nature of true knowledge is at issue, but Nervate mystic 
concerns are under wraps here in favor of the practice of flaneur 
realism. This is not incompatible with the fact that, as the external 
action shifts to the Valois, the focus of the narrative comes to fall 
predominantly on the contents of the narrator's mind (for in loiterly 
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texts, the question of the flaneur's identity is always, covertly or 
overtly, at issue, in view of his self-definition as a man given over, 
like Baudelaire's "homme des foules," to the exploration of alterity). 
Thus the nightmare of the third night is preceded on the second by 
a bad dream in which Fichtean gnomes hammer at the narrator's 
brain in an attempt to rearrange the deranged structure of his 
consciousness. But there is also a wonderful page of pure visual 
impressionism, as the narrator wakes after his disturbed night to 
sit by the Marne and await his morning coffee, in that absent mood 
we all know so well: 
People are beginning to come across the bridge; it has eight spans by 
my count. The Marne is marnense, of course; but at the moment it has 
a leaden sheen ruffled occasionally by currents from the mills, or, 
further away, the playful swoop of swallows. 
Will it rain this evening? (20) 
The major encounter of this section, however, symmetrical to 
the fellowship of the narrator with his friend in the first part of the 
text, is with a group of saltimbanks or strolling entertainers, two 
Savoyards passing respectively for an Italian tenor and a Spanish 
dancer, and an alleged "monstre" or freak, a "merino woman" who 
hails from Venice and whose woolly hair, the narrator speculates, is 
a genetic throwback to some kind of African ancestry. These folk 
stand, obviously, for the strangeness of the real in its most everyday 
manifestations (the flaneur's stock-in-trade), and doubtless also for 
the tricks of art, since their art—like the narrator's—consists of 
unstructured, episodic entertainment (first an aria, then a cachuca, 
then the freak), and appeals to an audience as idle as its performers 
are shiftless. As the narrator of October Nights has a flaneur for his 
friend, partner, and philosophical alter ego, so the flaneur's own 
artistic counterpart is the wandering street entertainer, whether 
saltimbank or conjurer. For the friend was already described in 
these terms: 
He will stop for an hour at the door of the bird-merchant's store, 
attempting to understand the language of birds. . . . No group gath­
ers around some work-site or bootblack-seller, no fisticuffs occur, no 
..
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dog-fight happens, without his distracted contemplation taking it in. 
The conjurer always borrows his handkerchief, which he sometimes 
has, or the five-franc coin, which he doesn't always have. (2) 
The hint of complicity here is unmistakable: if the conjurer engages 
in sleight-of-hand, the flaneur-narrator is a trickster too, in his 
way: his art of narrative temporizing "deceives" desire as the 
escamoteur deceives the eye, and the art of programming the 
reader's or spectator's idle attention, from turn to turn or from 
moment to moment, is common to both. Not surprisingly, we will 
find Colette's narrator-protagonist, Renee Nere, among music-hall 
artistes, an artiste herself, waiting her turn to take the stage after the 
performing dogs, the chanteuse, and the acrobats. 
Touring 
While Nerval's narrative starts with a missed train, The Vagabond 
(1910) begins with Renee arriving early at the theater and finding 
herself "prete trop tot," ready too soon.12 She has time on her hands 
as well, but for reasons and with historical implications diametri­
cally opposed to those of Nerval's flaneur. The latter, in his con­
tempt for schedules, shows himself a belated figure, behind the 
times; Renee is a New Woman, too early because she is struggling 
for emancipation from domesticity in a society that, as yet, scarcely 
has a place for her. Consequently, existence in time is, for her, 
experienced as a matter of deep insecurity, not only financial but 
also ontological: "Why are you there, all alone? and why not 
somewhere else?" she asks herself (4), and later comments anx­
iously, "How quickly everything changes, especially women" (88). 
Her problem is not that she is suspect as a loiterer but that she 
needs steady and honorable work; and if going on tour figures for 
her what strolling through the city and its near countryside repre­
sents in Nerval, the act of travel without leaving home, that phrase 
now has a negative ring, signifying the inability her anxiety betrays 
to escape the law of domesticity that imprisons women. For her life 
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in the theater involves difficult compromises that are figured 
implicitly by her metier as an Apache dancer (the woman brutal­
ized by the male, and performing fluttering steps of attempted 
escape), and explicitly by the tour through the provinces she 
undertakes, circling back in due course to Paris: "tourner," for her, 
is "tourner sur place," "revolving on the spot like my companions 
and brethren" (67). 
There she is, then, ready too early. The consequence is a split 
identity, but one less metaphysically described than the Fichtean 
problematic Nerval evokes. Her alternative is between an absurd 
and lonely existence in pure time ("Why are you there, all alone? 
And why not somewhere else?") and the personage she sees in the 
mirror and calls her "conseillere maquillee" [painted mentor] (3), 
that is, her entertainer's personality garishly made up for perfor­
mance, a seductive self devoted to entertaining the crowd whose 
work is the condition for the freedom the lonely self finds at once so 
precious and so burdensome. It is Renee's need for diversion from 
this intimate dialogue that accounts for the aspect of the book that 
most resembles the genre of flaneur realism and situates it as 
loiterature, despite its novelistic plot: Renee is a steady-eyed, 
unjudgmental observer of the backstage existence of music-hall 
performers, their poverty, courage, and pride, their makeshift 
conditions of life, their colorful language and sometimes easy 
morality, but also their hard work and devotion to their art—their 
life of instability that prompts her comment: "How quickly every­
thing changes . . ." Declassee as she is by her employment, Renee 
shares the flaneur's traditional sympathy for the life of the under­
class, along with his ability, as an educated member of the middle 
class, to represent its color and pathos for a similarly middle-class 
audience. In this too she is a creature of compromise. 
The compromise of her existence becomes a crisis of choice, 
however, on the occasion of the love affair that introduces narrative 
interest and plot: will Renee's affair with Dufferein-Chautel, affec­
tionately known as "le Grand Serin" or the Big Noodle, end—as 
Nerval would phrase it—in marriage? One of the few employment 
choices available to a "dame seule" is work in the theater, as Renee 
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explains: "What would you have me do? Sewing, or typing, or 
streetwalking? The music hall is the job [le metier] of those who 
never learnt one" (134)—of those, that is, who have been excluded 
from the privileges of discipline. Renee, in short, is exploiting for 
employment purposes the seductive art she learned as a wife 
(knowing how to use her tears of pain, for instance, to make herself 
look beautiful). But for that very reason, her theatrical art jeopar­
dizes the freedom of which it is also a condition, exposing her not 
only to the sexual advances of men (which she knows how to 
handle) but, more dangerously, to the temptation to return to the 
security—as well as the pain—of a conforming position in the 
patriarchal order as a married woman. This temptation is repre­
sented by the marriageable Dufferein-Chautel ("he looks married 
already" [102]), who is drawn to her by her stage performance, with 
his "ridiculous name, the sort of name for a member of Parliament 
or an industrialist, or a director of a discount bank" (100), but also 
with his ready assumption of male authority. Renee knows that she 
will not necessarily be reduced, as in her previous marriage, to 
being a kind of go-between in her husband's extramarital affairs; 
but she is also aware that marriage "turns so many wives into a sort 
of nanny for grown-ups" (137). Her little dog Fossette (the reference 
is to a fetching dimple) stands for the strength of the impulse in her 
to revert to the life of a "submissive bitch, rather shame-faced, 
rather cowed, very much petted, and ready to accept the leash, the 
collar, the place at her master's feet, and everything" (120). 
Renee, then, has only a choice of compromises: freedom with 
insecurity, or security with the leash—and the opportunity to 
write. Once a quite successful novelist, Renee's new loiterly, "too 
soon" existence is one in which, paradoxically, she has no time for 
writing, since earning a living means being subject to constant 
distraction and interruption: 
It takes up too much time to write. And the trouble is, I am no Balzac! 
The fragile story I am constructing crumbles away when the trades­
man rings, or the shoemaker sends in his bill, when the solicitor, or 
one's counsel, telephones, or when the theatrical agent summons me 
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to his office for a "social engagement at the house of some people of 
good position but not in the habit of paying large fees/' (12) 
Consequently her eventual return to writing, coinciding with her 
return to Paris, her rejection of the Big Noodle, and her implied 
acceptance of the loiterly life that is defined by interruption, is—as 
Nancy Miller has pointed out—the key to the book. Her return is 
also a renaissance (as her name foreshadows), since the writing to 
which she returns is not the writing she left behind her in her 
bourgeois existence. It is the writing, as Miller eloquently pro­
poses, of a "feminist" (and I would add "loiterly") subjectivity, one 
that has renounced the illusions of the bourgeois self and knows 
itself "subject to change." Miller rightly emphasizes that the letter 
of rejection for Dufferein-Chautel that Renee brings back to Paris 
with her is described as "unfinished" (214). But because it is unfin­
ished, and corresponding as it does to the anticlimactic ending of 
the missed otter hunt in Nerval, this letter cannot signify a resolu­
tion of Renee's identity problematic. It means only that, for now, she 
has chosen between her two compromises and opted for the one 
that associates independence and freedom with, on the one hand, 
insecurity and, on the other, the deployment of ''feminine" attrac­
tiveness, the conditions of her "too soon" existence. 
My proposal is that the writing she returns to incorporates a 
similar compromise and is epitomized in the novel itself: it accom­
modates the problematic split in Renee's identity in the (mixed) 
genre of the "loiterly novel," exactly that impure "alloy" Nerval 
sought to avoid, a compromise between pure observation in the 
digressive, interrupted flow of a narrative of temporality, and 
fictional invention, sentimental interest, and the seductions of plot. 
Such writing indicates that Renee's renaissance derives from her 
discovery and acceptance of the implications of being "no Balzac ." 
Writing need not ignore interruption but can accommodate to it 
and incorporate it; it need not have the monumental character of the 
Comedie humaine but can be, in exactly Blanchot's sense, a matter of 
desoeuvrement, of that "crumbling" of the edifice that loiterature as 
counterdiscursive narrative seeks not to resist or to deny, but to 
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assume and deploy as a tactic of oppositionality—a tactic whose 
success depends, however, on obtaining the pleasurable assent of 
its audience. 
Part of the compromise Renee invents involves plot, then, but 
another part involves finding a place in her writing for triviality. 
Early in the piece, she is tongue-tied when she seeks to represent 
herself to Dufferein-Chautel, hesitating between her "own personal 
language/' which she describes as that of "a one-time blue-stocking," 
and "the slovenly, lively idiom, coarse and picturesque, which one 
learns in the music-hall, sprinkled with expressions like: 'You bet!' 
'Shut up!' I '  m clearing out!' 'Not my line!'" ["Tu paries!'' "Ta 
gueule!" "J'les mets!" "Tres peu pour moi!"] (77-78). This is exactly 
the linguistic alloy of writerly distinction and colloquial vulgarity 
that we discover in the writing of The Vagabond, but it is Renee's 
dancing, as an art of the body ("Nothing is real except making 
rhythm of one's thought and translating it into beautiful gestures" 
[41]), that has taught her that it is possible to make art out of the 
trivial. And as Renee becomes aware when she dances for a society 
gathering (i.e. in exactly the circumstances she evoked when 
complaining of the interruptions that constitute the life of an 
artiste), dancing embodies a compromise between the freedom of a 
woman's body and an art intended to be seductive to the powerful 
(and specifically to Renee's own former set): 
Is not the mere swaying of my back [nn coup de reins], free from any 
constraint, an insult to those bodies cramped by their long corsets, 
and enfeebled by a fashion which insists that they should be thin? 
But there is something more worth while than humiliating them; I 
want, for one moment only, to charm them [les seduire]. It needs only 
a little more effort: already their heads, under the weight of their 
jewels and their hair, sway vaguely as they obediently follow my 
movements. At any moment now the vindictive light in all those eyes 
will go out, and the charmed creatures will all give in and smile at the 
same time. (41-42) 
By the time she is ready to negotiate her tournee with the 
theatrical agent who stands as another figure of the social (here 
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economic) conditions of Renee's independence (and who is, of 
course, the personage mentioned in the earlier passage about 
interruptions), she has lost her linguistic inhibitions—"I have 
found my voice again and the art of using it, and the right 
vocabulary [i.e. a suitably salty one] for the occasion" (92)—and it 
is not accidental that what is at issue here is a contract. Renee's 
loiterly art will be subject to a contractual obligation—the aesthetic 
obligation to be "charming" to the bourgeoisie—in a way that is 
modeled by the financial haggling that governs the limited free­
dom of her "escape" to the provinces, on tour. 
There is a name that might be given to the set of compromises 
Renee finally opts for, including the compromise formation that is 
her writing; it is metier. In order for a woman to be free of the 
domestic leash, she must be employed, and metier names the only 
kind of employment for which, as a middle-class woman, she is 
suited: not the discipline of the factory floor or the professional 
disciplines of knowledge, but "le metier de ceux qui n'en ont appris 
aucun," a job one can learn by doing it, under a sort of (pre- or extra-
disciplinary) apprenticeship system. For metier also names the 
artistic know-how one can acquire with hard work and under the 
guidance of a strict mentor, like Renee's partner Brague, from one's 
actual, "hands-on" contact with the world of the theater: in re­
hearsal, from observation of the audience, and from watching one's 
fellow performers. But metier finally, in the music hall and perhaps 
the theater generally, is the art of crowd-pleasing, the tricks of the 
trade that bring the audience back every Saturday night for more. It 
designates the theatrical seductiveness Renee must deploy as well 
as the means of livelihood that ensure her relative independence. In 
that sense it confirms what Renee's tour also teaches her, that 
although one can travel without leaving home, it is the impos­
sibility of ever quite leaving "home"—and everything that word 
implies, for a woman—that governs the degree of travel one can 
achieve. "I am going away," she writes to Max at the end; but she 
thinks: "I am escaping, but I am still not free of you, I know it. A 
vagabond, and free, I shall sometimes long for the shade of your 
walls" (215). 
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Cruising 
How, then, to "lose oneself in the city"? And what has that to do 
with knowledge? Who Was That Man? has an interesting epigraph 
drawn from Benjamin: "Not to find one's way in a city may well be 
uninteresting and banal. It requires ignorance, nothing more. But 
to lose oneself in a city . . . " I would draw out the implications of 
this epigraph as follows: if Renee Nere experiences her freedom as 
solitude and is consequently forced into a compromise with the 
society that limits that freedom, her problem grows out of igno-
rance—ignorance, that is, of any community to which she is 
connected—the community, say, of other independent women 
attempting to survive on their own terms. Knowledge of a commu­
nity is unlikely, however, to be a disciplinary knowledge, if only 
because discipline begins by separating its subjects in space, like 
soldiers on the parade ground, so as to turn them into autonomous 
individuals. Because it seeks on the one hand to promote "self­
reliance," and on the other to instil conformity, discipline is anti-
communitarian.13 And community is therefore likely to be the 
experience, and the source of identity, of those who are excluded 
from disciplinary subjecthood. 
The model for such people is therefore, in Bartlett's book, the 
sexual cruiser, seen as one who seeks identity, as knowledge of 
"self," in a community formed through identification with others, 
through "losing one's self' in a "city." Identity here is not a matter of 
individuality but of connectedness, in which both self and other, 
being mutually defining, exist only as members of a community. 
"I've come to understand," Bartlett writes, "that I am connected 
with other men's lives, men living in London with me." But he adds: 
"Or with other, dead Londoners. That's the story" (xx). The story, in 
other words, is not only that personal identity—in this case, for gay 
men—is indistinguishable from belonging to a community but also 
that the community extends into the past. Historically, gay identity 
emerged in London simultaneously with the constitution of a 
community of gay men; that is why a Londoner living in 1986 is 
connected with men who lived in 1895, the date of Oscar Wilde's 
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trial. And the reason it is important to establish this historical 
connection, as the book does, is that in producing Wilde individu­
ally as a homosexual the trial functioned—in typically disciplinary 
fashion (i.e. as a kind of examination)—precisely to obscure his 
membership in a community, and hence to deny the existence of a 
specifically gay identity as a communitarian phenomenon. 
London's present cruising grounds, then, were already cruising 
grounds a century ago, and the streets have a memory. "What if I 
rounded the corner of Villiers St at midnight," Bartlett writes, "and 
suddenly found myself walking by gas-light, and the man looking 
over his shoulder at me as he passed had the same moustache, but dif­
ferent clothes . . . would we recognize each other?7' (xx). In this ques­
tion of recognition lies the kinship of the historian and the cruiser: the 
power of recognizing the self in the other makes both historian and 
cruising man—or, of course, woman—into constructors (for the his­
torian, reconstructors) of community. And recognition is crucial be­
cause the social conditions of cruising are such that it cannot be a sys­
tematic activity: there is no way of identifying "gay men" unless they 
identify themselves; they are not available, as gay men, for the kind of 
disciplinary examination by which "homosexuals" are identified. 
Cruising can only discover, through recognition, a covert commu­
nity in a random way. For similar reasons, the historical cruiser is 
forced to be an unmethodical searcher, looking for "evidence" (and 
hoping to recognize it) wherever and however it might turn up. 
In this unpredictability sexual and historical cruisers have much 
in common with the activity of "collecting"; but like collectors, 
cruisers of knowledge are also driven, obsessive figures, creatures 
of desire, always in search of one more "item." Because it is driven 
by desire, there is no end to their work and they are therefore never 
in a position to systematize finally or definitively what can appro­
priately be called their "findings," which remain just that: collec­
tions of "trouvailles." Between gay cruising literature like John 
Rechy's Numbers or Renaud Camus's Tricks, and loiterly history like 
Walter Benjamin's Passagenwerk (a collection of quotations) or 
Georges Perec's Je me souviens (a collection of memories that have 
the specific quality of being both trivial and nonpersonal, or 
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collective), there are consequently "recognizable" structural and 
epistemological similarities that imply a generic relationship. Bart-
lett's book—the record of intense cruising not in Villiers St. but in 
the British Library—lies somewhere between the two groups. And 
what is a genre if not itself an assemblage or collection of texts, each 
"recognizable" in spite of dissimilarities as members of a commu-
nity—an assemblage carried out, as Anne Freadman insists, as a 
function of some specific motivation and in a clearly contex­
tualized, situated way? 
There is a deliberate rejection in this genre of a certain narrative 
structure that is itself a structuring of history, and of its implica­
tions. Two narrative models are available to gay people, as Bartlett 
points out (23-24). One is the coming-out story, with its firm 
narrative structure of "before" and "after," a beginning and an end 
mediated by a crucial event that has the status of an emergence of 
truth. A coming-out story can be either individual or collective, 
and Wilde's coming out—more accurately his involuntary "out-
ing"—functions as both. But the closed structure of such a narra­
tive makes it exclusionary, and Bartlett's study of the 1895 trial 
demonstrates that the outing of Wilde had as its unacknowledged 
purpose to silence gay voices that were beginning to be heard, to 
force back into invisibility and oblivion the community of gay men 
that had begun to emerge—of "gay men," not just of men with 
homosexual desires, a distinction that hangs significantly on their 
communitarian invention of signs of recognition, such as Wilde's 
green carnation or the moustache in Villiers St. But the cruising 
story, the obsessive collection of scraps of forgotten history, makes 
use of just such signs of recognition in order to undo the effect of 
exclusionary and scapegoating stories constructed by the powers 
that be. Thus Bartlett notices that men like Arthur Symonds and 
Edward Carpenter were already, long before him, engaging in the 
"inspired queenly assemblage of fragments" of gay history (227), 
and I, in turn, have just pointed out that such cruiser-historians 
form part of a larger counterdisciplinary epistemological commu­
nity of (re-)collectors of the past that includes Perec and Benjamin. 
The point, then, as Bartlett points out, is that "it never is in all the 
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papers" (125): the official story always needs supplementation by 
the collector, looking for the forgotten but telling scraps. "What I 
want are details, details are the only things of interest" (159). "I read 
texts with the dogged energy that I usually reserve for cruising; I 
became excited by the smallest hints; I scrutinized every gesture 
for significance; sometimes I simply stood close and waited for a 
response" (28). The outcome of working principles such as these is 
a book whose pages often seem to reproduce the bulletin board in 
the author's room: "On my wall a handsome face is pasted up next 
to a fragment from a novel, next to the latest report of an arrest or a 
persecution" (96); quotations from a range of nineteenth-century 
sources, personal observations about gay life in modern London, 
and analytic commentary coexist on the page; a chapter on flowers 
as recognition-signals includes the story of one Private Flower who 
was arrested for "cottaging" in the 1830s. Bartlett puts together a 
portrait gallery of men's faces and a glossary of historical gay slang 
omitted from the OED-, he rejoices that at the Wilde trial "the 
prosecution assembled one of the most extensive and glamorous 
collections of details about our life" (99), but he also assembles 
counterevidence of the energy and vividness of gay life in the years 
between the trial of Boulton and Parks (alias Stella and Fanny) in 
1870 and the Wilde trial, in the form of a year-by-year "calendar" of 
quotations and cuttings that extends over twenty-five pages. 
A scrapbook such as this, says Bartlett, is "the true form of our 
history" (99). Because "our past is continually lost" (59), it is 
necessary to make good the omissions; "because the clues change" 
(63) and recognition is therefore always aleatory, no truth claim can 
be made or conclusions safely drawn. The scrapbook "embodies in 
its own omissions how we remember and forget our lives. We are 
always between ignorance and exposure" (99); but in doing so it 
nevertheless demonstrates that "the past is still with us" (82). Like 
the cruiser hunting familiar streets that harbor memories of dead 
Londoners, the scrapbook's demonstration of the proximity of past 
and present represents another sense in which the loiterer's experi­
ence consists of traveling without leaving home; Such Erfahrung is 
exhilarating—but its dependence on recognition also makes its 
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epistemological status dubious, as Bartlett emphasizes. After all, as 
Oscar Wilde's "composing" of a new identity after 1895 demon­
strates, gay men are given to "making it all up as we go along" (170­
71); moreover, in a way foreshadowed by Wilde's story "The Portrait 
of Mr. W. H.," the whole enterprise of the "recollection" of gay 
culture and community raises the question whether it is perhaps 
all a fantasy, fueled only by desire. "My father always said, if you're 
not sure if it's the real thing, then it isn't" (189). And collecting, as 
an activity of knowledge, has exclusionary implications of its own: 
it takes place "within a specific economy" (186) of class and 
privilege and is dependent on one's having "discretionary income" 
and (something Bartlett does not specifically mention although it is 
everywhere implied) time and leisure. Who can otherwise afford to 
spend an idle bank holiday weekend ("I wasn't working, and it was 
the first good weather of the year") and then return to the library, as 
Bartlett describes himself doing (125-26)? 
What matters here is not the incompleteness of the scrapbook 
method, or the dubious objectivity of an epistemological "hunt" 
motivated by desire, or the dependency of this activity on specific 
social conditions. What does matter is the dubiousness of claims to 
completeness and objectivity, and of narratives that mask their 
socially positioned status with implied or explicit truth claims. It is 
in not making such claims, and in making its specific position of 
enunciation readable in historical, economic, and cultural terms by 
its careful exploration of the conditions of gay male life as Bartlett 
knows them in modern London, that this loiterly narrative makes 
its own epistemological point. In so doing, it makes the point for 
loiterature in general, whose doubtful reliability in matters of 
information and whose class ties to the bourgeoisie and its history 
scarcely need to be indicated. It is not that such features are 
invalidating, but that their visibility questions the assumptions by 
virtue of which they might be invalidated. Such assumptions are 
those of disciplinarity, whose epistemological reliance on exam­
ination presupposes the separability of (examining) subject and 
(examined) object. Claims to dispassionate objectivity rest on such 
assumptions of separability, assumptions which themselves derive 
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from a concept of individual identity as autonomous, unconnected, 
not dependent on the alterity of a community in which it is possible 
to "lose oneself/one's self." 
But when Bartlett writes simply: ''It's quite true, I am other 
people" (205), he is echoing flaneur-knowledge that goes back at 
least to Nerval's "I am the other" (a phrase he scribbled on a portrait 
of himself), or to Baudelaire's definition of the flaneur (itself de­
rived from Poe) as 'Thomine des foules," the man of the crowd.14 As 
visible as are the class differences in Nerval's account of Parisian 
lowlife and Colette's reportage on the backstage life of the music hall, 
there is also a sense of community in these texts—of the commu­
nity of society's misfits, underlings, and rejects—that draws a line 
from Nerval's preoccupation with alter egos (the Parisian friend, 
the saltimbanks), through the comradeship celebrated in Colette's 
novel, to Bartlett's "I am connected with other men's lives." That 
statement is embroiled in gendered blindness, just as those of 
Nerval and Colette are embroiled in the limitations of class, but all 
of them can be rephrased as: I am connected with other lives. 
Although I cannot demonstrate the point at length here (part of 
the argument is in Werner Hamacher's distinction between ratio 
and lectio and elements of another part are in Room for Maneuver),151 
want to enter the claim in conclusion that "reading" is the name 
that can most appropriately be given to the mode of loiterly knowl­
edge that enacts identity as connectedness and questions the 
assumptions underlying disciplinary "examination" Where an 
examiner is focused on an examinee as an other to be dispas­
sionately assessed in terms of a set of disciplinary "norms," the 
reader is the site of a more intimate and less certain experience— 
that of a recognition, mediated by much less assured "signs" or 
"tokens/' in which it is through the other that the reading subject 
becomes known. In reading, the "object" must be recognized as 
a(nother) subject at the same time as subjectivity is itself experi­
enced, not as in-dividual, but as split, because necessarily pro­
duced through that other's mediation. 
In Bartlett's text, the narratee is consistently produced as a 
reader in this sense, because the narrative deploys the pronouns of 
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address, "we" and "you/' as pronouns of community, inviting the 
addressee to confirm the narrator's own recognitions by recogniz­
ing in turn, as tokens of gay identity, his various "findings." Earlier 
loiterly narrators, such as those in Nerval and Colette, are readers 
of the discourse of the world much like the more familiar Bau­
delairean flaneur; they are always confronted with a fragmentary 
text, or a haphazard series of partial texts, that they cannot or do 
not seek to master, because, in ways both obscure and evident, they 
have a sense of their own inescapable investment and involvement 
in the "object," the connectedness of "I" and "not-I." "Always ready 
too soon," Renee Nere responds by reading: "I'd better open the 
book lying on the make-up shelf . .  . or the copy of Paris-Sport the 
dresser was marking just now with my eyebrow-pencil; otherwise 
I'll find myself all alone" (3). 
If the proximity of city and countryside in Nerval and Colette 
and that of present and past in Bartlett are the conditions for 
traveling without leaving home, then reading, as the experience of 
the proximity of I and not-I, is the paradigmatic form of that loiterly 
Erfahrung. Our theories of reading do not much stress that it is, in 
essence (but "essence" is not the word), an experience of the 
inevitably temporal constitution of a mediated, and so split, subjec-
tivity—one that knows itself only in and through the other. But 
temporality is also what the loiterer knows best, and it is inescapa­
bly the dimension of experience implied by the contraction of space 
that conditions travel without leaving home. "With time," reads the 
first sentence of October Nights, "the passion for long trips fades." 
One might equally say that it is with the fading of the passion for 
long trips that knowledge, as the Erfahrung of time, begins. 
Notes 
1. Walter Benjamin, 'The Storyteller/' in Illuminations. 
2. This essay is partly programmatic and partly exploratory: it is not 
meant to be exhaustive or even thorough but to introduce a few ideas for 
discussion. I plan to expand in later work on a number of points that are 
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made briefly here. 
3. See Narrative Exchanges. 
4. See Ross Chambers, Story and Situation and Room for Maneuver. 
5. I intend the term "counterdisciplinary" to locate the narrative genre 
that is my subject as counterdiscourse in Richard Terdiman's sense of the 
word. See his Discourse/Counterdiscourse. 
6. See Le recit excentrique. 
7. See Maurice Blanchot, L'Espace litteraire. Translator Ann Smock 
comments on the word desoeuvrement on p. 13. See in particular "1/experi-
ence de Mallarme," 30-42 (trans. 38-48) and "Le regard d'Orphee," 179-84 
(171-76). In Lost beyond Telling, Richard Stamelman translates desoeuvrement 
as "worklessness" (46). 
8. Michel de Certeau, Arts de faire. 
9. See in particular de Certeau's discussion of tactics as opposed to 
strategy, 21 (trans, p. xix). 
10. All translations are mine, and for the convenience of users of other 
editions I refer in parentheses to chapter numbers, not pages. On Les Nuits 
d'Octohre, see Ross Chambers, chapter 9 of Gerard de Nerval et la poetique du 
voyage, and Daniel Sangsue, 360-64. 
11. On this question, see my Gerard de Nerval et la poetique du voyage, 
329-30. 
12. Page numbers in parentheses refer to the Ballantine edition. I have 
sometimes silently emended the translation. 
1^. As my discussion of Bartlett's book will confirm, I do not conceive 
community either as a matter of conformity (the totalitarian model) or as a 
contractual phenomenon (between "individuals'7 and "society"), but as a 
function of the recognition of self in alterity and so of a mediated play of 
differences. For theoretical work along these lines, see Miami Theory 
Collective, ed., Community at Loose Ends, work that is itself broadly inspired 
by Jean-Luc Nancy, La Communaute desoeuvree. 
14. See Charles Baudelaire, "Le peintre de la vie moderne." 
15. Werner Hamacher, "Lectio: de Man's Imperative." More broadly 
relevant is Michel de Certeau's characterization of reading, in The Practice of 
Everyday Life, as a loiterly practice, like "walking through the city": "to read 
is to wander through an imposed system" (169). 
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Generic and Doctrinal Politics in 
the Proletarian Bildungsroman 
B A R B A R  A FOLE Y 
My topic in this essay is the relationship between form and politics 
in the left-wing fiction produced in the United States during the 
Depression. In particular, I wish to examine the usability of the 
form of the bildungsroman for revolutionary political ends. Many 
Depression-era writers turned to the developing form of the "col­
lective" novel, as well as to the testimonial form of the fictional 
autobiography, which was closely tied to the worker-authored 
"sketch" celebrated in the Soviet Union (Foley). But large numbers 
of left-wing novelists opted for what critics of the time called 
"conversion plots" and wrote what were essentially proletarian 
bildungsromans—accounts of the process whereby a non-class-
conscious worker develops into a seasoned and committed fighter 
for the proletariat. These writers were thus attempting to adapt to 
radical ends a genre that is often seen as the most typically 
bourgeois of novelistic modes. 
What are the consequences and implications of this choice? Did 
the "conversion plot" serve proletarian writers well, supplying—as 
Georg Lukacs would argue—a generic model that would dialec­
tically embody the broad contradictions of history in a single 
concrete instance? Or did the use of the bildungsroman format 
doom these writers in advance by committing them to an irre­
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mediably bourgeois set of assumptions about character and con­
sciousness? Or was form essentially irrelevant, with doctrinal 
politics or "line" the crucial determinant of political effect in the 
proletarian bildungsroman? Addressing these issues is important, 
not only for an understanding of what 1930s proletarian writers 
were doing, but also for an appreciation of the issues facing other 
groupings of writers today who are variously termed "opposi­
tional," "marginalized," and "subaltern." 
I shall first examine the estimate of inherited narrative forms 
and the attitude toward "propaganda" in literature that were preva­
lent among the 1930s Marxist critics. Next, I shall summarize the 
critique of novelistic realism that has attained widespread currency 
among contemporary critics. Next will come an analysis of a 
paradigmatic proletarian bildungsroman, Myra Page's Moscow Yan­
kee, followed by a glance at Tillie Olsen's Yonnondio, a novel that 
departs significantly, in both structure and rhetoric, from the 
standard bildungsroman format. On the basis of this brief theoreti­
cal, historical, and textual commentary, I shall offer some conclu­
sions about the relation of generic to doctrinal politics in the 
proletarian bildungsroman. I shall be navigating some difficult 
terminological waters, since the two key terms under scrutiny, 
"bildungsroman" and (especially) "realism," have been subjected 
to multiple significations. Moreover, while clearly related both 
theoretically and historically, these two concepts cannot simply be 
conflated. I attempt to retain an alertness to nuances and distinc­
tions in the deployment of these terms as I draw some general 
conclusions about the relation of politics to novelistic form. 
Those proletarian novelists who turned to the classically realis­
tic genre of the bildungsroman were hardly working against the 
grain of contemporaneous U.S. Marxist theory about politics and 
form. Most reviewers and critics writing in the New Masses and the 
various organs of the John Reed Clubs proclaimed themselves 
agnostic with regard to issues of genre and ideology. To be sure, 
some cultural commentators, like the editors of The Left, the journal 
of the John Reed Club of Davenport, Iowa, declared that "new 
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forms and techniques must be hammered out to express the fresh 
substance, the faster tempos and rhythms of the new world order" 
("Editorial" 3). Such novels as Dos Passos's USA trilogy, William 
Rollins's The Shadow Before, and Clara Weatherwax's prize-winning 
Marching! Marching!—all texts experimenting with innovative styles 
and structures designed to convey both conflict and totality—were 
greeted with enthusiasm in the left press (see Schneider, Adler, 
Basshe). But the literary left never theorized what was "experimen­
tal" about these texts or writers or held them up as models. In 
general, Marxist critics evinced little disquietude that inherited 
novelistic forms might come into the revolutionary camp trailing 
the mists of bourgeois ideology. When reviewers found fault with 
texts written in classically realistic modes—for instance, Grace 
Lumpkin's To Make My Bread, Fielding Burke's Call Home the Heart, 
Jack Conroy's A World to Win—they rarely developed a theoretical 
argument relating politics to genre (see Nadir, Jerome, Le Sueur). 
Granville Hicks, literary editor of the New Masses in the proletarian 
period, wrote a series of articles called "Revolution and the Novel" 
in which he argued that the novel form "lends itself to many 
purposes and all points of view." Even though the novel "has 
closely corresponded to the rise of the bourgeoisie and has fully 
expressed . . . the mind of the bourgeoisie," he argued, "it cannot 
be limited to one class" (19). In Hicks's view, proletarian novelists 
who opted for the form of the "biographical" novel ran no risk of 
reproducing bourgeois conceptions of subjectivity or experience. 
Indeed, while 1930s Marxists reacted positively to literary exper­
imentation, they generally discouraged writers from using tech­
niques that ruptured narrative illusion in order to call direct 
attention to political doctrine. Depression-era left-wing criticism is 
replete with approving references to texts that "weave" or "blend" pol­
itics into the tale of a character's attainment of class-consciousness. 
Contrary to the stereotype of the Communist critical commissar 
bludgeoning novelists into writing party propaganda, the typical 
1930s Marxist critic endorsed an aesthetic of seamless transpar­
ency, denigrating texts that engaged in "preaching," "editorializing," 
or "sloganeering." Even though the critics urged writers to create 
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texts that would be weapons in the class struggle, instilling revolu­
tionary optimism and representing the "way out" from the mis­
eries of capitalism, they chastised novelists who produced "the 
revolutionary equivalent of the Cinderella formula" (Calmer 17). 
"Tendentiousness" (a concept taking in a grab bag of rhetorical 
strategies and devices, from hectoring narrators to pontificating 
mentors to implausible "conversion" plots) was branded by "Stalin­
ists" and "Trotskyists" alike as "leftist" (see Murphy, Foley). The 
debates over documentarism, expressionism, and realism that 
filled the pages of Soviet and German left-wing journals were never 
fought out on U.S. soil. Indeed, both Brecht and Lukacs were 
relatively unknown to the American cultural left. But insofar as 
their antipathy to "leftism" led them to embrace a doctrine of 
showing rather than telling—a kind of left Jamesianism-—the Ameri­
can Marxists embraced, if only by default, an essentially Lukacsian 
conception of realism.1 
American Marxists of the 1930s would thus have been shocked if 
they were reincarnated as flies on the wall of a typical 1980s MLA 
session on the politics of novelistic realism. For the fundamental 
assumption guiding much—if not all—postmodernist discussion 
of the classical modes of realism is that they reproduce and support 
dominant ideology. As distilled in the work of two exemplary 
theorists, Catherine Belsey and Lennard J. Davis, the postmodern­
ist critique of realism makes three main points. First, realism 
privileges individual psychology and individual experience. Pro­
tagonists presumably serve as synecdoches for their time and 
place: the intensive totalities projected through the stories of their 
individual destinies embody in microcosm the extensive totalities 
of their social worlds. But these protagonists usually turn out to 
possess intrinsic qualities of "character" that are simply "revealed" 
through experience: in Catherine Belsey's formulation, "character, 
unified and coherent, is the source of action" (73). In the classic 
bildungsroman, as Lennard J. Davis puts it, "the idea that the 
subject might be formed from social forces and that change might 
have to come about through social change is by and large absent" 
(119). Protagonists are routinely portrayed as autonomous moral 
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agents, who end up either "reconciled to" or "pitted against" the 
social order. Second, realism purports to consider conflicting value 
systems, but at base it cannot tolerate contradiction. In particular, 
narrative closure operates as an ideological mechanism guarantee­
ing that disturbing issues are laid to rest and that competing 
discourses are subordinated to the text's hegemonic discourse 
through narrative "inevitability." "The logic of [the structure of 
classic realism]," Belsey notes, "precludes the possibility of leaving 
the reader simply to confront the contradictions which the text may 
have defined" (82). Third, realism co-opts readers into agreement 
by positioning them as "always already" in concurrence with the 
politics shaping the narrative. The technique of free indirect dis­
course (for example, "she came to see that . . .") epitomizes real-
ism's co-optative strategy. A character "realizes" the truth which 
guides the novel, and to which the reader, in collaboration with the 
narrator, has been privy all along. The reader is thus, in the 
Althusserian sense, "interpellated" as what Stephen Heath calls 
"the unified and unifying subject of [the text's] vision" (85). 
The implications of this argument for the proletarian novel 
should be apparent. The logic of the postmodernist critique of 
realism is that, hard as they might have tried to make realism serve 
the ends of a revolutionary politics, the proletarian novelists were 
headed for failure by their adherence to an intrinsically conserva­
tive and repressive mode of writing. The line of political argument 
explicitly urged in a text—the necessity for militant participation in 
class struggle, the falsity of petty bourgeois aspirations, even the 
desirability of communism as an alternative to capitalism—cannot 
move the reader leftward if it is embedded in a discursive mode 
premised upon a bourgeois epistemology and bourgeois assump­
tions about selfhood. The very posture of political certainty en­
couraged by realistic form produces an effect of ideological closure; 
if a text wishes to query the existing order of things in a thorough­
going way, it must instead adopt what Belsey calls an "interroga­
tive" form, one that decenters all putatively authoritative expres­
sions of politics. Despite its posture of confronting and unmasking 
reactionary idealisms with an unflinching portraiture of "what is," 
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the argument goes, realism turns out to be not an ally but an 
antagonist to the project of literary radicalism. However left-wing 
their intentions, proletarian writers who worked in the form of the 
realistic novel ended up confirming the very world order that they 
originally set out to oppose. 
Not all commentators—on proletarian fiction in particular or on 
the novel in general—concede that realistic form presupposes 
naive empiricism or authoritarian control (e.g. Levine). Some crit­
ics argue that the novel is in fact uniquely empowered to articulate 
oppositional discourses. For example, feminist critic Diane Price 
Herndl, citing Bakhtin's doctrine of novelistic heteroglossia, argues 
that the novel is historically a "feminine genre" and that "[njovelis­
tic discourse achieves a state of non-definability, of otherness, of 
freedom from hierarchy" (13). Peter Hitchcock, also invoking Bakh­
tin in his formulation of the "dialogism of the oppressed," writes 
that "[w]hat is important in theorizing working-class fiction is not 
form for form's sake, but the struggles over form. . . . The inter­
rogative text of which Belsey writes may be antirealist in the classic 
sense, but nevertheless we should entertain the possibility that 
such a text may still be realist" (97). Carole Snee takes issue with 
the "dominant critical practice [which] argues that because the 
realist novel has been concerned historically with the individual, 
and its narrative structures operate through one—or a series of— 
individual consciousnesses, its philosophy is always essentially 
'liberal/ " On the contrary: the realistic novel "does not simply at 
best reveal and interrogate the dominant, unstated ideology, or 
exist uncritically within it, but can also incorporate a conscious 
ideological or class perspective, which in itself undercuts the 
ideological parameters of the genre, without necessarily transform­
ing its structural boundaries" (Snee 168-69). H. Gustav Klaus offers 
the valuable caveat that, while form "is doubtless a carrier of 
ideology," it is "not the only [ideological] constituent of a text, and it 
is, above all, not some kind of cosmic, transhistorical category 
immune to change" (Socialist Novel 2). 
Nonetheless, most contemporary defenders of novelistic realism 
qualify their endorsement of inherited fictional modes as potential 
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carriers of oppositional politics. Herndl, it is true—like some other 
recent celebrants of Bakhtinian dialogism—may proclaim "the 
novel" an antihierarchical genre qua genre. In so doing, however, 
she greatly oversimplifies Bakhtin, who polemically distinguished 
Dostoevsky's attainment of a "plural-voiced" novel form with the 
"monologism" that he saw characterizing all modes of the novel 
before—and most after—Dostoevsky's time (Bakhtin 5-46). For 
Bakhtin—if not for all his apostles — "heteroglossia" did not signify 
protopoststructuralist subversion and free play, but instead the 
contradictory coexistence of different social discourses within a 
single text. Hitchcock, a more cautious Bakhtinian than Herndl, 
concedes most of Belsey's argument about the conservative politics 
of novelistic realism. Rather than directly defending inherited 
realistic narrative forms, however, he shifts the ground of the 
argument, in a Brechtian maneuver, to a redefinition of "realism" 
itself. Snee admits that a text articulating a "conscious ideological or 
class perspective" necessarily "undercuts the ideological parame­
ters of the genre"—that is, goes against the generic political grain. 
Klaus, discussing the difficulties posed by the bildungsroman 
form to socialist writers, notes that the focus on a central hero runs 
the risk of effacing "the central fact of the class struggle to the lives 
of individuals" {Literature of Labor 127). In short, most present-day 
advocates of the continuing viability of novelistic realism posit a 
tension between form and idea: even if a text's doctrinal content 
may pull it to the left, inherited novelistic conventions will usually 
pull it to the right. If realistic texts manage to be oppositional, this 
occurs in spite of, rather than because of, inherited generic tenden­
cies. These critics are anything but reborn Lukacsians. 
So far we have been speaking of novelistic realism, or the 
realistic novel, in general terms. Critics of the bildungsroman, a 
subspecies of both these larger categories, have generally con­
curred that this genre is if anything the quintessentially bourgeois 
form of the novel. Hegel, describing the conventions of the emergent 
novelistic form epitomized in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, noted that 
such texts depict "the education of the individual at the hands of the 
given reality. . . . For the conclusion of such an apprenticeship 
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usually amounts to the hero getting the rough spots knocked off 
him. . .  . In the last analysis he usually gets his girl and some kind 
of job, marries, and becomes a philistine just like all the others" 
(quoted in Swales 50). Dilthey, without Hegel's irony, coined the 
term bildungsroman to describe a novel featuring a hero who "enters 
into life in a blissful state of ignorance, seeks related souls, experi­
ences friendship and love, struggles with the hard realities of the 
world and thus armed with a variety of experiences, matures, finds 
himself and his mission in the world" (quoted in Hardin xiv). 
Subsequent theorists of the bildungsroman have sought to 
broaden its ideological scope, noting that the genre can stress 
conflict over accommodation (Shaffner) and, especially in its mod­
ernist variants, can allow for irony and open-endedness (Swales, 
Sammons). Even the genre's staunchest advocates concede, how­
ever, that it is premised upon fundamentally bourgeois notions of 
self. As James Hardin notes, the great majority of bildungsromans 
feature accommodation through their depiction of ''the intellectual 
and social development of a central figure who, after going out into 
the world and experiencing both defeats and triumphs, comes to a 
better understanding of self and to a generally affirmative view of 
the world" (Hardin xiii). Even texts that portray alienation or 
rebellion presuppose a division between self and society, a "con­
frontation with society" (Steinecke 95). The bildungsroman pro­
jects, according to Martin Swales, "a tension between a concern for 
the sheer complexity of individual potentiality on the one hand and, 
on the other, a recognition that practical reality—marriage, family, a 
career—is a necessary dimension of the hero's self-realization, albeit 
one that implies a limitation, indeed a constriction, of the self" (51). 
Moreover, the genre is based upon a largely a priori conception of 
individual identity. As Jeffrey Sammons puts it, "the concept of 
Bildung is intensely bourgeois: it carries with it many assumptions 
about the autonomy and relative integrity of the self, its potential 
self-creative energies, its relative range of options within material, 
social, even psychological determinants" (42). Even when the bil­
dungsroman focuses on society as well as subjectivity, then, it 
presupposes a "character" possessing intrinsic potentialities who 
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enters an "environment" that either fulfills or restricts his or her 
individuality. The bildungsroman, which purports transparently 
to convey the essential qualities of both the self and the world, thus 
furnishes the textual epitome of "programmatic individualism" 
(Visser). 
What is at stake in this analysis is by now, I hope, clear. If the left-
wing 1930s critics are right, the form of the "biographical" novel 
was ideologically neutral: whether or not a writer successfully 
conveyed a revolutionary vision depended upon whether he or she 
adeptly "wove" or "blended" radical politics into the story of the 
protagonist's "conversion" to class-consciousness. If the post­
modernist critics of realism are right, the writers of proletarian 
bildungsromans were doomed to failure. To test the relative valid­
ity of these two hypotheses, we shall now turn to an analysis of two 
proletarian bildungsromans. 
My paradigmatic text in this discussion of politics and form in 
the proletarian bildungsroman is Myra Page's Moscow Yankee (1935). 
Since I, like other scholars of noncanonical texts, must assume my 
audience's lack of acquaintance with my material, I shall briefly 
recapitulate what this novel is about. Moscow Yankee is in one sense 
unusual among proletarian novels in that it takes its hero, Andy, an 
unemployed Detroit auto worker, to the USSR during the First Five-
Year Plan and thus raises directly the issue of socialism. (Almost all 
U.S. proletarian novels delineate class struggle in the capitalist 
United States.) In its portraiture of a hero who, through experience 
and ideological struggle, moves from non-class-consciousness to 
revolutionary commitment, however, the novel presents an exem­
plary instance of the "conversion" plot. Moreover, because its 
politics are so explicit, Moscow Yankee brings to the fore important 
questions about the politics of representation in the proletarian 
novel. The novel's plot has two main strands. The central plotline 
deals with Andy's personal growth into a partisan of the socialist 
USSR. This metamorphosis is effected through three experiences: 
working on the assembly line at the Red Star tractor plant and 
becoming a tovarisch (comrade) of his fellow worker Sasha; arguing 
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politics with some American Communist expatriates, the white 
Mac and the black Ned; and falling in love with the winsome young 
tovarisch Natasha, who teaches him that socialist construction is 
inseparable from changed personal relations between and among 
people. This personal plot reaches its climax when Andy realizes 
that he wants to be free of his obligation to his American fiancee, 
Elsie, who writes him whining consumerist letters and at one point 
announces that she plans to join him in the USSR. The dilemma is, 
how is Andy going to free himself honorably from Elsie (who can't 
be blamed for her low level of consciousness, not being herself a 
"Moscow Yankee") and end up with his new true love? The key 
issue raised in the main plot, then, is that of the politics of personal 
loyalty in the context of class loyalty. The traditional bildungsro­
man focus upon the individual's maturation through experience is 
thus invested with revolutionary doctrinal content. 
The novel's subplot, which involves two American engineers 
working in Moscow, addresses the politics of production. The 
"good" engineer, Boardman, who favors any industrial regime 
privileging "science, engineering, efficiency," is counterposed with 
the "bad" engineer, Crampton, who is fixated on "speed, money, 
costs" (146). The plant's machinery is itself endowed with vital 
force, being described as a "beautiful, quivering nerve center" (22). 
The production subplot reaches its climax when some white Rus­
sians who are enemies of socialist construction attempt to sabotage 
Red Star. After a suspenseful chase by Ned, the nefarious activities 
of the former countess Katia Boudnikova and her entrepreneurial 
sidekick Alex Turin are thwarted. The key theme raised in the 
subplot is the necessity for workers' steadfast commitment to 
building and defending the material infrastructure of the emerging 
socialist society. 
Clearly Moscow Yankee raises all kinds of revolutionary politics. 
But it also offers what many contemporary critics would see as a 
classic case of realism's antipathy to, and foreclosure of, contradic­
tion. For the two plots are brought to termination not by any 
political logic or synthesis but by simple narrative juxtaposition. 
The sense of inevitability accompanying the strong narrative tra­
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jectory produces the sense that issues have been resolved, when in 
fact they have been sloughed over. The suspense and emotional 
satisfaction deriving from each plotline are displaced onto the 
other. The main plotline has posed the thesis that the "personal is 
political" and has argued that socialist construction entails a thor­
oughgoing fight against traditional notions about gender. There is 
even a minor subplot about a former prostitute, Zena, who straight­
ens out and regains self-esteem as an assembly-line worker: devel­
oping the productive forces, it is implied, also develops human 
potentiality. Yet Andy is himself let off the hook regarding his 
personal politics. He never has to decide between Elsie and Natasha, 
since—somewhat implausibly—near the end of the novel he re­
ceives from Elsie a "Dear John" letter, followed closely by a letter 
from one of Andy's former buddies who tells him that Elsie was a 
bad lot all along, having been fooling around with one of Andy's 
other buddies ever since Andy left. At the same time, even though 
the novel has raised the question of worker control of production, 
this issue is forgotten amidst the flurry surrounding the threat­
ened explosion of Red Star. When Andy decides to stay in the USSR 
and do his bit for socialist construction, the actual social relations 
that socialism entails at the point of production are no longer a 
point of contention and query in the novel, which ends with Andy 
happily cuddled up with Natasha and participating in his first 
Soviet May Day. The personal plot here usurps rather than parallels 
and interpenetrates the public plot. 
It could thus be argued that conventions of bildungsroman 
narration foster political opportunism in Moscow Yankee. Suspense 
has displaced conceptual argument onto narrative trajectory, thus 
foreclosing further confrontation with the issue of personal re­
sponsibility raised by the Elsie/Natasha plot. Similarly, ideologi­
cally coercive (if emotionally satisfying) conventions of romantic 
closure can be seen to secure Andy's reconciliation with the new 
society through his discovery of the right love partner. Andy may 
not have become a "philistine," as Hegel wryly noted of the typical 
bildungsroman hero; but it would seem that the narrative's focus on 
"getfting] his girl" has helped to render moot any further consid­
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eration of the question of egalitarianism at the point of production, 
which was initially addressed in the production plot. Moreover, the 
bildungsroman's synecdochic presumption that one person's story 
embodies in microcosm larger social contradictions prohibits skep­
ticism about the typicality of Andy's tale. What Andy "realizes" 
about the virtues of socialism is what the reader learns—in fact, 
what the reader is positioned to have known all along, and to have 
pitied Andy for not knowing. Even though Moscow Yankee is, on the 
level of manifest content, clearly motivated by revolutionary poli­
tics, one could argue that the novel's reliance upon inherited 
realistic plot conventions—in particular, on the individualistic 
conventions of the bildungsroman—substantially damages, even 
subverts, the text's political intentions. The Nezv Masses reviewer's 
complaint that the novel ended with a "pink sunset" (Field 26) can 
thus be attributed—although the reviewer did not say so—not just 
to Page's Utopian politics, but to her option to tell her story through 
the vehicle of the bildungsroman. According to the postmodernist 
critique of realism, it is the generic politics of the bildungsroman 
that undermine the doctrinal politics of communism. 
In my view, however, the issue of politics in Moscow Yankee is not 
this simple. For generic politics not only undermine but underline 
doctrinal politics in Moscow Yankee. Politics are not just a textual 
phenomenon: the actual line of the 1930s left, specifically with 
regard both to what was called the "woman question" and to the 
issue of the role of the productive forces in socialist construction, 
figures crucially into the opportunistic closure of Moscoiv Yankee. In 
relation to gender issues, the communist-led left was in some 
respects the best act in town. There were trials for male chauvinism 
in the party; women were organized as both workers and house­
wives; theorists linked women's emancipation to the abolition of 
classes (see Rosenfelt, Foley, Pitts, and Inman). Yet the left never 
arrived at an adequate analysis of the political economy of work 
performed in the home and thus never broke with the capitalist 
ideological dualism between the spheres of domesticity and pro­
duction. As a consequence, the 1930s left never consistently repudi­
ated, and in fact frequently reproduced, mainstream ideas about 
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what men and women simply "are." The proletariat was routinely 
encoded as male in the discourse and iconography of the left; 
particularly in the post-1935 period of the Popular Front, the 
legitimacy of the capitalist nuclear family was rarely questioned. 
When Moscow Yankee ends with Elsie turning out to have been a bad 
girl who wouldn't have benefited from living in Moscow anyhow, 
and with Andy and Natasha building their Moscow love nest, what 
is involved is not just an uncritical deployment of conservative 
narrative conventions. A less-than-revolutionary doctrinal politics 
about gender both articulates and is articulated by the premise of 
novelistic realism that character is "given" and that social value is 
embodied in personal romantic fulfillment. 
Similarly, ambiguities in the communist line about socialist 
construction are reproduced in the production plot's evasion of the 
issue of workers' control. The formulations of socialism by the 
1930s left were contradictory. On the one hand, socialism was a way 
station on the road to communism; it entailed the creation of new 
human beings and new social relations, contingent on people 
realizing their full "species being" by abolishing alienation and 
taking control over both the forces and the relations of production. 
On the other hand, even amidst the fervor of the First Five-Year 
Plan, socialism entailed the full retention of wages, the institution 
of material incentives (Stakhanovism), the continuing division of 
mental and manual labor, and other aspects of capitalist social 
relations. Even though Soviet workers participated actively in 
socialist construction, the immediate practice of communist distri-
bution—from each according to commitment, to each according to 
need—was looked down upon as "vulgar equalitarianism," the 
"psychology of primitive peasant 'communism'" (Stalin 107; Bet­
telheim). The foreclosure of contradiction that accompanies the 
"pink sunset" portrait of Andy's "conversion" to socialism at the 
end of Moscow Yankee is thus not simply a function of Page's use of 
monologic and repressive narrative conventions. The novel's inter­
rupted discourse concerning production relations also reflects the 
tendency of the entire 1930s left to posit communism as something 
for the future, and to adopt an attitude toward the building of 
* 55 ' 
BARBARA FOLEY 
socialism that was at once mechanistic and voluntarist: tractors 
plus proletarian enthusiasm would create the new world. 
The anomalously "conservative" tenor of the ending to Moscow 
Yankee thus results not from a simple opposition of revolutionary 
form to radical content, but from a complicity between doctrinal and 
generic politics. The form exerts its most bourgeois influence when 
and where the text's "line" is least revolutionary. There is, to be 
sure, a tendency to reproduce dominant ideology built into certain 
bildungsroman conventions. Larger social contradictions—such as 
that between capitalist and communist relations at the point of 
production—can be sloughed over to the extent that the form is 
focused, finally, on an individual fate and an individual conscious­
ness. Because production relations do not figure as a problem for 
Andy to confront and resolve, they do not figure in the resolution to 
the novel. But the bildungsroman form does not itself cause the 
issue of production relations to be abandoned. One might specu­
late instead that Page opted to tell her tale as a bildungsroman 
precisely because she herself saw this issue as "background" rather 
than as a social and political contradiction crucially determining 
the nature of Andy's relations with his coworkers. 
Yet the political wheel needs to be spun one more time. For the 
question must then be asked: How damning—from a "left" stand-
point—are the conclusions I have reached here? Does the presence 
of foreclosing and co-optative mechanisms in the novel's form, or of 
tendencies toward sexism and a doctrine of productive-forces 
determinism, mean that Moscow Yankee loses all its force as an 
articulation of revolutionary politics? This is a particularly urgent 
question in the present-day context, when not only the Sunday 
morning pundits but even many who claim to be on the left are 
joining the chorus of condemnation of all that has gone forward 
during the past seventy years under the banner of socialism or 
communism. I would suggest that despite the many "bourgeois" 
ideological traces in Moscow Yankee, the novel has plenty to say 
about creating new and better types of human interaction in a new 
and better type of social order. There is inspiration in its message of 
"I have seen the future, and it works"—not just, I believe, for 
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unreconstructed leftists like myself, but also, as indicated by the 
novel's largely sympathetic reviews in the contemporaneous main­
stream press, to readers closer to the center (e.g. Marsh). Even if 
conventions of realism co-opt readerly disagreement in Moscow 
Yankee; the reader is positioned to agree that Moscow is a good 
home to be accommodated to, and that a red factory worker is the 
ideal bride to effect the protagonist's social reconciliation. The 
novel's revolutionary message is mitigated but by no means can­
celed by the text's formal and doctrinal residue of capitalist ways of 
thinking about, and representing, human potentiality. Even if the 
postmodernist critics are right that realistic novels coercively posi­
tion their readers, it is still legitimate to ask whether this coercion is 
exercised for good or bad ends. Page would no doubt respond that 
the end justifies the means. 
Before closing, it will be a useful contrast to glance at another 
proletarian novel, one that departs significantly from conventions 
of narrative transparency while retaining the routine focus of the 
bildungsroman on an individual's initiation, education, and matu­
ration. Tillie Olsen's Yonnondio: From the Thirties takes as its protago­
nist Mazie Holbrook, a young girl who grows toward selfhood in a 
context of extreme deprivation, both material and psychological. 
Because the novel is unfinished (Olsen started but abandoned it in 
the 1930s), Mazie's development into adulthood is not delineated. 
But the novel clearly indicates that it was to depict Mazie's growth 
toward class consciousness; Olsen, moreover, has stated that her 
protagonist was eventually to become a union organizer (Rosenfelt 
399). In its method and plan, if not in its final result, Yonnondio is a 
"conversion" novel squarely within the tradition of the proletarian 
bildungsroman. 
Yonnondio departs from this tradition, however, both structurally 
and ideologically. The narrative continually intersplices the pro-
tagonist's experience and consciousness with those of other family 
members, particularly her mother and father, Anna and Jim. Mazie's 
reactions of helplessness and anger when watching Anna being 
battered by Jim are counterposed with Anna's thoughts; Mazie's 
feelings of "boundlessness and selfness" (119) during a rare moment 
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of untroubled mother/daughter love are juxtaposed with her moth-
er's sensation of inhabiting a "bounded body" (120). Furthermore, 
both Mazie's and Anna's experiences of Jim's violence are counter-
posed with his own confused sense of guilt and powerlessness: 
"And as he sat there in the kitchen with Mazie against his heart, and 
dawn beat up like a drum, the things in his mind so vast and 
formless, so terrible and bitter, cannot be spoken, will never be 
spoken—till the day that hands will find a way to speak this: 
hands" (95). Bildungsromans routinely posit the hero's uniqueness 
and subjectivity as given: even if she or he is affected by social 
relations, these do not constitute her or him. In Yonnondio, the relation 
of self to socius is reversed. Even though Mazie, as a distinct individ­
ual, possesses "traits" of curiosity and resilience that equip her to be 
the novel's "hero," these qualities of "character" are not a priori, nor do 
they furnish "causes" for Mazie's acts. Rather than an autonomous 
individual moving through an "environment," Mazie is the social 
relations that encompass her; in a sense, she is the working class. 
Yonnondio's diffusion of focus away from its protagonist also has 
an important rhetorical effect: Mazie's growth does not bear the 
burden of teaching the reader the politics that shape the text. The 
reader's attainment of greater class consciousness hinges upon him 
or her inferring general lessons from the totality of the character's 
experiences. In Moscow Yankee the reader's knowledge is contingent 
upon identification with Andy; if the hero does not come to a 
definitive position on the question of production relations, neither 
do we. In Olsen's novel, by contrast, no single character is obliged 
to "realize" the text's revolutionary doctrine. Even though it is clear 
that the novel is structured according to the pattern of the "conver­
sion" narrative—and it is a significant loss to left-wing literature 
that Olsen never completed her tale—it is also clear that issues not 
fully understood by Mazie—or any other character, for that mat-
ter—will not therefore be sloughed over. Truth is contained in, but 
not restricted to, what the hero learns. 
Yonnondio manages to project its collectivist politics not only 
through structural modulations upon the individualistic bildungsro­
man plot but also through its bold use of narratorial voice. Whereas 
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in Moscow Yankee political values and ideas are left to be conveyed 
by character development, event, and dialogue, in Yonnondio the 
narrator articulates what the author believes; the text "tells" as well 
as "shows." Some of Yonnondio's devices for producing commentary 
are conventional; the passage cited above describing Jim Holbrook's 
incoherent anger, for example, combines tagged free indirect dis­
course with intrusive omnisicent commentary. While recognizably 
didactic, the passage remains within the stylistic confines of narra­
tive realism. On several important occasions, however, Olsen aban­
dons standard narratorial omniscience and adopts a free-floating 
voice that makes no pretension to narrative transparency. For ex­
ample, when a minor character named Jim Tracy, a coworker of Jim 
Holbrook, rebels all by himself against exploitation and ends up on 
a chain gang, the text introduces a long typographically inserted 
passage in which the voice of an unidentified coworker declares: 
I'm sorry, Jim Tracy, sorry as hell we weren't stronger and could get to 
you in time and show you that kind of individual revolt was no good, 
kid, no good at all, you had to bide your time and take it till there were 
enough of you to fight it all together on the job, and bide your time, 
and take it till the day millions of fists clamped in yours, and you 
could wipe out the whole thing, the whole goddamn thing, and a 
human could be a human for the first time on earth. (79) 
In this passage, revolutionary doctrine is conveyed in working-
class language. But it is not articulated by a given individual— 
these are not Jim's thoughts—nor does it emerge as a "natural" 
consequence of Jim Holbrook's and Jim Tracy's experiences at the 
point of production. Like the Bolshevik theory outlined in Lenin's 
Wltat Is to Be Done? the call for workers' insurrection in Yonnondio is 
a response to exploitation that comes, epistemologically, "from the 
outside" (Lenin 374-75). If Olsen's strategy here is "leftist," the 
term, in my view, warrants not opprobrium—as for most 1930s 
Marxists—but commendation. The politics of class in Yonnondio 
bypasses economism and projects revolutionism largely because the 
text has discovered strategic ways of intersplidng "showing" with 
"telling." As with its dispersal of "character/' the novel finds ways 
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to embed the collective in the individual; in its dispersal of narra­
tive author-ity the novel experiments with methods for conveying 
authorial politics. Yonnondio is a bildungsroman, but to a degree it 
contests the individualistic and transparent premises of the genre. 
As in the case of Moscow Yankee, however, the political wheel 
must be spun one more time. For Olsen's achievement in pressing 
the bildungsroman form to new political limits in Yonnondio is not 
simply a function of her avant la lettre experimentation with post­
modernist methods for interrogating subjectivity and subverting 
ideological closure. Olsen's "line" is, on certain crucial issues, also 
more "left" than that of Page in Moscow Yankee. While the plot of 
Moscozv Yankee hinges upon a traditional gendered division be­
tween a "private" love plot and a "public" production plot, Yonnon­
dio continually reverts to the relation between production and 
reproduction—of people, of social relations, of consciousness. 
Opportunistic displacement between plotlines is precluded in Yon­
nondio largely because the novel admits to no fundamental differ­
ence between labor at the point of production and labor in the 
home. Moreover, while both novels are radically egalitarian, Yon­
nondio continually stresses the necessity for workers' "fists" and 
"hands" to break into articulateness. Page's novel leaves unsettled 
the issue of whether or not eradicating the division of mental and 
manual labor is necessary to the construction of socialism. Olsen's 
novel—while set in a context of anticapitalist class struggle that 
does not require her squarely to address socialist relations of 
production—still suggests that "a human [will] be a human for the 
first time on earth" only when workers gain the capacity to speak 
with something other than their hands. Olsen's experiments with a 
narrative voice that ruptures realistic illusionism are not merely 
formal; they bespeak her larger political concern with the new 
types of articulation that both enable and are enabled by the 
revolutionary process. As in Moscow Yankee there is in Yonnondio a 
confluence of doctrinal and generic politics. 
What can we conclude, then, about the adequacy of the post­
modernist critique of novelistic realism as applied to 1930s prole­
tarian fiction? How usable were "bourgeois" literary forms to revo­
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lutionary writers? As I hope to have suggested here, there is a 
conservative tendency embedded in the classic form of the bil­
dungsroman; Hicks and other 1930s critics were, I believe, in error 
when they posited that the novel bore no ideological freight from 
its bourgeois heritage. A proletarian writer like Page, who more or 
less uncritically adopted the conventions of the genre, reproduced 
a number of traditional distinctions between male and female, 
public and private. A writer like Olsen, who worked against the 
genre's structural and stylistic grain, projected more revolutionary 
conceptions of potentiality, both individual and social. But, in both 
cases narrative strategy is inseparable from political "line." While 
the implication of the postmodernist critique of realism would 
seem to be that narrative transparency is in and of itself politically 
"bad," and narrative subversion politically "good," the dialectic of 
generic and doctrinal politics in the two novels examined here 
indicates that the relationship between politics and form in the 
novel is more complicated, more nuanced. Particularly when pressed 
to adopt experimental techniques to articulate collectivist politics, 
the traditional "bourgeois" form of the bildungsroman proved 
usable—perhaps to a surprising degree—by the 1930s proletarian 
novelist. But even when the proletarian writer acceded to bour­
geois ideological pressures of various kinds, emergent left-wing 
ideas had a stubborn way of making themselves felt and heard in 
and through the bildungsroman—regardless of the residual forms 
and discourses that hemmed these ideas in and inhibited their full 
expression. Amid all the current talk about the unalloyed failures— 
economic, political, cultural—of twentieth-century movements for 
class emancipation, it is important to acknowledge the 1930s liter­
ary proletarians' often compelling representations of a world by no 
means powerless to be born. 
Notes 
1. Brecht's dramatic theory and practice were greeted sympathetically 
and intelligently in the U.S. left press (e.g. Burnshaw) but did not spark any 
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polemics. Lukacs published in Partisan Review an important essay, "Propa­
ganda or Partisanship?" that drew praise from Philip Rahv; Lukacs did not, 
however, function as the locus of any defense of realism in contradistinc­
tion to modernism (see Lukacs, Rahv). The finer points in Lukacs's sophis­
ticated Hegelian defense of realism were not articulated in the American 
setting, where the best-known spokespersons for Third International 
aesthetic theory were "official" figures like Bukharin, Radek, and Luna­
charsky. Alan Wald, however, remarks that "Angel Flores, who edited 
Dialectics and the Critics Group series, told me on the phone before he died 
that Lukacs was a big influence in his circle" (personal communication). 
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Narratives of Bourgeois 
Subjectivity in Mozart's 
Prague Symphony 
S U S A  N M C C L A R  Y 
The recapitulation of the finale of Mozart's Symphony No. 38 (the 
Prague, 1786) begins quite innocuously with the return of the 
playful tune that serves as protagonist for this movement. At this 
point, we might well become complacent: our experience with 
other such pieces may lead us to expect little more from what 
remains of the movement than the reiteration of themes and a 
grand conclusion. But after a mere thirteen bars, the proceedings 
are rudely derailed by a blast from the brass and timpani. 
Principles of formal propriety for this period dictate that new 
materials not intrude into a composition so late in the game. And, 
as it turns out, the outburst is not entirely extraneous: we can trace 
it back to the development section, where it repeatedly obstructed 
the progress of the principal theme. Thus we might explain the 
event in the recapitulation by arguing that the business of develop­
ing had not quite been completed within the segment of the piece 
devoted to development, so that it necessarily spills over into the 
section usually concerned with consolidation. 
But the blast also recalls a more distant referent: the symphony's 
introduction is repeatedly disrupted by a similar configuration, 
- 65­
SUSAN MCCLARY 
which is not so much resolved as sidestepped by the comedic 
affairs of the opening movement. Its reappearance here at the 
eleventh hour, after all the turmoil ought to have subsided, repre­
sents quite literally a return of the repressed. Indeed, the eigh-
teenth-century topos here invoked is the ombra, a stock image long 
associated in opera with the shadowy supernatural. 
Moreover, this moment resembles the one near the end of Don 
Giovanni where the foreboding ombra that opened the overture 
suddenly breaks in on Giovanni's revelry to announce the arrival of 
the statue.1 That Mozart was writing the Prague Symphony and Don 
Giovanni at the same time encourages the comparison, even though 
there are crucial differences—most obviously, the sinister music in 
the opera announces Giovanni's impending doom, whereas the 
symphony's finale recovers its playful character for an affirmative 
conclusion. But as in Don Giovanni, the symphony's finale suffers 
the intrusion of the militant materials from the introduction into 
what appears to be an extremely secure context. In neither instance 
can purely structural accounts suffice. Like the parallel occurrence 
in Don Giovanni, this disruption in the Prague may tempt us to 
appeal to narrative for explanations.2 
While an earlier generation of critics were happy to write in 
narrative terms about such tensions in Mozart's instrumental mu-
sic,3 musicologists of the last thirty years have focused almost 
exclusively on its formal dimensions. Many critics today prefer to 
hear his music as the manifestation of perfect order, and their 
analyses consequently strive to account for that order, which is 
presumed to stand outside or beyond the realm of mere significa-
tion.4 Disruptions are demonstrated not truly to have been disrup­
tions at all, but instead sophisticated strategies in voice-leading, 
discernible by those who have studied advanced music theory. 
Moments of apparent conflict, such as the one that occurs in the last 
movement of the Prague, are not so much explained as explained 
away. 
In the last few years, however, the issue of narrative in instru­
mental music has reemerged in musicology and has sparked a 
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lively theoretical debate. On the one hand, scholars such as An­
thony Newcomb, Lawrence Kramer, and Fred Maus—all of whom 
focus on questions of musical signification—have begun to demon­
strate how narrative procedures often informed nineteenth-century 
instrumental music.5 
The other side of the debate has been most forcefully articulated 
recently by Carolyn Abbate.6 Abbate objects to narrative accounts 
of most instrumental music in part because they usually fall short 
with respect to both musical and historical specificity: that is, as the 
plotline proposed by the critic takes on its own momentum, details 
of musical construction (especially those that do not advance the 
cause of the plot) are often ignored; and insofar as the narrative 
scenarios suggested by critics tend to fall into a few stereotypical 
patterns, crucial differences between moments in musical style are 
obliterated. In short, narrative accounts, while perhaps attractive 
as crutches, lead us away from the piece of music and its cultural 
particularities. 
These objections need to be taken very seriously, even if— 
especially if—the Prague tempts us to appeal to narrative. I propose 
that narrative impulses began to influence compositional procedures 
in the late eighteenth century—that narrative is not simply im­
posed from the outside by critics who lack analytic sophistication, 
but that it is often integral to the rationale of the music itself—and 
that these impulses correspond to extremely important concerns 
emerging in other areas of European culture at that same moment 
in history 
By suggesting that Mozart's instrumental compositions may have 
narrative dimensions, I do not mean to imply that he engages in 
what later became known as programmatic music (in which a title or 
accompanying scenario indicates explicitly the framework to be em­
ployed in listening), but rather that he often introduces significant 
narrative inflections into his formal procedures. In other words, 
the structural order and balance celebrated by so many analysts are 
indisputably present in his music, but so are other elements—such 
as the event described at the beginning of this paper—that raise the 
kinds of questions typical of plot-oriented media.7 
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As Terry Eagleton has demonstrated, this tension between 
formal and narrative impulses is among the most fundamental 
characteristics of bourgeois culture. In The Ideology of the Aesthetic 
(1990), Eagleton explains how the theories of art that emerged in 
the 1700s served as one of the sites where the emerging bourgeois 
class worked through many of the dilemmas it confronted as it 
attempted to carve out a new modus operandi. Significantly, many of 
the principal aestheticians of the day were also leading political 
theorists, and these two domains—art and the public sphere— 
were understood quite self-consciously in the same terms. 
In both realms, attention was focused especially on questions of 
the self. Previous eras had seemed to bestow markers of identity 
such as class at birth; but with increasing opportunities for upward 
mobility, intellectuals and artists began to concentrate on the 
process of self-generation, with its attendant rewards, but also its 
responsibilities and anxieties. Thus eighteenth-century aestheti­
cians, like political theorists, typically deplored the rigid conven­
tions of the ancien regime and advocated free individual expression. 
But at the same time they recognized that private feelings without 
objective form fail to be intelligible, just as groups of individuals 
acting according to their own separate whims produce chaos. 
Structure, therefore, was deemed indispensable to the new art and 
to the new society; yet the structures that made identity viable had 
to seem now as though they were the result of internal necessity, 
motivated by ongoing trajectories of becoming, rather than of the 
surrender to outside authority. Eagleton writes: "If the aesthetic 
comes in the eighteenth century to assume the significance it does, 
it is because the word is shorthand for a whole project of hegemony, 
the massive introjection of abstract reason by the life of the senses. 
What matters is not in the first place art, but this process of 
refashioning the human subject from the inside, informing its 
subtlest affections and bodily responses with this law which is not 
a law'' (42). 
Much of what Eagleton writes concerning aesthetics and bour­
geois ideals would sound quite plausible if we were dealing with 
Beethoven.8 But Mozart? Even though Beethoven too worked un­
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der aristocratic patronage for much of his career, we tend to 
associate Mozart far more closely with that institution. Our ac­
counts of Mozart often assume that he faithfully reflected in his 
music the sensibilities and interests of his patrons, that he accepted 
unconditionally the constraints of his employment as he com­
posed. Thus our critical readings of Mozart's music typically em­
phasize its courtly dimensions: its noble grace and formal balance. 
We have no evidence that Mozart had any interest in class 
politics per se. Yet even if he did not identify his plight with those 
of other nonaristocrats, he frequently bridled at having to submit to 
those who had economic authority over him.9 Moreover, he had a 
healthy regard for his imagination, which permitted him to inflect 
in such unexpected ways the galant style that surrounded him. And 
if we delve beneath the polished surfaces and assuring reconcilia­
tions that characterize the public veneer of Mozart's music, we 
often find him wrestling with precisely the tensions Eagleton 
analyzes as characteristics of late eighteenth-century bourgeois 
culture.10 
Mozart's music could scarcely have avoided the tensions that 
preoccupied his particular historical moment, for they were al­
ready implicated in the formal procedures he had inherited before 
he even touched them. In other words, the narrative impulses of his 
music are not truly "extramusical": they emerge from the premises 
of the most fundamental of his musical materials—tonality and 
sonata. 
The brand of tonality that developed in Italy over the course of 
the seventeenth century traces something like the familiar quest 
narrative, whereby identity (the tonic key area) is established, 
destabilized through excursions into other keys, and eventually 
regained (fig. la). In most music of the 1600s, this pattern of 
beginning, middle, and end is best explained by rhetorical mod-
els—which is, in fact, how theorists of the day accounted for 
effective musical organization. So long as the expected series of 
events proceeds relatively unimpeded, narrative seems not be at 
issue.11 
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FIGURE I 
a: Tonal Trajectory 
Tonic (1) >> KeyX >» Key Y » KeyZ » » 
b: da Capo form 
A B A 
1 » X »> 1 Y » Z exact repetition of A 
c: Binary Form 
(repeat) (repeat) 
||: I » X :||: X » (Y) » 1 :|| 
d: Sonata 
Exposition (repeat) Development Recapitulation (repeat) 
||: ist key/theme (1) >  2nd key/theme (X) :l I: X » Y » Z » list (1) >» 2nd (1) :|| 
As the eighteenth century approached, the onrushing flamboy­
ance of early tonality became domesticated, in part through stan­
dardization, in part through the rise of various formal schemata 
that served to contain and channel its extraordinary vitality.12 The 
da Capo aria that dominated aristocratic opera seria during the 
1700s, for instance, operates according to a principle of nested 
symmetries: the opening section presents the tonic, moves to a 
closely related key, and returns to reestablish the tonic for closure; 
a middle section moves through contrasting areas; then the open­
ing section returns intact to insulate the unstable middle section, 
to restore both tonic and the initial affect (fig. 1b).13 The linear 
thrust of earlier procedures was thus radically reconstrued: eigh-
teenth-century formal designs continued to draw on tonal energy, 
but they kept tight control over its potentially unruly qualities 
through hierarchically arranged patterns of structural repetition. 
Sonata procedure—a new formal means of articulating the tonal 
background—began to appear in the mid-eighteenth century, and 
it became the principal organizing schema in most instrumental 
genres for over a hundred years. Like most other structural pro­
cedures of the 1700s, sonata depends heavily on formal conven­
tions. But the exuberant rhythms of opera buffa animate this 
procedure, infusing it with dynamic energies reminiscent of tonality 
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before its formal containment. Thus sonata resulted from a fusion 
between the symmetrical structures of the eighteenth century and 
a newly invigorated, somewhat rebellious tonal impulse. The his­
tory of this genre has been played out along the fault lines between 
these virtually incompatible elements. 
On the one hand, sonata procedure developed not from the 
kinds of baroque movements that unfold through principles of 
linear progress, but rather from the staid binary form of the courtly 
dance (fig. IC). Thus, while its opening section moves dramatically 
to the point of the first modulation (on the dominant or relative 
major), this section must then be repeated. Likewise, the second 
half—which contains the series of contrasting keys as well as the 
return to tonic—is reiterated. The dynamic impulse contributed by 
the tonal dimension of sonata is effectively held in check by such 
formal imperatives (fig. id). 
Sonata procedure itself adds yet another structural device that 
weighs against progressive narrative: the section articulating the 
return to tonic (recapitulation) grows to mirror in both length and 
sequence of events the opening half (exposition). And as bipartite 
dance forms become rather more tripartite in their distribution of 
functions, issues of architectonic balance begin to inform the 
process, as they do in da Capo arias. Textbook diagrams of sonata 
sometimes resemble a static classical building, with symmetrical 
wings buttressing a middle section. 
But on the other hand, certain other aspects of sonata intensify 
the dynamic forces that fuel it. Composers began to mark the 
openings of sonata movements with idiosyncratic themes which 
are deployed as though they were protagonists. Moreover, the 
second key area in the exposition started to rival the tonic in 
duration, and it often brought with it its own themes and affects. 
The relationship between first and second key areas varies from 
piece to piece: the sense of uniform agency typical of Baroque 
music may be maintained if both keys are articulated with the same 
theme; or the two may establish a crucial dramatic dichotomy, 
either complementary or antagonistic.14 The tensions between 
these two aspects of the exposition are not immediately resolved; 
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rather they spill over into the middle section, which destabilizes 
and develops thematic materials as it proceeds through its series of 
distant keys. 
Thus far (if we count the repetition of the exposition as some­
thing like an instant replay that allows us to witness once more the 
move from tonic to secondary key), the process could be regarded 
as linear.15 Moreover, the development leads back eventually to the 
dramatic return of tonic and opening theme for recapitulation and 
closure. But at the point of recapitulation, principles of formal 
balance suddenly come to the fore, since the central business of this 
section is to reiterate the events from the exposition. Unlike the 
return in the da Capo aria, however, the recapitulation is not a 
mechanical reiteration of a previous self-contained section. The 
tensions raised by the dynamic contrast of the exposition are 
resolved only in this concluding section, in which all materials 
typically confirm the tonic. Thus the recapitulation serves as a 
literal "capitulation" to formal convention, but also as narrative 
telos—as the site of reconciliation for all the dramatic conflicts that 
made the movement seem idiosyncratic. 
As it attempts to satisfy both the demand for formal symmetry 
and also the desire for unimpeded progress and free expression, 
sonata manifests in its musical premises the tensions Eagleton 
describes.16 In some movements, structural exigencies appear to 
prevail over the particularities of the process. Others privilege the 
more dynamic aspects of sonata, so that something like a narrative 
trajectory rather than a predetermined set of conventions seems to 
motivate the movement's central events. Neither of these solutions, 
of course, can be entirely consistent: the energies whipped up by 
the process always threaten to overflow the bounds of the form, 
making containment seem a bit arbitrary; and narrative inflec-
tions—while they may encourage us to hear some of the important 
junctures of movements in terms of linear causality—do not influ­
ence the many passages where conventional musical processes 
dominate. 
But in any case, sonata is never merely a form imposed from the 
outside. Because it captures so well the dilemmas surrounding 
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identity and dynamic change in the bourgeois era, sonata becomes 
the central arena in music where such issues are explored, fought 
through, and negotiated. Whatever the solution in any given 
movement, the tensions between energy and stasis inherent in the 
procedure remain—just as they remained unreconciled in the 
social sphere. Yet music's malleability always suggests that a possi­
ble answer to the great puzzle is just around the corner. This is why 
generations of musicians continued to hack away at sonata rather 
than inventing thoroughly new procedures, once the frustrations 
of sonata became apparent. We can tell a good deal about what was 
most important to each artist, each moment in history, by observ­
ing where the compromises occur, what gets sacrificed, and what is 
preserved at whatever cost in sonata-based constructions.17 
Mozart's narrative inflections in his instrumental music operate 
simultaneously on two fronts. First, he sometimes enacts resis­
tance against the musical signs of aristocratic absolutism and 
against the social constraints that manifest themselves in music as 
formal conventions. In other words, the revolutionary impulse that 
becomes far more explicit in Beethoven is detectable not only in 
Mozart's operas such as The Marriage of Figaro or Don Giovanni, but 
also in some of the instrumental music.18 The emancipatory narra­
tive recounting the emergence of a new variety of self-sufficient 
(bourgeois) individual here begins to make its appearance. 
At the same time, Mozart can be heard exploring a set of issues 
that seem at first glance to be more private: the construction of an 
integrated self in the face of both the desire to remain in an infantile 
state of blissful coextension with the mother, and the threats and 
demands posed by patriarchal law. In "The Image in Form," May­
nard Solomon proposes a psychoanalytic model for addressing 
such issues in Mozart's music, manifested in Mozart's proclivity for 
dark undercurrents that often threaten to break through his affir­
mative surfaces. While accepting much of Solomon's Freudian 
schema, I would like to qualify it a bit. 
First, rather than regarding Freud's account as the universal 
experience of early development, many theorists now contend that 
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important aspects of this model are particular to males and to the 
bourgeois era.19 This explains in part why Mozart and Freud could 
both arrive at similar constructions, why we latter-day bourgeois 
still are hailed by it, and why musics of other places and times seem 
not to work according to such precepts. 
Second, even if such an experience of subjectivity were com­
monplace, European composers did not see it as a suitable topic for 
musical representation until about Mozart's time. We might relate 
this set of issues to Mozart's own struggles with his father for adult 
identity. But Mozart certainly was not the first composer to be 
burdened with a domineering father. He does happen, however, to 
have been composing at a time when the ordeals of the inner self as 
it aspires to maturity had become paramount in European cul-
ture—not only in literary genres such as the Bildungsroman, but 
also in music.20 These "private" issues turn out, in other words, to 
be at the center of public discourse in the late 1700s: we need not 
read Mozart's pieces as revealing personal secrets. 
To some extent, these two narrative strands—emancipation 
from aristocratic/patriarchal authority and the self-generation of a 
seemingly autonomous identity—are similar stories. And many of 
the cultural artifacts of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centu­
ries merge the two. The kind of self celebrated by the psychologically 
preoccupied novels of this time is a specifically bourgeois subject— 
a subject who must learn how to negotiate successfully in a world in 
which class status and masculinity must constantly be won anew, 
how to prize yet compartmentalize sentiment, how to overcome 
and repress the contradictions required in achieving selfhood.21 
For on the one hand, the liberation and Bildung agendas of this 
historical moment need to show the generation of the new breed of 
subject step by step—a feat that requires that we first meet him as a 
vulnerable, relatively unformed being and that we witness him 
become something other than what he was, even though such a 
process often involves severe crises.22 But on the other hand, this 
same subject needs desperately to believe in his immutable integ­
rity; consequently, the traumatic narrative of emergence is dis­
avowed at the very moment it succeeds. The increasingly "organic" 
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aspects of such narratives are designed to imply that the seeds of 
success were present in the subject from the start, that identity 
owes nothing to contingency but is (regardless of conflicts in the 
manifest content of the story) always already guaranteed.23 
Mozart's music also resides uneasily between these positions, as 
he takes up and works through the same thorny issues.24 If he 
increasingly inflects his musical procedures with narrative drama, 
he also puts increasing effort into the "purely musical" relation­
ships within his compositions. Many of his constructs try to 
sustain the fiction that we can have it both ways—narratives of 
becoming and structures of immutable being at the same time. It is, 
I believe, for this reason that we who still cling to many of these 
same fictions gain such solace from his music.25 Yet the contradic­
tions are quite apparent, even in Mozart.26 
The adagio that opens the Prague Symphony fulfills the func­
tions typical of slow introductions in this repertory, in that it 
arouses our expectations for what follows.27 To use Edward T. 
Cone's terminology,28 an introduction serves as an extended rhyth­
mic upbeat that releases its accumulated tension only with the 
arrival of the allegro and the securing of the tonic key area. It exists 
prior to the beginning of the movement's sonata procedure; and 
although its relative instability may seem to propel us causally 
forward into the movement's exposition, it need not share actual 
materials with the remainder of the symphony. 
Mozart's adagio turns out to be more integral to the unfolding of 
the symphony than usual, for—as we realize in retrospect—it 
introduces in the course of its fantasia-like meanderings many of 
the topoi, motives, and dilemmas that pervade the remainder of the 
piece.29 It begins conventionally enough, with grand, sweeping 
gestures invoking the French overtures of Louis XIY the absolutist 
monarch par excellence. Both the presence of trumpets and timpani 
and their favored key of D major underscore the opening's aristo­
cratic (and potentially military) associations. 
Somewhat incongruously, this majestic pronouncement is fol­
lowed by quiet, staccato pitches creeping up through the tonic 
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triad, as though to some other place. The F-sharp at the peak of the 
ascent is met by the full orchestra blaring out an unexpected, 
deceptive harmony that diverts us away from D major to B minor. 
Apparently unfazed, the strings echo the diversionary tactic and 
arrive on G major; the winds do likewise and take us even further 
afield, to E minor. 
Instead of unfolding rationally to establish the tonic D major, the 
continuation from the bold opening triad simply spirals off into 
what is marked—for the moment at least—as unintelligibility. 
Recall that Eagleton speaks of aesthetics as "this process of re­
fashioning the human subject from the inside, informing its sub­
tlest affections and bodily responses with this law which is not a 
law." This musical passage seems to have escaped the old law, only 
to indulge in feelings that do not yet have any "objective" form to 
regulate them. 
After a pause, the strings take us back to D, but into the very 
different affective realm of Empfindsamkeit—the highly stylized 
tenderness of mid-eighteenth-century bourgeois sensibility. In 
contrast to the absolute certainty of the opening, this section (mm. 
7-13) proliferates sighs, languid melodies, exquisite harmonic in­
flections (once again to E minor), and chromatic meltdowns, all 
over a hesitant accompanying figure. 
One could associate these gestures with "femininity" as it was 
construed in musical codes of the time. Certainly this section 
represents a more intimate, gentle mode of discourse than the 
public spectacle heralded by the opening. But an important feature 
of the middle-class male subject was his sensitivity, even his will­
ingness to display tears.30 Thus we could read this moment both 
as feminine and also as a function of masculine interiority. More­
over, given the appropriation of sentiment by bourgeois males as 
evidence of their moral superiority to the noblemen they aspired to 
displace, we might read it as pertaining to class as well. 
At last, in measure 12, we are prepared for a clear diatonic 
cadence. True to its melancholic predisposition, however, the phrase 
ends instead on a sigh and a deceptive cadence, which is echoed in 
the winds. But this is exactly the same move that diverted the 
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movement from D and its aristocratic bearing in the first place. The 
full orchestra suddenly bursts in, as though picking up where it left 
off before the tender bourgeois episode we have just enjoyed. 
Indeed, Mozart banks on our having enjoyed this episode so much 
that it returns, gently wresting the controls back from G major, 
which the trumpets and drums had asserted, for a second attempt 
at a cadence on D. 
The sentimental dalliance of this material, however, is not al­
lowed to subvert the composition—at least not without a proper 
battle. At this point, the trumpets and drums return with a ven­
geance, in the guise of the ombra topos. The benign D major of the 
beginning is disfigured into a grim D minor, made all the grimmer 
by a military tattoo in the timpani. As in measure 3, the strings 
sneak up through the triad presented, now intensified with plead­
ing turn figures. Each would-be arrival is met by a new orchestral 
chord, to which the cowering strings conform—yet from which 
they apparently seek escape. 
The series of chords at first seems almost arbitrary—the exercise 
of absolutist authority. But the chords are not truly random: after 
leading us through a number of flat-laden keys related to D minor, 
they lead back inexorably to a dominant pedal anticipating a 
cadential arrival in that key. The chords also turn out to be the ones 
dictated by the constraints of those signs of aristocratic might, the 
natural trumpet and timpani: in order to sound with their full 
acoustical force, these instruments can play only the pitches D and 
A. Yet these restrictions become the most terrifying evidence of 
their power over the discourse, as they legislate that all motion be 
confined to accommodate their own severe limitations.31 
In the final bars of the introduction, motivic fragments from the 
Empfindsam section return, their former mobility now imprisoned 
by martial alternations between D and A, their sweetness rendered 
pathetic by the minor-mode context. Once again, both class and 
psychoanalytic readings seem plausible, as absolutist or patri­
archal order thwarts the emergence of another kind of agent: one 
that exhibits such characteristics as flexibility, curiosity, tender­
ness, and dynamic motion—namely, a bourgeois subject. Yet its 
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very sentimentality seems to have hampered it from successfully 
evading the static law of the aristocratic Father.32 
I have chosen thus far to highlight those elements in the 
score that would enhance a narrative approach. But most of my 
musicological colleagues would select rather different details— 
those that demonstrate that an iron-clad sense of musical order 
underlies all the discontinuities and violent ruptures I have 
privileged. And they would, of course, be perfectly justified in 
doing so. For instance, those digressions to B, G, and E near the 
beginning are soon folded back into normalcy. Every musical detail 
can be understood as operating within an autonomous musical 
domain of harmonic, melodic, contrapuntal, and rhythmic rela­
tionships. 
Yet I would view an entirely formalist account as reductive. 
Mozart presents within this introduction a bewildering array of 
culturally significant affects and topoi that seem virtually to de­
mand a story, a justification for materials that are not yet rationally 
deployed. The economy that we expect of aesthetic objects of this 
period—especially Mozart's—requires something more by way of 
explanation. Why have we been subjected to this jumble?33 If we 
have faith that these fits and starts were purposeful, the continua­
tion of the symphony will reward our expectations. Rather than 
choosing between strictly formal and strictly narrative accounts, it 
seems critical to acknowledge that Mozart is operating continually 
in both registers, and to see this tension as perhaps the most 
important aspect of content in this work. 
The first movement of the Prague enacts marvelously the con­
struction of the subject, from timid beginnings to a degree of 
confidence comparable to—if vastly different from—the autocratic 
gestures of the introduction. If we examine the clues we already 
have been given, we might know in advance something of what 
will constitute an appropriate answer to the opening section, for 
the orchestral forces deployed at the outset will probably be used 
again—in part for the sake of balance, but also (on a much more 
pragmatic level) to have made the hiring of all those musicians 
worthwhile. In other words, despite its exceedingly modest debut, 
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the subject of the first movement must eventually grow to fill the 
very large shoes of its predecessor. 
The inauguration of the allegro's subject is singularly inauspi­
cious: while the solo D in the first violin delivers the tonic pitch 
foretold by the introduction, it does so hesitantly, in quaking 
syncopations. The other strings enter with tentative, inverted 
harmonies that hover between consolidating D as tonic and inflect­
ing it as a function prepared to resolve to G major, the passive, 
subdominant side of the key. So insubstantial is the first violin that 
the lower parts may be heard as the melodic line, a line that strives 
twice to rise before it descends to the first genuine cadence we have 
had thus far. At the moment the lower strings begin their descent, 
the first violin emerges from its paralysis with a small motive of its 
own and joins in the arrival. 
The first theme of the exposition contrasts sharply with what has 
preceded it, yet it draws heavily upon figures that Mozart already 
has set forth. The syncopations of the opening, for instance, had 
been established in the final measure of the adagio; the turn in 
measure 43 had already marked the tormented ascents between 
oppressive blasts from measures 17-27; and the tendency to deflect 
inward to G major or B minor—rather than pushing dynamically 
toward the self-confirmation of tonic and dominant—had occurred 
repeatedly in the introduction. 
But even if its genetic materials can be traced to the adagio, the 
identity of this thematic unit is woefully insecure, given its ambiva­
lence with respect to pulse, phrasing, direction, key, and even 
which line counts as the tune. Nevertheless, it does succeed in 
pulling together enough rhythmic and harmonic momentum to 
achieve the tiny triumph of a cadence, an occasion hailed with a 
fanfare by the whole ensemble—brass, drums, and all. This burst 
of approbation encourages the theme to repeat itself, leading to a 
second cadence and the beginning of the theme's progress toward 
self-realization. 
Skipping ahead to the end of the movement, we find that the 
process concludes with a victorious apotheosis of this first theme. It 
has been duly transformed to occupy its role as confident adult: its 
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parts are inverted so that the yearning gesture originally in the 
lower strings now serves unequivocally as melody, while the stam­
mering syncopations have developed into constant eighth notes 
that press dynamically forward to the final cadence. This, then, is 
the telos, the goal toward which the movement strives: the confi­
dent coming-to-power/coming-of-age of a subject whose advent 
can be detected in retrospect in the introduction, who begins his 
journey unaware of his own resources, and who eventually works 
through his own potentialities to become fully actualized. 
More than most Mozart movements, this one seems determined 
always to generate new ideas out of materials already presented: 
consequently, the development of the self-sufficient subject seems 
constantly at stake. For instance, the harmonic motion of measures 
51-54 is accomplished by the motive of measure 42 laid end to end; 
the turn figure inverts and the syncopations become aggressive to 
produce the vigorous sequence beginning in measure ^yf and even 
the halting redundancies of measures 9 and 39-40 are embraced 
and mobilized in the jubilant arrival on the dominant in measures 
63-71. 
But if the movement as a whole pursues a trajectory of linear 
development, it does not do so simplistically. The emancipation 
from aristocratic/patriarchal control is only one feature of the story 
here enacted; even more crucial is the question of what kind of 
subject the emergent self will be. As though addressing precisely 
these concerns, Mozart problematizes various critical moments in 
the unfolding of the movement—-the moments where the narrative 
and structural components of the composition are most likely to 
pull in opposite directions. These include most obviously the 
second key area and the requisite return to opening materials for 
recapitulation. 
Although formal procedures had not yet become frozen into the 
schemata theorized later, the second key area was even in Mozart's 
time a moment when contrasting thematic materials most often 
appeared, in order to heighten the tonal dichotomy fundamental to 
the dynamic process.34 In this movement, however, Mozart installs 
his contrasting key with yet another enactment of the emergence of 
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the first theme. Its identity thus is stamped on this site where 
integrity might have been threatened, and although a contrasting 
theme occurs presently in this new key, the terrain of this key is 
already defined as belonging to the protagonist—especially as the 
increasingly empowered opening subject returns to serve also as 
closing material. 
The second key area offers a new set of challenges to our subject. 
First, it turns out that to cadence on the dominant is not the same as 
to be in the dominant, nor does self-proliferation of imitative 
patterning guarantee security. The enterprising sequential passage 
beginning in measure 82 seems to intensify identity, yet it rushes 
headlong into a tonal crisis—the first suggestion of violence in this 
otherwise rather playful context. It is as though the dominant had 
been won too easily, without the struggle such a step necessarily 
entails. The brass and timpani return to set out an unyielding pedal 
on D; and it is only with tremendous effort (the bass shoving up 
through a chromatic scale) that A major is regained—earned this 
time rather than simply assumed as the next step in the convention. 
This process—the sustained D in the brass, the chromatic bass 
leading eventually to an arrival on A—resonates with the crisis of 
the introduction (mm. 16-28). In the introduction, the arrival 
served as containment; here in the exposition, it represents hard 
work, success, and the opening of new terrains. Instead of smack­
ing into the dominant as though conquering it, the escape from D 
deflects deceptively onto F-sharp, from which position the har­
mony floats down graciously into A major. Only now, in this 
carefully circumscribed realm, does another thematic unit appear. 
This unit is not, of course, altogether new: it is related affectively— 
even through melodic profile and accompaniment pattern—to the 
lyrical materials that first appeared in measures 7-12 of the intro­
duction. Unlike the principal theme, which constantly overflows 
expected phrase boundaries, this second theme unfolds compla­
cently in symmetrical four-bar groupings. It luxuriates in sensitive 
chromatic inflections, then repeats itself in the melancholic color­
ing of A minor. But at the moment of cadence where the minor 
mode might have established itself, the major intercedes and 
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brings us back—at first tenderly, and then by the energetic sequen­
tial motives that first brought us to the dominant—to the trium­
phant opening theme. 
We might regard these contrasting materials as representing 
another force, perhaps—as in the introduction—aligned with femi­
ninity35 Yet it seems that Mozart has taken great pains to situate 
them within a domain bracketed firmly at both ends by the princi­
pal theme. Moreover, they too display the legacy of the introduc­
tion: they resemble the motives that worked in opposition to the 
tyranny of the brass but were too weak to prevail. Here in this 
context—after the principal theme has laid the public foundation 
for its unimpeded continuation—it becomes possible to indulge in 
tenderness, in depth of feeling without the fear of destruction from 
the outside. Form has begun to structure feeling. 
To be sure, sentiment soon devolves into melancholy and threat­
ens to undo the confident facade achieved during the first section 
of the exposition. Thus the sudden turn to major in measure 112 
sounds like a conscious decision not to continue in that vein. But 
this detour into sensitivity makes the eventual triumph of the 
principal theme seem all the more palatable, for we have witnessed 
not only the battle of self-development waged in the public sphere 
of motivic construction, but also the realm of subjective interiority: 
the spiritual depth demanded of the new bourgeois male. 
The recapitulation is a bit different. Adorno has made us aware 
of the problematic nature of formal recapitulations: the conven­
tional demand that a movement return to its original key and 
thematic materials two-thirds of the way through the piece would 
seem to destroy the illusion of ongoing narrative development that 
became such a central concern of nineteenth-century culture.36 
Beethoven tended to display his rebellion against the external 
requirements of formal conventions quite dramatically, and the 
entry into recapitulation is often the site for his most resistant 
maneuvers. In contrast with Beethoven, Mozart sometimes seems 
to accept the constraints of formal convention without a struggle. 
But in the Prague, the moment of recapitulation is inflected nar­
ratively rather more than one would expect. 
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The development section itself is one of the most intensively 
combinatorial passages in Mozart, as he works through a series of 
motives, each put into canon-like imitation with itself and in 
superimposition with the others. The one moment that had seemed 
to stand outside the subject—the huzzah that greets its first 
presentation in measure 43—unexpectedly provides the motive 
(originally a simple countermelody to the brass fanfare) that per­
vades its development section. Once all these ideas have been 
explored sufficiently, Mozart channels the tension through a linear 
buildup into what sounds initially like the recapitulation. We have 
heard precisely this buildup and resolution before, however: it is a 
repetition of the passage that first arrived on the dominant. And 
this is exactly what happens here—we begin not on tonic but on A 
major. 
Notwithstanding its problematic key, the principal theme begins 
confidently; but within a couple of measures it becomes hesitant 
and lists toward D minor. The melancholy shadings of the second 
theme are recalled, as well as the sense of entrapment over the A 
pedal at the conclusion of the introduction. The motive that had 
dominated the development so aggressively now fades into mourn­
ing and reveals its affinity with the lyrical motives of the second 
theme. But it gradually builds momentum and drives into the 
actual recapitulation in measure 208. 
Once again, this presentation on A of the principal motive serves 
as a foil, to demonstrate the follies of premature assumptions. Just 
as the easy arrival on the dominant had to be discarded and 
properly achieved in the exposition, its reappearance in the move-
ment's most critical juncture makes the return to tonic seem earned 
rather than mechanical. To be sure, the recapitulation satisfies 
formal expectations; yet Mozart designs his strategies to suggest 
that it is motivated not by convention, but by the demands of this 
narrative of becoming. 
Mozart also problematizes the security of D major itself after it 
returns. In measure 217 (after the celebratory fanfare), the theme 
indulges in chromatic inflections and moves unexpectedly into 
B-flat major. It is as though the first theme is sufficiently confident 
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that it can incorporate some of the flexibility of its more private side 
into its public presentation. This move requires a renewed struggle 
if the identity of D major is to be regained: thus the crisis that built 
toward the second theme in the exposition can be repeated as 
though of internal necessity, and the lyrical themes themselves serve 
as welcome dramatic contrast rather than blind repetition. 
The movement ends with the consolidation of identity: the 
principal theme occurs twice in its triumphal form, inflected with 
the chromaticism of the second theme, permitting the two to reach 
a kind of synthesis at the end. Unlike the rigid, aristocratic gestures 
of the introduction, the subject that has fully emerged by the 
conclusion of the movement is dynamic, its motives carefully 
balanced among its central figure's yearning, sensitivity, and confi­
dent ability to enact closure. And like the bourgeois individual 
whose characteristics the movement so closely resembles, it ap­
pears to be autonomous—self-reliant and self-generated. 
To some extent, the narrative closure enacted by this opening 
movement seems to render subsequent movements superfluous. 
This is, of course, a central formal preoccupation of the nineteenth 
century: when narrative components appear to motivate structural 
unfolding, the usual four-movement series becomes an embarrass­
ment. Beginning most clearly with Beethoven, composers attempt 
to refashion their narratives so that the finale serves as closure for 
an entire cycle of interrelated movements. 
While Mozart often creates affinities among his movements, one 
rarely finds evidence of cyclicism per se. Yet he rarely pushes his 
narrative inflections as far as he does in the opening movement of 
the Prague; and in this piece, some of the dilemmas confronted 
more vehemently by Beethoven begin to emerge. The most obvious 
instance of cyclical interdependence in the Prague occurs in the 
passages of the closing movement mentioned at the very beginning 
of this paper, where the patriarchal authority left behind in the 
introduction suddenly returns in full force. 
The exposition of the presto drops few clues that anything 
troublesome might be forthcoming. Its principal theme is sprightly 
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and confident from the outset; it does not seem to demand a 
narrative of becoming, for its identity is already secure. To be sure, 
the exposition goes through the paces expected of it, and it recalls 
superficially some of the tensions of the first movement—the 
modal shifts and chromatic inflections similar to those in the 
allegro recur, as does a triumphal transformation of the sprightly 
opening theme. But the doubts that confronted the subject of the 
earlier movement appear to have been transcended: the crises that 
appear in the exposition of the finale sound like tempests in 
teapots. 
The development section alters that state of affairs, however, as it 
opens with the notorious blast from the brass and timpani. As in 
the introduction, the protagonist here follows the harmonic dic­
tates of the blasts—yet its impish energy tends to mock the serious­
ness of those autocratic pronouncements. And after four brass 
interjections (none of them, incidentally, particularly disruptive 
harmonically), the subject just dances off. The remainder of the 
development is devoted to working out the implications of the 
principal theme itself. After some clever feints and dodges, it enters 
into the recapitulation in measure 216, The business at hand would 
seem to be the reiteration of the sequence of events in the exposi­
tion and final closure on the tonic. 
Scarcely has the D major recapitulation begun, however, when 
the aristocratic blast reenters, now in earnest—in G minor. The 
theme itself might be said to have provoked this harsh interven­
tion, for it had just pivoted off teasingly (and apparently irrespon­
sibly) toward G major. As in the introduction and development, the 
theme follows dutifully the dictates of the blasts, even as it appears 
to be attempting to sneak away. Suddenly in measure 244, the 
protagonist seizes the powerful voice of the brass and timpani, but 
compels it now to conform to the finale's principal tune. It marshals 
those forces through to the arrival on the dominant in measure 260, 
at which point the puckish second theme group emerges un­
scathed. 
Something like this particular crisis with the brass and timpani 
had already occurred in the exposition. But it was not at that time 
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explicitly affiliated with the symphony's introduction. What Mozart 
accomplishes in the finale's recapitulation is the confrontation that 
had been postponed since the first movement's exposition began. 
For while that movement successfully demonstrated the generation 
of the self, it did so without referring to the traumas that had 
preceded it. The theme in measure 37 of the opening movement 
simply turns its back on the introduction's painful struggle over 
authority. But if we have been paying close attention to the implica­
tions of that opening movement, we may feel as though we have 
been waiting for the other shoe to drop—as we are throughout the 
apparent frivolity of Don Giovanni, 
As in the opera, the symphony's nightmares are realized when 
the repressed refuses to remain buried and returns to interrupt the 
proceedings. However, this composition is far more comedic than 
Don Giovanni, and the return offers the opportunity for the emer­
gent subject to demonstrate that he has in fact achieved the aristo­
cratic father's strength and stature without also taking on his more 
autocratic tendencies. Power has been transformed from prohibi­
tion to dynamism. Yet one more crisis occurs (mm. 307-17) before 
the end—again brought on by an ill-advised approach to G; but, as 
was the case in the parallel moment in the exposition, it is quickly 
laid to rest and is superceded by playful triplets, trills, and a final 
statement of the theme, which has appropriated the brass-and-
drum fanfares to its own glory. 
If only the outer movements were at stake, I would be inclined to 
follow primarily the political implications of this narrative trajec­
tory: the emergence of a bourgeois sensibility out of aristocratic 
oppression. But it was a slow movement that inspired Maynard 
Solomon's psychoanalytic inquiries, and the middle movement of 
the Prague too invites a reading that draws us into the private 
sphere (which is no less publicly articulated). 
The andante is in G major. This follows convention, for the 
subdominant had long been a common choice for slow movements. 
But this key also ties in with some details of the framing move­
ments. Recall, for instance, that the principal theme of the allegro 
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has a tendency to lean passively toward G—a tendency that has to 
be overcome repeatedly in favor of forward motion. And the central 
crisis in the finale is precipitated by an attempted move t o G - a 
move that brings down all the prohibitive weight of the Law. In 
other words, the key of G seems to be desired yet forbidden—by 
external forces and also by the subject's own imperatives for 
dynamic progress and self-sustained identity. 
As the second movement begins, this realm becomes topically 
more specific. The movement presents a kind of pastoral, in that its 
rhythms are those of the siciliano and its melody (doubled in 
"sweet" sixths) occurs over a tonic pedal, in the style of a musette. 
It displays a tendency toward its own subdominant, stressing the 
nostalgic atmosphere already suggested by the references to an­
tiquated and rustic types.37 
The altered inflections that had already appeared in the intro­
duction and first movement proliferate here, producing an affect of 
heightened sensitivity. A chromatic scale seems to lead toward the 
first implied cadence in measure 4, only to overflow with excess 
bounty through the measure to the beginning of the next phrase. 
This next phrase turns out to be a repetition of the first, but 
intensified by still more inflections and yearning suspensions. 
Measure 8 brings in a contrasting idea—a tiny staccato motive 
moving timidly in sequence. Gradually its baby steps acquire 
greater confidence and lead back into the embrace of lush suspen­
sion chains related to the opening material, rounding off the first 
section. 
This nostalgic landscape of plenitude corresponds to images not 
simply of "the feminine," but, more specifically, of "the maternal." 
This is so not only because of the semiotic associations with which 
Mozart engages in constructing this tableau, but also because of 
the conflicted way this material operates within the movement's 
structure. A successful representation of infantile coextension 
with the mother would require that the static quality of this 
opening be maintained indefinitely; in fact, the movement's se­
quence of events implies that this dreamy stasis is precisely what is 
desired. 
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Alas, the movement is indelibly stamped with its own historical 
moment—the late 1700s—-and the procedures of that time neces­
sarily bring dynamism along with them. The andante can be 
intelligible only if it participates (however reluctantly) in the tele­
ological processes of tonality and sonata. In contrast to Movements 
I and III, which seem to rely on narrative inflection to overcome the 
nay-saying oppression of the brass, this interlude resists change 
and must be forced into narrative (the by-product of separation) by 
harsh interventions. It seems to cling to the fixed image of preoedi­
pal bliss; yet reality keeps breaking in, disrupting the peace and 
pressuring the movement to participate both in the progressive 
dimensions of late eighteenth-century ideology and in the traumas 
of maturation. 
The first disruption happens in measure 18, where the cocoon of 
G major is suddenly shattered by loud B octaves, introducing an 
imperious E-minor passage. As in the introduction to the sym­
phony, a struggle ensues as the more gracious elements emerge and 
move through a chain of sighs toward D major, then D minor. The 
louder forces break in again on B-flat, and when the sighs return, it 
is over an A pedal—again as at the end of the symphony's introduc­
tion. The sixteenth-note runs that had spelled plenitude at the 
beginning of the movement circle within this minor-mode context 
as though lost, until they are marshalled toward a cadential arrival 
on the dominant, D major. The second key area restores the 
musette, suspensions, and baby steps from the opening passage. 
At measure 45, they participate briefly in a minuet, as though they 
have moved to a more external, social terrain. A crisis in measure 51 
threatens to destroy the illusion, but it is defeated and maternal 
peace seems to reign at the end of the exposition. 
If in the other movements the Law of the Father seems to prohibit 
growth, here it is generative, as it destabilizes the domestic inertia 
and nostalgia into which the subject seems all too happy to 
regress. The kinds of identity forged in the outer movements could 
not emerge if the pastoral were permitted to survive. Thus we hear 
this landscape through a glass darkly—we get glimmers and half-
forgotten memories, but access back to the experience itself is 
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heavily mediated by noise and interference. As Solomon has writ­
ten so eloquently: 
Such music is expressive of a preverbal, preoedipal state of symbiotic 
fusion of infant and mother, a dual-unity matrix that constitutes, 
under favorable circumstances, an infancy Eden of unsurpassable 
beauty, inexpressible love, and ecstatic merging, but also a state 
completely vulnerable to terrors of separation, loss, psychosis, and 
even fears of potential annihilation; moreover, a state that inevitably 
terminates in separation, which even under the most favorable 
circumstances leaves a residue of mourning and engenders a desire to 
rediscover anew the blissful sensation of undifferentiated fusion 
with the mother. (10) 
In the development section, Mozart inscribes the opening tableau 
on three successive pitch levels (mm. 64-83), as though he were 
trying to find a way to reconstitute and inhabit this Edenic mem­
ory. Each time it disintegrates after a few measures. At last the baby 
step motive is forced to undergo a stormy development; and although 
it eventually finds its way back for the recapitulation, the pastoral is 
henceforth indelibly marked by a history of violent struggle. Again, 
Eagleton locates this structure within its historical context: 
The subject of the sublime is accordingly decentred, plunged into 
loss and pain, undergoes a crisis and fading of identity; yet without 
this unwelcome violence we would never be stirred out of ourselves, 
never prodded into enterprise and achievement. We would lapse 
back instead into the placid feminine enclosure of the imaginary, 
where desire is captivated and suspended. Kant associates the sub­
lime with the masculine and the military, useful antidotes against a 
peace which breeds cowardice and effeminacy. Ideology must not so 
thoroughly centre the subject as to castrate its desire; instead we 
must be both cajoled and chastized, made to feel both homeless and 
at home, folded upon the world yet reminded that our true resting 
place is in infinity. It is part of the dialectic of the beautiful and the 
sublime to achieve this double ideological effect. (90) 
Mozart presents in this movement an adult's reminiscence of an 
experience that might be foundational to subjectivity but that can 
SUSAN MCCLARY 
never actually be regained. He knows you can't go home again. And 
thus we return to the public sphere of the finale where identities 
can seem to be consolidated through struggle, but where traces of 
that interior world occasionally surface to balance the more aggres­
sive qualities of self-generation. 
In the decades that followed Mozart, these tensions between 
structure and narrative in musical composition became increas­
ingly more vexed—as they did in the social arena of the nineteenth 
century. The containment so admired during the Enlightenment 
lost credibility, and the notion that the subject conformed to formal 
dictates from internal—rather than external—necessity came to 
appear deluded. Thus, beginning with Beethoven, the forms of the 
eighteenth century were subjected to sustained attack. 
As his career proceeded, Beethoven called into question vir­
tually every aspect of sonata that still operated according to unex­
amined convention. He cast aside traditional tonal backgrounds in 
favor of idiosyncratic progressions derived from his own materials; 
he bashed away at the boundaries separating self-contained move­
ments until they became interlocking segments of overarching 
narrative entities; he protested within his music against what he 
marks as the external "necessity" of recapitulation. 
Yet even as he shattered the relative complacency of sonata's 
conventions, Beethoven put more and more energy into the illusion 
of rigorous rnotivic integrity. The split that opened up in the 1810s 
between the forms required for intelligibility and the desire for 
narratives of ongoing self-generation became increasingly exacer­
bated, parallel with the same dilemmas raging in the social world.38 
Many of Beethoven's successors accepted the terms of the struggle, 
and a kind of metanarrative unfolds over the course of the nine­
teenth century in which the contradictions of sonata become ever 
more pronounced until they break down at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
Mozart is usually regarded as speaking to us from a prelapsarian 
moment before certainty collapses into relativity, before—in Karl 
Marx's words—all that is solid melts into air. Because Mozart was 
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writing at a time when optimism in the emergent bourgeois subject 
was still warranted, he was able (like eighteenth-century aestheti­
cians and political theorists) to present the possibility of a solution 
without seeming to compromise himself. As Karol Berger has 
described it: 
It is rather the characteristic sense of life of the pre-revolutionary or 
better pre-Terror Enlightenment (Kant's view of history comes to 
mind as another example of the same trust which similarly escapes 
the charge of naivete because it is tempered by the same awareness of 
the possibility of tragedy), a Lehensgefiihl so utterly absent from the 
art for such a long time now that we cannot but hear in Mozart's music 
a voice from a very distant and alien past.39 
Mozart's music strikes a balance between formal constraints and 
sensitivity, between the conventions that make his music publicly 
intelligible and the marks of individuality that cause his adherence 
to those conventions to seem self-determined. Yet the contradic­
tions in subjective formation that eventually proved unsolvable can 
be detected even here. Is identity guaranteed by narrative coher­
ence? by motivic integrity? by foririkl propriety? What is the 
relationship between interiority and the feminine (or the mater­
nal)? Does trafficking in this terrain render the subject vulnerable? 
How does one strike a balance between interiority and public 
objectivity in the construction of the self? 
By indicating how these concerns inform even his most affirma­
tive compositions, I may be undermining that image of universal, 
perfect order that makes Mozart the darling of festivals. But I hope 
to be clarifying how his music, far from holding aloof from the 
struggles of his day, contributed compelling early models for how 
bourgeois subjectivity might be constructed in the face of both 
oppressive authority and the temptation to regress into nostalgia. 
Notes 
i. See the comparison between the introduction to the Prague and the 
overture to Don Giovanni in Allanbrook, 198. 
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2. In "Music as Narrative/' Fred Maus has argued that all movements 
from this repertory—even those that follow the norms-—invite narrative 
readings (17-18). I concur with him and will later suggest that the conven­
tions themselves already have narrative implications. But for now I focus on 
anomalies that seem to demand special explanation. 
3. Jens Peter Larsen, for instance, described the Prague as a Mani­
chaean battle between good and evil. See Larsen, 188. 
4. For a fuller discussion of this tendency to reduce Mozart to princi­
ples of order, see my "A Musical Dialectic from the Enlightenment." 
5. See Newcomb, "Once More 'Between Absolute and Program Mu­
sic7 " and "Schumann and Late Eighteenth-Century Narrative Strategies"; 
Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900 and "Musical Narratology"; 
and Maus, "Music as Drama" and "Music as Narrative." I have examined 
some of the ideological premises of the narrative schemata of nineteenth-
century music in my Feminine Endings. 
6. Abbate, especially chapters 1 and 2. Abbate wants to restrict the 
word "narrative" along lines prescribed by Paul Ricoeur, who demands as 
one of his criteria a sense of past tense. She thereby eliminates from 
consideration most instrumental music. This definition seems unneces­
sarily narrow, for it disqualifies not only music, but also plays, films, and 
many other media that are regularly discussed in terms of narrative 
strategies. 
7- See Leo Treitler's elegant narrative reading of the slow movement of 
Mozart's Symphony No. 39 in "Mozart and the Idea of Absolute Music," in 
his Music arid the Historical Imagination, 176-214. Treitler, however, seeks to 
locate Mozart's instrumental music within the category of "absolute" music: 
that is, "autonomous instrumental music that is essentially musical because 
it is not determined by any ideas, contents, or purposes that are not 
musical," or music that is "not conditional upon the associations—cultural 
and personal—that language necessarily carries as its historical baggage" 
(177). I argue that Mozart's music likewise is burdened with "historical 
baggage." 
For helpful theoretical discussions of plot in literature, see Brooks and 
Chambers. Brooks and Chambers (and also White) deal with narrativizing 
as a crucial feature of nineteenth-century culture. 
8. It is surely no coincidence that many of the discussions concerning 
instrumental music and narrative focus on Beethoven (see, for example, 
Maus, "Music as Drama7' and "Music as Narrative," Hatten, and Kramer, 
"Musical Narrativity"). Yet only Kramer addresses the historical context 
that predisposed Beethoven to narrative strategies. 
9. See the appraisal of Mozart and his social relations in "The Rebel," 
chapter 7 of Stafford's The Mozart Myths, 177-206. See also Pestelli, 142-48. 
• 92 • 
Bourgeois Subjectivity in the Prague Symphony 
10. Eagle ton points out that Kant, one of the foremost aesthetic theo­
rists of this movement, manifests many of the same ambivalences with 
respect to class politics as does Mozart. 
11. See Bonds for a study of how eighteenth-century theorists con­
ceived of musical form. See also, however, my discussion of how narrative 
elements break into Bach's Brandenburg Concerto No. 5 in 'The Blasphemy 
of Talking Politics," 21-41. 
12. For a discussion of how formal devices begin to regulate the opera 
aria in the late seventeenth century, see chapter 10 of Rosand. Opera seria 
itself was a rule-bound attempt at salvaging the spectacularity of opera 
while purging it of the excesses it had exhibited during its phase as public 
entertainment in Venice. 
13. Indeed, this final section is not even notated. The middle movement 
concludes with the designation "da Capo" (from the top), and the first 
section is performed again exactly as before, except with the addition of 
improvised ornaments. 
14. Second themes that pose threats are rarely found before the nine­
teenth century, when dilemmas involving alterity begin to emerge at the 
very time the liberal project begins to be threatened from below—by those 
who must be kept in subordinate positions, such as workers, ethnic aliens, 
women, and femininity itself. By contrast, the eighteenth-century sonata 
usually focuses on the viability of the subject per se: its freedom of activity, 
its depth of feeling, and its capacity for consensual interchange, 
15. Some theorists at the time found the repetition quite problematic, 
even from the point of view of rhetoric. Gretry, for instance, wrote in 1797: 
"A sonata is an oration [discours]. What are we to think of a man who, 
dividing his discourse in half, repeats each half? T was at your house this 
morning; yes, I was at your house this morning to talk with you about 
something; to talk with you about something' . .  . I speak above all of the 
long reprises that constitute the halves of an oration. Reprises may have 
been good at the birth of music, at a time when the listener did not 
comprehend everything until the second time around. I know that an 
oration is often divided into two sections; but without a doubt, one does not 
present each one twice." Quoted in Bonds, 130-31. 
16. Lawrence Kramer draws on Jacques Derrida's notions of force and 
structure to make a similar argument in "As If a Voice Were in Them': 
Music, Narrative, and Deconstruction," Music as Cultural Practice,. 176-213. 
17. Eagleton, 107: "The aesthetic is a kind of fictive or heuristic realm in 
which we can suspend the force of our usual powers, imaginatively 
transferring qualities from one drive to another in a kind of free-wheeling 
experiment of the mind. Having momentarily disconnected these drives 
from their real-life contexts, we can enjoy the fantasy of reconstituting each 
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by means of the other, reconstructing psychical conflict in terms of its 
potential resolution/' 
18. For a similar argument, see Rosen, 325. 
19. Eagle ton also argues this position throughout his book. See also 
Chodorow and Benjamin. 
20. For a discussion of how the Kantian categories of the sublime and 
beautiful are defined in terms of patriarchal law and the mother's body 
respectively, see Eagleton, 90-93. See also the quotation from Eagleton 
below. 
21. For discussions of how the work of bourgeois social formation was 
accomplished in the novel, see Moretti and Armstrong. 
22. I am using masculine pronouns deliberately because the narratives 
inscribed in most such stories involve male protagonists. Jane Austen's 
works foreground women who must learn how to negotiate between the 
social world and their own subjectivities, but those tensions are quite 
distinct from both those in novels by male authors and those in Mozart's 
narratives. This is not to suggest that women listeners cannot identify with 
the male protagonists in either literature or music, but only to acknowledge 
important historical differences. 
23. See Ballantine, "Beethoven, Hegel and Marx," Music and Its Social 
Meanings, 34: "Where, in the earlier style, a piece evolves on the basis of 
what is already there at the beginning, in the later it gropes ever towards a 
new formulation, one not given but latent within an original contradiction: 
it strives to become what it is not, on the basis of what it is" Ballantine 
specifically includes Mozart in "the earlier style," yet what he says applies 
to certain of Mozart's later compositions, especially the Prague. See also 
chapters 6-8 of Meyer. 
24. For other discussions of Mozart along these lines, see Subotnik, 
"Evidence of a Critical Worldview in Mozart's Last Three Symphonies," 
Developing Variations, 98-111; and Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideolo­
gy, 188-90. I have also benefited from reading Christine Bezat's Foucaul­
dian account in "The Order of Things in the Prague Symphony!' 
25. Moretti calls the late eighteenth-century Bildungsroman "classic," 
because it typically tries to reconcile tensions. Compare Agawu: "Mozart 
can disrupt a nominally secure conventional tonal world, knowing all 
along that such disruption is illusory, that the security guaranteed by a 
closed, hierarchic tonal structure remains an immutable law. This is artistic 
play of a subtle and alluring kind" (83). Later novels by Stendhal and others 
insist on the fundamental impossibility of reconciliation, as do many 
nineteenth-century composers beginning with Beethoven. 
26. For an example in which the contradictions seem quite exposed, see 
my "A Musical Dialectic." 
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27. The remainder of the article presents a reading (by no means the 
only one feasible) of the Prague Symphony. I have tried to describe the 
music in such a way as to assist those who cannot read notation, but the 
reader must consult a recording or score in order to follow the arguments. 
While performances differ radically, the recording by Nikolaus Harnon­
court on Teldec comes closest to projecting what I describe. 
28. Cone, 24-31. 
29. Strangely enough, Charles Rosen comments on how little the intro­
duction has to do with the remainder of the piece. See his The Classical Style, 
347­
30. See Caplan. Even as late as David Copperfield, tears served as an 
index of masculine sensitivity For an account of the cult of eighteenth-
century sensitivity in Germany, see Ford, 33-37. 
31. On connections between the limitations and semiotics of the natu­
ral trumpet, see Walser, "Musical Imagery and Performance Practice in J.S. 
Bach's Arias with Trumpet/' 63-69. 
32. See Ford, 34-35, on the political passivity of German Empfindsamkeit 
and even Sturm und Drang. See also Szondi, "Tableau and Coup de Theatre: 
On the Social Psychology of Diderot's Bourgeois Tragedy," On Textual 
Understanding and Other Essays, 115-32, for a discussion of how eighteenth-
century sentimentality stands as a substitute for genuine action: "[A]s long 
as the middle-class spectator wants to feel pity in the theater, the model 
hero of bourgeois tragedy will be the helpless victim of an absolute ruler's 
arbitrary power. . . . Or, conversely, as long as the bourgeoisie does not 
revolt against absolutism and make a bid for power, it will lie solely for its 
emotions, bewailing in the theater its own misery" (132). 
33. For an examination of the relationships between topics and formal 
structure in this introduction, see Agawu, 17-25. Agawu is reluctant to 
refer outside the music and its immediate codes; he explicitly insists on 
"reference without consequence" (38). Indeed, he seems to want to read 
works from the height of the Enlightenment as perfect instances of what 
Fredric Jameson disparages as the "blank parody"—the mere "playing with 
signs"—of postmodernism. Along with Eagleton, I believe there is far more 
at stake here, that the references do have consequences—both within the 
domain of the composition and in the realm of social formation. 
34. For eighteenth-century confirmation of this point, see Bonds, espe­
cially 98-102. 
35. I am drawing here (as is Mozart) on the codes that circulated on the 
operatic stage. In some sense, it does not matter whether we regard this 
passage as a feminine Other or as the privatized, domestic dimension of the 
subject. 
36. Adorno wrote extensively on this dilemma in many disparate 
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places. An insightful narrative account of his various arguments is pre­
sented in Rose Rosengard Subotnik, 'The Historical Structure: Adorno's 
'French' Model for the Criticism of Nineteenth-Century Music," pages 206­
38 in Developing Variations. 
37. For more on the topical associations of the siciliano and musette, see 
Allanbrook, 44 and 52-54. She writes: "The siciliano is closely identified 
with the pastoral genre; Sicily is, after all, the Italian Arcadia. . . . [I]t often 
bears an affect of nostalgia and resignation, passions naturally attendant 
on memories of a better world" (44). 
38. See my "Narrative Agendas in Absolute Music." See also Eagleton 
for a metanarrative of how these tensions develop within aesthetic theory, 
and Moretti for how they develop in the later Bildungsroman. 
39. Berger, 28. Moretti observes the same change in the contemporane­
ous Bildungsroman. 
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The Ethics of Forms: Taking 
Flight with The Wings of the Dove 
WAYN E C  . B O O T  H 
When I accepted the assignment to "do an essay for our volume, 
one that will combine theory with practical criticism/' I felt no 
compunctions about undertaking once again a task that thousands 
of us perform annually: raiding a book for critical purposes. I 
would simply do a careful "ethical" critique of some major novel. 
Then I thought over those I would like to read again, chose The 
Wings of the Dove, and began my first re-reading in about three 
decades of a novel that I remembered as impressive but more 
formidable than lovable.1 
Long before the middle of the book, however, the reading had 
forced me to ask how my project would appear to the master of 
moral subtleties. I had of course promised him that I would try to 
obey his commands—that I would do my best to surrender to 
whatever the book demanded of me before drawing back and 
becoming the professional critic: I would struggle to understand 
before pursuing any outstanding. But of course I was still driven 
by the assignment to look for my point of critical entry. 
The story I found myself meeting, however, threatened to con­
demn that assignment. The touching account of Milly Theale's 
betrayal seemed to nag me about the fundamental difference 
between those like Kate Croy who comfortably use others, and 
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those like Milly who know how or learn how to find their life by 
living with and even for others.2 Whatever I might finally say about 
this novel, I could be sure that it was not written to be used, to be 
reduced to a counter in some critical economy—even mine. It was 
written to be, or to act, or to teach, or to make us see—choose your 
own critical view of what novels are written for, but do not, if you 
want to enter Henry James's drawing room, say that his elaborate 
tales are written to be used a century later by this or that critic with 
an ax to grind. I was being reminded, in short, that no other moral 
fault, in James's rich display of faults, is given more attention than 
reduction of beauty or truth or goodness to market value.3 
Yet in the way the story is told I seemed to find a confirmation of 
my project: James-the-old-intruder was inviting me to turn my 
attention away from the story of Milly and Kate and Merton to 
attend to his idiosyncratic way of telling it—a way not all that 
idiosyncratic by standards of our time but radically so in his. As I 
went on reading, more and more slowly, sometimes exasperated by 
James's subtlety, deflected from the "story" by his many reminders, 
explicit and implicit, of rhetorical manipulations, I soon realized 
that I was caught between two seemingly contradictory demands: 
"Don't use me, because like every other thing of beauty I am not to 
be turned into a commodity." 
"Do use me critically, just as my author 'uses' me by calling your 
attention to his blatantly manipulative way of telling his story." 
Indeed that second demand at times seemed almost explicitly 
directed to Wayne Booth, the lifetime practitioner of point-of-
voyeurism. The full strength of this demand will perhaps not be 
fully intelligible to those who have not read at least one of James's 
late novels. For any such who happen to have stumbled upon me 
here, and also for readers who, though they have read The Wings of 
the Dove, find that their memory of its details is as dim as mine was a 
few weeks ago, I offer in the apendixes two sorrowfully simplified 
summaries: first of what I shall call "the raw chronology" (what 
Gerard Genette calls "story" and some narratologists have called 
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the fabula, what my mentors used to call the "material plot") and 
then of what we can call, adapting James Phelan's terminology, "the 
actual progression" (what Genette calls the "narrative" or "narra­
tive discourse"). I assume that many readers will find those appen­
dixes simply unreadable, but I am convinced that only in attending 
to what they reflect can one appreciate both the full powers of 
James's "late" way of composing and also the ethical pressures that 
thinking about such complex powers can exert. 
My question thus became, as I carried through with my deter­
mination to face James down if he could not answer well: Is your 
presentation of these seemingly contradictory reading demands of 
any great value to me, one of your devotees? In the terms I raise in 
The Company We Keep, are you really good company, in the sense of 
being my true friend, working for my weal? 
The Many Kinds of Reading 
To address the question properly, we must back up and underline 
the complications that make ethical questions about narrative 
methods extraordinarily difficult. 
In the first place, the question as put won't do. It should not be, 
"Is this novel, is this implied Henry James, my true friend?" Who 
but Wayne Booth cares about that? The question should be, "Is this 
novel, when given its full head, a true friend potentially to all 
readers who read it with any care?" And that question thrusts us 
into the facts about diverse readers and readings. Are they not 
unlimitedly various? Can anyone these days deny that the effects of 
The Wings of the Dove will vary from reader to reader, and for each 
reader from reading to reading? Do we not hear, as we pursue 
ethical questions, a strongly ethical demand from several critical 
camps that we celebrate diversity and deliberately ignore or violate 
the work's own demands? Since the phrase "the work's own de­
mands" is itself absurd, I can hear some critical friends saying, the 
only ethical stance is to pursue freedom of spirit, or sharpness of 
perception, or political awakening, all in the name of the deepest of 
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all truths: there is no fixed truth anywhere, and—even more 
certainly in an uncertain world—there are no single certain 
readings.4 
Yet if one wants to talk about the ethical value of a work in general 
and not just about what it has done to or for any one reader, one can 
hardly reject all concern for what it seems to ask every reader to 
do—not just "me" but "us"—regardless of how strongly we may 
want to emphasize what we can do to it.5 In short, the serious 
ethical critic is always faced with two tasks, not just the one that 
earlier ethical critics performed in describing the moral health or 
disease of any one work. To talk about the ethical powers of a work 
as being actually in the work, regardless of readers' differences, is 
one thing. To talk about a work's actual ethical effects is quite 
another. Can the two tasks in any way be reconciled? 
I think they can be, if we distinguish three kinds of reading that 
we all practice. 
We all engage, at least at times, in readings that I shall call 
"reading-with": the reading we do when we simply accept what 
seem to us the obvious demands of the text. The title is, say, Poirot 
Investigates, and the author is Agatha Christie. The cover calls her 
"The Unsurpassed Mistress of Mystery," and the title page adds a 
picture that includes some pearls and some blood. We know that a 
murder will occur, that Poirot will encounter many suspects and 
some fools who are confused by them, and that the book will end 
with the murderer exposed. No problem here, unless we are 
determined not to read-with: we know we have a specific kind of 
whodunit and we read for the mystery and for the mystery alone. 
Or let's say that the title is The Neio Awakening, described as "A 
Novel"; the publisher is Virago Press, a publisher noted for its 
feminist endeavors. In the opening pages a stupid cruel husband is 
shown mistreating a mousy wife; at the end the wife is—in one way 
or another—no longer a mouse; she's awakened at last. Again no 
problem: we read for that moment of liberation. Or we pick up a 
book with the title Merovingian Art from 500 to 751, or Plato's 
Epistemology, or Cognitive Science: A Synthesis; the publisher is, say, 
Cambridge University Press, and we find, on reading, that the 
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title's generic promises are roughly fulfilled. No problem: we read 
the book in the same spirit shown toward the others; we cooperate. 
Of course each of these readings will be in one sense entirely 
different: we "hear" radically different questions and answers. But 
all such reading is the same in one crucial respect: we never 
question—if we go on reading at all—the terms of the contract 
clearly specified by the work's emphasis on its own genre. We 
rely—even the least sophisticated and the most critically up-to-date 
among us rely—on our past experience of genres, slotting in the 
new work until and unless we bump into powerful violations of 
generic expectations. We can even say that two readers who read 
the "same" text in entirely opposed ways, one as a tragedy, say, and 
the other as a comedy, are still reading it "in the same way," for our 
purposes here, so long as each of them thinks the reading is 
reading-with. 
Stories that we read-with (putting aside for now scientific and 
scholarly and political discourse that is not overtly storied) come in 
three sub-types: (a) those that so clearly invite a probing of mean­
ings that most or all readers agree that the invitations are "there on 
the page"; (b) those that so clearly seem to be "just story," just plain 
gripping event-after-event, that only highly motivated critics bother 
to find meanings in them; and (c) those that seem happily to 
respond both to readers looking for profound meanings and to 
those who hope for a gripping experience of story. Aesop's and 
George Orwell's tales are of the first kind: they demand, if we are to 
read-with them, that we think about (and then perhaps talk about) 
meanings, ideas—the relation of the story to "life." With or without 
moral tags attached, readers have to work hard to avoid seeing a 
moral point in an Aesopian fable. The second kind—"Puss in 
Boots" and most murder mysteries and thrillers like Jaws—in effect 
asks us not to worry about meanings: "Just keep moving, if you 
hope to enjoy me in my primary being." 
If tales all fell clearly into these first two kinds, the life of the 
critic would be simpler. But most do not. A great deal of our critical 
energy has always gone into making sense of the third kind (surely 
the largest pile): those that allow readers to move in either direction 
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while believing that they are reading-with. Nothing the story-
centered reader encounters disrupts the story: it all seems to be 
just "what happened/' Yet everything the meaning-centered reader 
encounters supports or invites a given interpretation of meanings. 
Readers of popular fiction generally read-with; they just assume 
that they have the second kind of work (type b) in hand, and they 
suppress all concern for meanings. For them, as for me early in my 
reading life, that becomes the only kind of reading. They usually do 
not re-read, and even when they do they are likely to make their 
second time through pretty much like the first; they—we critics in 
some of our moods—seek simply to renew the original pleasure. 
As Peter Rabinowitz and Janice Radway have both argued, this 
kind of reading has been either ignored or condemned by modern 
criticism, and the pleasures and profit derived from such rapid, 
"unreflective" but deeply engaged reading-with have been almost 
universally underrated by critics while being exploited by commer­
cial authors.6 It is for some recent critics as if the only way to make 
reading such works worthwhile is to go to the opposite extreme, 
what I'll call "reading-against." 
The reader who reads-against sets out to find in the text what­
ever it does not promise or invite to, whatever its author presum­
ably never intended but unconsciously either allowed in or specifi­
cally banned. There are several terms on our critical scene for this 
fashionable kind of reading: "strong," "resistant," "deconstruction­
ist," "anti-intentional" and so on. For many critics, as I have already 
suggested, this could be called "the only intelligent" or "the only 
ethically defensible" type of reading. My central question here can 
be thus rephrased: As I impose my ethical question on The Wings of 
the Dove, am I reading-against or reading-with? 
The third type is not quite a blend of the other two, though it at 
first looks like that. It is what some of us do when, after having had 
a rewarding experience that we think of as reading-with (whether 
simply "for story" or for multiple meanings), we decide to go back 
and re-read, trying either to deepen or clarify the experience, or to 
discover how the author managed to achieve the results we love, or 
why he or she did not achieve such results. We might call this 
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"critical reading," were it not that most readers-against see their 
kind of reading as the only really critical kind. For want of a better 
term, call it "critical re-reading/' 
Such reading again comes in different kinds, depending on our 
critical interests. For now, we need only distinguish re-reading that 
probes for deeper meanings and re-reading that probes for an 
understanding of structure—the principles that determined the au-
thor's act of composition. Re-reading for meanings is often con­
ducted as if the novel might just as well have been written back­
wards; re-reading for structure, in contrast, cares deeply about 
every flashback, every foreshadowing, every expansion or contrac­
tion of the raw events, every shift of point of view.7 
Sometimes critical re-reading, whether for meaning or for archi­
tecture, can lead us to deplore our having read-with on the first go: 
we've been had. Why did we not see these vile meanings that the 
author obscured or never suspected, or these structural flaws that 
the author concealed? But often such re-reading can lead instead to 
heightened admiration, especially when it is assisted by other 
readers who see qualities we had overlooked. 
Responding to Explicit Invitations 
We now have three kinds of stories and three ways that they can be 
read—with two subclasses of critical re-reading. Whether we find 
this complexity annoying or not, I would claim that I did not invent 
it—that it is thrust upon us by the explicit and implicit invitations 
that various works offer to any attentive reader. Works "try" to tell 
us, in myriad ways (quite aside from their authors' statements outside 
the text) not only what genre to place them in when reading-with, 
but also whether they will be more rewarding when the reading-
with leads us to re-read critically. Note that in this scheme it is in 
principle impossible for any work to invite us to read-against its full 
being, however chaotic or anti-intentionalist that being might be. 
At the most negative, all a work can do is invite us to read-against 
generic expectations that we mistakenly thought appropriate. 
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A. C. Bentley's Trent's Last Case, for example, starts out as if 
asking to be read entirely "with," as a whodunit. But as Trent's 
solutions to the crime are successively undermined, even the first-
time reader is invited—or could one say "forced"?—to move to 
critical re-reading: "Just what is the genre here? What have I 
foolishly taken for granted in reading earlier detective fiction? 
What, indeed, does this surprise ending, with its explanation of 
the book's title, say about fiction, about detective fiction, about the 
relation of stories to life, about truth . . . ?"8 
Though it would be absurd to expect Bentley's novel to invite us 
to read-against its every stroke, it is not absurd of us to read-against 
it and ask questions not on its list, most notably questions that are 
raised in the second kind of critical re-reading, reading for archi­
tecture: "Just how did you put this together? What is your architec­
ture here? Did you do the best possible job in ordering the parts, in 
handling point of view, in expanding or contracting scenes?" To ask 
those questions of Trent's Last Case is to read-against, even when, as 
I have discovered in this case, to do so increases one's admiration 
for the writer. The book responds to my questions about its 
architecture, but it does not itself raise them, just as it invites no 
questioning of its own ethical value. (Note that most "formal" 
critics in the past—including me—have assumed that to appraise 
structure and technique is to read-with. It has taken me decades to 
realize that to ask Macbeth "Why did Shakespeare begin you just 
this way?" or "Why did he prolong the Porter's scene?" is to read-
against Macbeth even though Shakespeare usually—not always— 
stands up brilliantly to such questions.) 
The Invitation to Attend to Architecture 
When we ask of The Wings of the Dove first what kind of reading it 
"wants," and second whether that kind is ethically constructive, 
the answer to the first question is clear: anyone who has as much as 
dipped into this novel, reading-with it, will feel as I did a pressure 
to re-read-critically—that is, to combine the first and third kinds of 
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reading. What is more, that pressure will be toward thinking not 
only about moral and philosophical meanings but to think about 
construction. Many a fine novel—for example, any one of Jane 
Austen's—resembles Bentley's in this respect, never even hinting at 
questions about structure; Pride and Prejudice invites critical re­
reading, but only the kind that attends to a deepening of moral 
insight. The Wings of the Dove, in contrast, openly demands that we 
attend precisely to its author's act of composing. 
What it does not even hint at is the kind of question I am asking 
here: Is it really good for us—as readers, as creatures in the world— 
or even for the art of fiction, to spend hours, days, months, reading-
with James's explicit invitations and finding ourselves practicing a 
highly intricate kind of critical reading, the kind that generations of 
critics since Percy Lubbock have now exhibited? He never for a 
moment questions—and he always implies—the superiority of the 
kind of experience he struggles to provide. In his commentary 
outside the novels, he does occasionally claim explicit ethical value 
to what he calls his "method." But within the novels themselves he 
only implies it, never states it. 
But surely we have a right—more clearly in this decade than in 
any earlier time—to read-against and demand an answer: Have the 
hundreds of thousands of hours and millions of words spent on the 
art of fiction, fiction as poetry, fictions as well-wrought urns, 
exemplified a kind of life worth living? Many an exasperated reader 
has answered no, both with respect to such novels and to the 
criticism they inspire. 
If the answer for me were not in some sense yes, I obviously 
would not waste my time by adding to those millions here. But the 
details of the answer are not at all obvious. To put the matter as 
sharply as possible, shouldn't I be spending my time on some more 
self-evidently worthwhile form of life: working for aid to starving 
Africans, say, or tutoring deprived children, or—closer to home— 
becoming a media critic? Here I am, in my early seventies, as sure 
of my own coming death as Milly could be of hers—though not 
quite as sure about the timing—and I spend a large slice of my 
remaining time trying once again to appraise the gift James has 
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offered to share with me. Does that make sense at the deepest 
levels of meaning to which we can probe? Why do this rather than 
enjoying the latest Dick Francis or Sue Grafton romp? 
James's Plans in Prospect 
In the planning stage of The Wings of the Dove, James not only 
ignored our present "reading-against" question; for a long time he 
did not even talk about the "how" of telling. We can never know 
what really went on in his mind and heart as he worked and 
reworked his plans in his notebook. But what he said he was up to 
was not the construction of meanings or anti-meanings, whether 
metaphysical, psychological, political, religious, or ethical; nor was 
it about clever play with chronology and point of view and propor­
tions. Rather it was all about finding a powerful story, an action, a 
plot to be read-with as story. That task for him, as for all story 
tellers, involved first the discovery of what characters of a given 
kind would do to one another, and why. 
In short, he began not with an "idea" at all but with a "situation." 
This was never for James a static picture, a mere "image," as some 
have suggested; the words I have put in italics in the following 
passage show just how much his mind is on the need for action, for 
narrative movement, rather than on doctrine or how to draw out the 
right tricks from his copious trick bag: 
. . . the situation of some young creature . . . who, at 20, on the 
threshold of a life that has seemed boundless, is suddenly condemned 
to death . . . by the voice of the physician? She learns that she has but 
a short time to live, and she rebels, she is terrified, she cries out in her 
anguish, her tragic young despair. . . . She is like a creature dragged 
shrieking to the guillotine—to the shambles. The idea of a young man 
who meets her, who, knowing her fate, is terribly touched by her, and 
who conceives the idea of saving her . . . [perhaps by offering her] 
the chance to love and to be loved, . . . But the young man is entangled 
with another woman . . . and it is in that that a little story seems to 
reside. I see him as having somehow to risk something . . . to sacrifice 
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something in order to be kind to her. . . . the anecdote, which I don't, 
by the way, at all yet see [James's italics], is probably more dra­
matic . .  . on some basis of marriage . . . marriage with the other 
woman, or even with both! The little action hovers before me as 
abiding, somehow, in the particular complication that his attitude (to 
the girl) engenders for the man, a complication culminating in some 
sacrifice . . . or disaster. (Notebooks Nov. 3,1894) 
And on he goes, through pages of planning, toward the discov­
ery four days later (Nov. 7,1894) that his "little action" requires 
the man's agreeing with his fiancee that he shall marry the poor girl in order 
to come into her money and in the certitude that she will die and leave the 
money to him [James's italics]—on which basis . . . they themselves 
will at last be able to marry. 
James then tries out more and more possibilities for plot—well 
over 2,500 words with not one word about anything but "my story 
pure and simple." 
Three months later, re-reading his speculations, he finds them 
good—and suddenly introduces for the first time an ethical note 
that relates to my main point here. This story will do something for 
him, something that "compensates" him for five years of "bitter­
ness," "wasted passion and squandered time," "unspeakable . . ­
tragic experience," "long apparent barrenness," "suffering and sad­
ness intolerable": the "story" is "strongly, richly there; a thing, 
surely, of great potential interest and beauty and of a strong, firm 
artistic ossature!'9 Note that what it will give to him—the gift to his 
ethos, as we might put it, to stress the ethical note—is the gift of 
discovering the right "ossature," the right bone structure for his 
story: after years of barrenness, he can at last once again tell a story 
worth telling. 
It is hard to tell here whether James is thinking of the compensa­
tion as granted by the story emerging—the "what," the raw chro-
nology—or by the "how," the lessons he has learned, through the 
painful years, about the art of dramatic "showing" through scenes 
in order to create a beautiful "actual progression" Just what the 
ossature of any story is can always be hard to determine. But it is 
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beyond question that the beauty he is probing is the beauty of a 
well-constructed story—one that will engage readers in an "ossa­
ture" that inextricably combines the "what" and the "how." 
His Plans in Retrospect: The Preface 
That's where his mind still dwells nearly fifteen years later when, 
fresh from re-reading and revising the work, he writes his long, 
detailed "Preface." He begins as before with the firm bone structure 
of the action. For several pages one finds, as in the notebooks, 
nothing whatever about meanings. It is again all about an action, 
the action of Milly's "struggle"—of the young woman's "disintegra­
tion," of the "act of living," of the "battle," of how the "process of life 
gives way fighting," of how his heroine will be "dragged by a 
greater force than any she herself could exert," "contesting every 
inch of the road," of a "catastrophe determined in spite of opposi­
tions," of the "drama" of her wresting "from her shrinking hour . . . 
as much of the fruit of life as possible," and of the drama of her 
opponents' "promoting her illusion . .  . for reasons, for interests 
and advantages, from motives and points of view, of their own" (5, 
NY vii-viii). 
But he soon shifts to the topic not mentioned in the notebooks: 
the "how" of the story's telling, and the effects of the "how" on the 
reader. This topic, perhaps even less fashionable in 1994 than the 
topic of what makes for good raw chronology, he celebrates in 
loving and prolonged detail, as if to say, "Just think, dear reader, of 
the problems I faced, and of the hitherto unimagined solutions 
they led me to!" 
Since my subject inescapably expands itself from the effects of 
reading "the novel itself" to the issue of reading and writing the kind 
of criticism it leads us to, I must dwell a bit on this material that a few 
critics may still want to call "extrinsic." The great point, he says, was 
that if in a predicament she [Milly] was to be, . .  . it would be of the 
essence to create the predicament promptly and build it up solidly, so 
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that it should have for us as much as possible its ominous air of awaiting 
her. . . . One begins so, in such a business, by looking about for one's 
compositional hey, unable as one can only be to move till one has found 
it. . .  . [Tjhough my regenerate young New Yorker [Milly] . . . should 
form my centre, my circumference [those who observe and exploit her] 
was every whit as treatable. Therefore I must trust myself to know 
when to proceed from the one and when from the other. (7, NY x-xi; all 
italics mine except for the word "engaged") 
Then, following an account of how not using serialization set 
him free to "begin as far back" and as far "behind" Milly's own 
story as he wished, James celebrates just what opportunities free­
dom from editorial constraints granted him. It yielded 
the pleasure of feeling my divisions, my proportions and general 
rhythm, rest all on permanent rather than in any degree on momen­
tary proprieties. It was enough for my alternations, thus, [of point of 
view and locations in time and space] that they were good in 
themselves; it was in fact so much for them that I really think any 
further account of the constitution of the book reduces itself to a just 
notation of the law they followed. 
There was the "fun," to begin with, of establishing one's successive 
centres [in order to] . . . make for construction, that is, to conduce to 
effect and to provide for beauty. (8, NY xii; my italics) 
There followed from this fun the anguish of not being able to 
carry out his plan as fully as hoped. He "mourns" at some length, 
viewing the "gaps and the lapses," the "intentions that, with the 
best will in the world, were not to fructify" (9, NY xiii). He specifies 
the "gaps" (some of which seem very strange to me, since in my 
reading they were not felt as gaps at all). But then he recovers his 
confidence: each piece is, after all, "true to its pattern, and . . . 
while it pretends to make no simple statement it yet never lets go its 
scheme of clearness " After citing proof of his own clever strategies, 
particularly his consistency with point of view and his tact in 
withholding intimate scenes that other novelists would have pro­
vided, he turns to stronger self-praise, disguised as a criticism of 
the disportionate length of the two "halves" of the work: 
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that to "read-with" requires critical attention to the pleasures of 
compositional subtlety. 
Asking whether a particular move is a fault, he says, ''distinctly 
not"—not for the careful reader: 
(Attention of perusal, I thus confess . .  . is what I at every point, as 
well as here, absolutely invoke and take for granted; a truth I avail 
myself of this occasion to note once for all. . . . The enjoyment of a 
work of art . .  . is greatest, it is delightfully, divinely great, when we 
feel that the surface of the work, like the thick ice of the skater's pond, 
bear[sl without cracking the strongest pressure we throw on it. The 
sound of the crack one may recognize, but never surely to call it a 
luxury.) (14-15, NY xx-xxi) 
And back he goes to a demonstration of what he wants his ideal 
reader to do: place the strongest possible pressure on the "thick 
ice" to discover just why his subtle way of "driving portents home" 
(15, NY xxi) by transforming raw chronology and point of view will 
resist cracking under the weight. And he concludes after much 
more on similar points with a cheerful lament that space does not 
allow him to say as much as he would like to say about the novel's 
construction! 
The novel itself fulfils James's hopes for this kind of attention— 
does so, that is, for any reader who is willing to read-with its 
invitations. So we can now bring our ethical pursuit to a head by 
asking, bluntly, how we are to value all of what many from the 
beginning called mere artificiality, fussiness, and even elitist de­
struction of the true value of "story"? Should we not after all join 
his brother William, a habitual reader-against, in calling it per­
verse? 
You've reversed every traditional canon of story-telling (especially 
the fundamental one of telling the story, which you carefully avoid) 
and have created a new genre litteraire which I can't help thinking 
perverse, but in which you nevertheless succeed, for I read with 
interest to the end many pages, and innumerable sentences twice 
over to see what the dickens they could possibly mean. . . . (Norton 
458) 
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well as here, absolutely invoke and take for granted; a truth I avail 
myself of this occasion to note once for all. . . . The enjoyment of a 
work of art . .  . is greatest, it is delightfully, divinely great, when we 
feel that the surface of the work, like the thick ice of the skater's pond, 
bear[sl without cracking the strongest pressure we throw on it. The 
sound of the crack one may recognize, but never surely to call it a 
luxury.) (14-15, NY xx-xxi) 
And back he goes to a demonstration of what he wants his ideal 
reader to do: place the strongest possible pressure on the "thick 
ice" to discover just why his subtle way of "driving portents home" 
(15, NY xxi) by transforming raw chronology and point of view will 
resist cracking under the weight. And he concludes after much 
more on similar points with a cheerful lament that space does not 
allow him to say as much as he would like to say about the novel's 
construction! 
The novel itself fulfils James's hopes for this kind of attention— 
does so, that is, for any reader who is willing to read-with its 
invitations. So we can now bring our ethical pursuit to a head by 
asking, bluntly, how we are to value all of what many from the 
beginning called mere artificiality, fussiness, and even elitist de­
struction of the true value of "story"? Should we not after all join 
his brother William, a habitual reader-against, in calling it per­
verse? 
You've reversed every traditional canon of story-telling (especially 
the fundamental one of telling the story, which you carefully avoid) 
and have created a new genre litteraire which I can't help thinking 
perverse, but in which you nevertheless succeed, for I read with 
interest to the end many pages, and innumerable sentences twice 
over to see what the dickens they could possibly mean. . . . (Norton 
458) 
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Or do we allow the master to have his way with us—and then praise 
him for having offered an ethical gift in requiring us to attend not 
just to the what of the story but to the how? 
"The achieve of, the mastery of the thing" 
So far as I can discover, our question has never been addressed 
except in a most perfunctory way—either in the form of brusque 
expressions of annoyance like William's or brief praise for the 
"poetry" of James's novels. What more can one say, other than "I 
like it" or "I detest it"? 
The full effect is of course beyond summary; it can be known 
only to those who have succumbed to the master's demands and 
followed his steps as he takes them, with or without the assistance 
of his guidebooks. Indeed the full effect, for the serious critic, can 
come only for those willing to follow step by step a detailed 
comparison echoed inadequately by my appendixes. (Surely I can 
talk at least one or two of you out there into tackling them?) Only 
someone who has gone through that can then face the full force of 
the question: Was that good for you? 
My own response to this late, late Henry James, in spite of some 
frustration along the path of this essay, can best be described as 
gratitude. I was myself surprised by just how powerfully this great 
implied author, purged entirely of the daily pettinesses that we 
know the "real" James was capable of in his "declining" years, 
affected me. I had spent a lifetime arguing that implied authors are 
always not only different from but to some degree superior to their 
makers, purged of whatever those makers took to be their living 
faults. I was therefore not surprised to find myself engaged with a 
"James" who was the most "Jamesian" figure I had ever met—even 
compared with his other late novels. What was a bit surprising was 
the gratitude I felt for one more experience with the "fussiness." 
"James" has invited me to re-create under his tutelage a beautiful 
structure—not just any abstract structure but a structure of beau­
tifully realized human creatures highlighted miraculously by the 
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artist. He offers me the chance to pretend, for the duration of my 
reading, that I too live "up there" with him, able not only to 
appreciate what he has done but to do it myself. Nobody, including 
James himself, has ever lived for long in this empyrean: sharing not 
just the intensity and depth and wit and wisdom of other fine 
artists but the special precise attention to getting it all right—to 
creating it all better than anyone else could, even given the same 
"materials." 
We can explain something of this power if we examine the more 
important steps he took that were by no means necessary, given the 
raw chronology he finally arrived at for the story of Milly, Kate, and 
Merton. (Readers who have never read the novel might do well to 
read my detailed summary in Appendix A.) Their story could be 
told in innumerable ways, without violating its factual and moral 
intricacy. It could, for example, be told as a simple chronological 
melodrama of two lovers plotting for the fortune of a dying woman 
and ending with the ambiguities and beauties of this novel's 
ending. Even if we decided to tell essentially the story that James 
tells, no longer just the story of Milly that he first planned but with 
as much emphasis on Kate and Merton as we now have, we still 
could make many un-Jamesian choices. 
METAPHORIC EXTRAVAGANCE 
Turning instead to what he actually did, we could dwell on his 
"choice" (though by this time in his career he could hardly choose 
differently) to bestow on all of his main characters a metaphoric 
and imagistic gift that is totally beyond what any "real" characters 
like Milly and the others could exercise. They all think in elaborate 
characteristic metaphor and imagery, and they needn't have done 
so. One could take this book and cut out every one of the passages 
that begins "It was for him as if. . ." and one would still have a 
readable story (in one sense a more readable one). 
Of all the marvels that would be lost in such a cutting, the one 
most pertinent here is the effect on the reader of having to sort out 
just who is responsible for each metaphor or image. There is a 
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"dialogue" of different imaginations here, producing a "polyglos­
sia" that makes the effect that Bakhtin attributes to Dickens seem 
simple by comparison; indeed even Bakhtin might see Dostoevsky 
as at least rivaled here, if not surpassed. It is a dialogue that 
requires us to attend to each stroke, alert to the distribution of 
responsibilities. 
That James sees his own allocations of metaphor in something 
like this light is revealed in a marvelous passage where he plays 
with three imagists at once: Kate, Milly, and the narrator. It occurs 
in Venice (VII. ii) when the two women are reveling in their 
successes among the British socialites and at the same time relish­
ing those moments when they can "put off their harness" and their 
social "masks," and relax together (I feel uneasy about what the 
ghost of James will want to say about my intrusive commentary in 
the right-hand column): 
These puttings-off of the mask there is no hint that this image 
would be used by either of them: it 
is the narrator's alone 
had finally quite become the 
form taken by their moments 
together . . . whenever, as she 
[Milly] herself expressed it, she 
got out of harness. an image all three share 
They flourished their masks, the narrator alone again 
the independent pair, as they 
might have flourished Spanish 
fans; dearly this "as" belongs to the nar­
rator alone 
they smiled and sighed on re­
moving them; but the gesture, 
the smiles, the sighs, strangely 
enough, might have been sus­
pected the greatest reality in 
the business. ''strangely enough" to whom? we 
have to ask by now. The narrator 
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Strangely enough, we say, for 
the volume of effusion in gen­
eral would have been found by 
either on measurement 
to be scarce proportional to the 
paraphernalia of relief. It was 
when they called each other's 
attention to their ceasing to 
pretend, it was then that what 
they were keeping back was 
most in the air. 
There was a difference, no 
doubt, and mainly to Kate's ad­
vantage: Milly didn't quite see 
what her friend could keep 
back, was possessed of, in fine, 
that would be so subject to re­
tention; whereas it was com­
paratively plain sailing for Kate 
that poor Milly had a treasure 
to hide. This was not the trea­
sure of a shy, an abject affec­
tion . .  . it was much rather a 
principle of pride relatively bold 
and hard, a principle that 
played up like a fine steel 
spring at the lightest pressure 
of too near a footfall. 
seems to hear our question and re­
plies: 
aha!, so "we" say it! 
presumably, then, they didn't get 
around to measuring? 
in the air for them? Certainly not 
in this form, because neither knows 
all of what the other is keeping 
back 
is this metaphor Kate's? probably 
not 
quite possibly Kate's way of think­
ing ofMilly's secrets? 
at last one that is surely Kate's, her 
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Thus insuperably guarded was 
the truth about the girl's own 
conception of her validity; thus 
was a wondering pitying sister 
condemned wistfully to look at 
her from the far side of the 
moat she had dug round her 
tower. 
Certain aspects of the connex­
ion of these young women 
show for us, 
such is the twilight that gathers 
about them, 
in the likeness of some dim 
scene in a Maeterlinck play; we 
have positively the image, in 
the delicate dusk, of the figures 
so associated and yet so op­
posed, so mutually watchful: 
that of the angular pale 
princess, ostrich-plumed, black-
robed, hung about with amu-
self-conscious picture of what will 
happen if she presses too close to 
the truth ofMilly's illness: a steel 
trap will be sprung; the hunter 
loill become the hunted 
"sister" is in fact an ironic meta­
phor here, because Kate is much 
more than a "wondering pitying 
sister" 
Kate's image? Probably not, since 
Kate would not want quite to think 
of herself as laying siege to an ene-
my's castle; but like all the others, 
James's image has become ours, in 
our pity for the besieged Milly 
Yes, for us; again the two central 
characters are shut out! 
his and ours, not theirs 
ah, yes, wel 
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lets, reminders, relics, mainly 
seated, mainly still, all ours, and possibly Kate's 
and that of the upright restless 
slow-circling lady of her court 
who exchanges with her, across 
the black water streaked with 
evening gleams, fitful questions 
and answers (VIII.iii, 261-62, ours and definitely not Milly's. 
NY II.138-39). 
And so "we" go on observing Kate circling Milly ('like a pan­
ther"), "with thick dark braids down her back, drawing over the 
grass a more embroidered train." Under James's tutelage we extend 
the Maeterlinck play to include Milly's confidante, Mrs. Stringham. 
"We" come to know more about both of these hearts than either 
knows, even about herself, and we thus read the relatively literal 
apologia for Kate that follows with an awareness totally different 
from what it would have been without the elaborate metaphor (262­
63, NY 140-41). 
Metaphors by their very nature require greater creative energy 
in the receiver than straight talk. They risk more; many a reader 
will just get off the metaphorical boat and condemn the clumsy 
author. But when they work, they bind us to the author—in this 
case all three "authors"—with no route for escape. 
SILENCES 
Another requirement on our creative powers is even more power-
ful—what might be considered the opposite of rhetorical ampli­
fication: suppression, silence, deliberate omission from the narra­
tion of crucial events in the raw chronology The most revealing of 
these suppressions of what other novelists would have considered 
essential is his silence about what happens when Densher is at long 
last invited back to the palazzo for a final interview with Milly. 
James's friends and critics objected to that omission, just as he 
himself had rebuked H. G. Wells, decades before, for failing to 
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dramatize the crucial courtship scene between lovers in the novel 
Marriage.10 But once one has been tuned to vibrate on James's 
inimitable wavelength, the effect can be an enormous stimulation 
of the imagination. I have found myself working over that omitted 
scene again and again, imaginging the lovely frail girl who has 
dressed herself up, perhaps for the last time, in order to present to 
the man she loves a courageous and inoffensive front. I am helped 
in these reconstructions by the hints Merton later gives to Kate: 
"Did she receive you—in her condition—in her room?" [Kate 
asks]. 
"Not she/' said Merton Densher. "She received me just as usual: in 
that glorious great salone, in the dress she always wears, from her 
inveterate corner of her sofa/' And his face for the moment conveyed 
the scene, just as hers equally embraced it. "Do you remember what 
you originally said to me of her?" 
"Ah I've said so many things/' 
"That she wouldn't smell of drugs, that she wouldn't taste of 
medicine. Well, she didn't/7 
"So that it was really almost happy?" 
It took him a long time to answer, occupied as he partly was in 
feeling how nobody but Kate could have invested such a question 
with the tone that was perfectly right. (X.i, 362, NY II.328-29) 
We have no good critical vocabulary for the ethical effect of 
having one's mind preoccupied with all this "perversity" in the 
telling: piling up obtrusive metaphors, deliberate excision of "es­
sential" parts, to say nothing of obsessive transformations of point 
of view. How can I express my conviction that it is good for me to be 
required to go through all this, and to know that if I return with 
similar attentiveness to the other late novels I'll be invited to 
similar—but always fresh—re-creations? I have no doubt about it 
myself—I who am so much inclined to preoccupations of far less 
defensible kinds. My ultimate defense, if I could ever fully work it 
out, would have something to do with what happens to the "back of 
my mind/' during the waking hours before and after returning to 
the desk to wrestle with this recalcitrant work. Its scenes and 
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languages and puzzles form a running accompaniment while 
trimming my beard and showering, while paying bills, while 
driving. In other words, it has made me over—in James's direction. 
Of course none of this kind of questioning could be considered 
significant if we once lost the belief that some ways of spending our 
lives are better than other ways: Why should it matter how I 
conduct my waking dreams, especially when they are only "at the 
back of my mind"? But if any value judgments about ways of living 
make sense, then those authors (and composers, and painters, and 
so on) who subtly lead us to live moments of high creative intensity 
even when we are not directly engaged with their works are indeed 
among our truest friends. 
As Milly says to the obtuse and bewildered Lord Mark, "One 
can't do more than live." 'And you don't do anything?" he asks in 
his confusion. "I do everything," she replies. "'Everything's this', 
she smiled; I '  m doing it now. One can't do more than live.'" She is 
acting, she says, under the great surgeon's advice— 
the best advice in the world. I'm acting under it now. I act upon it in 
receiving you, in talking with you thus. One can't, as I tell you, do 
more than live." 
"Oh live!" Lord Mark ejaculated. 
"Well, it's immense for me'.' (VII.iv, 272, NY 155) 
It's immense for us too. Though we may not put quite as much 
emphasis on expensive rococo surroundings as James and Milly 
seem to do throughout the novel, we live in the greater richness 
James provides, both in taking in his moral probing of how Milly 
and Kate and Merton behave and in the discovery that we have 
been led to create and re-create all that, both while reading and 
long afterward. 
The part of this new life that explicitly wrestles with James's self-
chosen constructional task would be described in conventional 
terms as "formal" and hence "aesthetic." But obviously here the 
aesthetic task has become deeply ethical. To get the craft of it right, to 
keep the ideal of the highest excellence constantly before one as a 
demand to do it better than what at first seemed merely good, so 
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that those who travel with us—our readers—will get it right too: 
that is the ethics of craft. It required of James courage, persistence, 
and a willingness to risk hearing once again from his brother a 
gentle mocking of his results. It required, in sum, a kind of 
conscientiousness that fuses morality and the love of beautiful 
form. And it requires of us an echo of those virtues. 
The beautiful thing is that—in contrast with Milly's luxurious 
purchases—ours are in unlimited supply: there is no zero-sum 
game here. Our "possession" of these gems never diminishes the 
supply; indeed, the more lovers such works find for themselves, the 
better, since talking with other lovers about the treasures "appreci­
ates" their value. 
Are not the hours we spend sharing with James and his read-
ers—at least when we are at our best—hours that James might well 
have had the surgeon add to the remedy he offers Milly? If she was 
to live, why did the doctor fail to order her to spend some time 
reading the novels of Jane Austen or George Eliot, perhaps, or even, 
in a postmodernist reflexive ploy, The Wings of the Dove? 
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Appendix A: 
The Chronological Story 
Until you have tried to summarize the real action of any one of the late 
James novels, you don't know just how complex his plots are. Wiien one 
looks at the summaries provided in any of the reference booksr what is most 
striking is how little evidence they provide about what really happens. The 
mere outline of how, say, a nondescript "Kate" lies to and seeks the fortune 
of an equally nondescript "Milly" cannot tell us whether the lie was noble 
or base, and it thus gives us no notion of what the story is really about—of 
hoiv we are made to hope for, or fear, or in any way enjoy a given resolution. 
As Martha Nussbaum insists in her account of The Golden Bowl, the 
moral meaning of any one choice—whether to lie, whether to seek a 
fortune—is found only within the full specificity of circumstances and 
characters, not in any one principle allowing or forbidding lying or 
pursuing a fortune. 
The following summary is only slightly more useful than the kind I 
have just condemned. But at least it hints at what I think James was 
striving for in his elaborately ethical probing: How should one live one's 
life? What forms of perception and behavior can be justified, in the face of 
the ultimate fact of tragically early death? 
Kate Croy, beautiful and talented and morally sensitive daughter of an impov­
erished and unscrupulous English gentleman, is urged by her widowed sister, 
• 123 • 
WAYNE C. BOOTH 
helplessly poor and burdened with four young children, to cultivate their rich 
aunt, in the hope that Kate might relieve their poverty both by marrying rich 
and by receiving some of the aunt's fortune. Kate at first resists, sensing all the 
ways in which truckling to her aunt will infringe on her freedom and violate her 
principles. But after falling in love with Merton Densher, a highly attractive, 
witty, intelligent London journalist with little income, and experiencing—in a 
trial period living at her aunt's—some of the genuine amenities of life that are 
made possible only by money, she realizes just how essential it is to her not to 
marry poor. Living with her aunt while Merton is in America on an assignment 
as a journalist, she meets her aunt's guests, two Americans, one an orphaned 
but rich young woman, the beautiful, innocent, generous-hearted Milly Theale, 
the other Milly's devoted and intelligent confidante, Susan Stringham, a former 
schoolmate of the aunt. 
Kate and Milly become friends, and we learn that Merton and Milly have met 
and become friendly in America. Milly and Susan Stringham learn that Milly 
has an incurable illness, one the fatal effects of which can only be postponed by 
living life to the hilt—and especially by loving and being loved. 
When Kate learns of the illness, she sees the chance both to obtain a fortune 
for herself and Merton and at the same time to do a favor to the dying Milly: she 
persuades the reluctant Merton to pay court to Milly, hoping that Milly will 
leave her fortune to him on her death. To make the scheme work—Merton only 
gradually realizes the full nastiness of it—they must of course continue to 
deceive everyone, especially Milly, about their own engagement: the world 
must believe that although Merton has indeed been in love with Kate, Kate now 
feels nothing for him and he is thus perfectly free to shift his affections to Milly. 
The highly intelligent, courageous—indeed in most respects admirable—Kate 
proceeds on a course of openly lying to Milly, even while acting in every other 
respect as Milly's most intimate and loving friend. Merton himself, while 
attending regularly on Milly, assuages his confused conscience by scrupulously 
refusing ever to tell an actual lie; he simply exercises his natural charm on her 
and thus allows the deception to proceed. 
For some time their plot seems to be working: Milly becomes radiantly 
happy as she lives her waning life fully in a Venetian palazzo, courted, as she 
has increasing reason to believe, by the most charming young man she has ever 
known. A far less charming suitor, Lord Mark, a bland, empty-hear ted moral 
nonenity who has been one of the vulgar aunt's candidates for marriage to Kate, 
arrives in Venice to win her hand. He also has learned of the fatal illness and 
worked out his own plan to obtain Milly's fortune through a kind of "death-bed 
marriage"; he makes his crude proposal to Milly and she politely and firmly 
refuses him. Meanwhile Merton, who has been "courting" Milly daily, though 
with no formal statement of intentions, is becoming increasingly uneasy about 
the various moral issues in his situation: he is doing all this for Kate, assuming 
her love for him, but what proof does he have of her love? Does she really love 
him enough to justify the whole plot? He insists that to prove her love she must 
"come to him," in his apartments rented specifically for that purpose, and the 
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ravishingly beautiful creature, who really does love him, comes, for one night. 
She then returns to London, leaving him to continue his false courtship until 
the girl's death. 
Lord Mark, having learned that Kate and Merton are in fact engaged, gets 
his revenge for Milly's refusal by telling her, basely, of the whole base scheme, 
and Milly is devastated: she "turns her face to the wall/' refuses ever to see 
Merton again, and prepares to die. Susan, her confidante, desperately trying to 
save her, attempts to persuade Merton to go to her and deny the engagement to 
Kate, but this is a lie he refuses to tell. ("We are," he later moans to Kate, when 
she wonders, back in London, why he didn't go ahead and tell Milly that they 
were not engaged, "We are, my dear child, I suppose, still engaged" [X.i, 323]). 
He simply waits, day after day, hoping—by now more fully caught up in Milly's 
beautiful spirit than he can acknowledge to himself without acknowledging 
that he has behaved like a "brute"—that he might see her again. She finally 
relents, for reasons we do not learn, and invites him back for one last meeting— 
which we are not privileged to witness. 
The final events—all of book X, considerably more than a tenth of the whole 
novel and, along with book V, much the longest in the book—consist entirely of 
Kate's and Densher's wrestling with what all this is to mean for them—how they 
are to live with what they have done and with what it has meant for Milly. And it 
is all from Densher's point of view. For several weeks he does not even visit 
Kate —though he still assumes their engagement. When they do meet he has 
received a letter from Milly, intended to be received on Christmas Eve; he has 
chosen not to open it except in Kate's presence. But Kate throws it into the fire, 
and Merton resists the impulse to rescue it and discover what Milly would say 
to him at the end. They soon discover, from lawyers, that a part of what she 
would have said is that she is after all making him, in a splendidly magnani­
mous gesture (or perhaps an act of revenge against Kate? we are never to know 
for sure just how much Milly has inferred), her heir. Learning of this, Kate is 
exultant: their scheme has worked. They have the money they need to marry, 
and they have it with Milly's blessing. Merton, however, having been awakened 
to a fully moral perception of the whole experience, tells Kate point-blank (or as 
point-blank as anyone ever tells anyone anything in this novel) that he will 
marry her only if she'll join him in repudiating the money; on the other hand, 
she can have the money—without him. She says that she'll take him, without 
the money, if he can swear that he is "not in love with Milly's memory." Since he 
refuses to do that, they separate, aware that the whole experience has changed 
them both and—we are left to assume—made their marriage an impossibility. 
We are left to speculate: Will Kate take the money? Will she marry someone as 
awful as Lord Mark? Has she been morally destroyed or perhaps deeply 
enlightened by what has happened? Readers have—for reasons that should be 
obvious—shown much more curiosity about her fate than about Merton's. 
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(The Narrative, the Discourse) 
These notes might be taken as a step toward that critical act that James 
hoped some "literary critic" would undertake, ''bent on improving his 
occasion to the profit of the budding artist/' Or perhaps it is only a failed 
try at demonstrating the "attention of perusal" that he claims he zoants, at 
every point, absolutely "to invoke and take for granted." 
Page numbers are to the New York edition. Italics indicate James's 
operations with time scheme and points of view. (Abbreviations: M, Milly; 
MD, Merton; K, Kate; S, Susan Stringham; L, Mrs. Lowder [Aunt Maud]). 
Li: Inside Kate (K), at age 25, for all of book I. She turns for rescue from her 
isolation first to her father, after living for one winter with her Aunt Maud 
(L). Is she already in love with Merton (MD)? (21 pp.) 
1.2.: Inside K, living at aunt's, chronologically before Li. Sees value of material 
things for her. Torn by "bond of blood" (32). 
After chapter 1, we see, in interview with sister Marian, that Marian is 
obviously willing to use K (34). Marian warns against MD, because he 
means poverty for them both. 
II. 1.: Inside MD. His patient waiting for K, before chief events of book I (back to p. 
47). The appeal of his "mind." We learn that they met before her mother's 
death: 4 pages on their first meeting, then encounter on railroad, 54. Inside both K 
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and MD, back and forth a bit about courtship; in other words, they are "together" 
for a while. 
Inside K, with L for a while after Li, about Mr. Croy. 
K walks with MD, with point of view alternating again, moving to MD alone 
(61-74). K tells MD of 1.1 and 1.2; long discussion of the morality of Mr. Croy 
and K: K's self-described "small stupid piety" (71); "I do see my danger of 
doing something base" (72), but "I shall sacrifice nobody and nothing" (73). 
They plan to work on L. (27 pp.) 
II. 2: Inside MD, waiting for L. Made to see the meaning of wealth (4 pp.!). 6 pages of 
scene with report to K. MD called to America (86). K and MD mixed point of 
view, long conversations about selves and prospects, leading to engagement 
(95), then plans for dealing with L, letters, talk about planned deception. 
Note that this concludes 100 pages, one seventh of the book, with what, 
from one point of view, is "only" background! Of these pages, about half 
are "inside" K, but much of book II is also about her, as seen through MD. 
Such expansiveness obviously explains James's lament about his "mis­
placed middle," but he understates the effect the misplacement will have in 
centering our emotions on K. 
III.i: Inside Susan Stringham (S). Retrospective account of Milly's [M] earlier life: as 
princess, as heiress of ail the ages (to 120,18 pp.). M's view of the Alps as of 
the universe (through S's eyes). S's view of M's promise. Note that we've had 
no real scene through this chapter, no developed conversations. 
III.2: Inside S still, talking with M about MD. First hints of early dying (134-45). 
Note that we've had almost 150 pages with no inside view ofM, who was originally 
at the center of James's conception! 
IV. 1: Inside M for first time, talking with Lord Mark at a dinner party, which 
actually took place a short time after III. 2 — time enough for M and S to be 
welcomed fully by L. M baffled by all the changes. Thinks of K, a 
"wonderful creature." Only a very few comments from the author's own 
voice (159). M speculates about Lord Mark and K—clear that she herself 
cannot consider him as a possible mate (163). M accepts herself as a 
"quantity"—someone whose life has real importance (166). 
IV. 2: Inside S, speculating on their social successes, with occasional glimpses 
"inside" M. K and M together shop etc. (point of view mixed, making them 
seem really together). K is puzzled at not hating M for her money (176). K 
explains London society to M. M on K: not "brutally brutal" (182). 
IV 3: Inside both M and S, though mainly M: they are REALLY together. They 
discover that the Londoners know MD (185). Inside M (187 and following): 
M increasingly aware of how much K keeps back. K's sister warns M about 
MD (193). Long discussion between M and S about MD and K. (10 pp.) 
V.i: Mostly inside M, almost entirely with Lord Mark, S, L, at Matcham: culture 
laid on heavily, dramatizing M's "felicity" but also her puzzled speculation 
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about K and Lord Mark. "She was somehow at this hour a very happy 
woman and a part of her happiness might precisely have been that her 
affections and her view were moving as never before in concert" (215-16). 
We have meanwhile been "told/' in various ways that the "concert'' is 
misguided, the felicity doomed. 
V.2: Inside M. She is shown a Bronzino portrait said to look like her—"with her 
slightly Michael-angelesque squareness, her eyes of other days, her full 
lips, her long neck. . . . And she was dead, dead, dead." Thinking thus, M 
weeps—she is aware of her own mortality, yet feels that she "can never be 
better than this," that nothing will ever "be so right again" (211). 
K then probes her about her health, M meanwhile reaching out to K for 
friendship: "I absolutely trust you." M asks K to go with her to see the 
surgeon, Sir Luke Strett. (James is hitting hard on the dramatic irony by now, 
with no character knowing everything that others know.) (12 pp.) 
V.3: Inside M. Accompanied by K, she goes to Sir Luke Strett. Interview not 
shown, but she comes out from it strengthened. 3 pages of speculation 
about it with K. Then 2nd interview with the doctor (K not in attendance); 
the doctor is authoritative, sympathetic, but highly oblique: tells her she 
has a "great rare chance" to live, while implying, quite clearly, that she will 
soon die. (15 pp.) 
V4: Inside M, 8 pages of interior monologue ("several hours worth" about her 
situation, about whether K has told S, about why S is not more inquisitive 
about her health, etc. 
K rushes to her in the evening to find what the doctor has said; to M she 
looks suddenly the way she must look when she (K) is looking at MD, and 
she infers—correctly, of course—that the two of them must have a "connex­
ion" (257). She dissembles her illness to K, saying mainly, "I'm now to go in 
for pleasure." K makes heavy assertion of her loving desire to help—more 
dramatic irony. (13 pp.) 
V 5: Inside M. L probes her for knowledge about whether MD has returned from 
America. M further senses that K and MD have a connexion, because she 
can read in K's eyes that MD has come back from America. (11 pp.) 
V.6: InsideM. K instructing M about the ways of the world, claims she is "giving 
away" everything, including herself. But of course she is not: more dramatic 
irony. K tells M Lord Mark has shifted his goal from K to M. K: You should 
drop all of us, including me: "Oh, you may very well loathe me yet!" M 
arranges for S to learn of her illness through the doctor (286). Intense 
foreshadowing: M increasingly seen as "dove," with others as predators. (12 
PP-) 
V.7: Inside M. National Gallery. M surprises K and MD together; K covers 
brilliantly M only partially deceived: she believes it is indeed a liaison, but, 
she thinks, one based on MD's love of K, with K indifferent. Left alone with 
MD, she slowly works through her feelings for him and her anxiety about 
what the doctor has told S. Our attention at the end of volume 1 is entirely 
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on M, a total contrast from opening of this volume, where we were entirely 
interested in and concerned for K. (14 pp.) 
VI. 1: Opens with privileges inside both MD and K, moves mainly "into" MD, who is 
suffering sexual deprivation and is puzzled by K, who says her cleverness 
has grown "infernal." He does not know K's plans. (12 pp.) 
VI. 2: Inside MD. K still is not telling him her full plan; he is still frustrated about 
their physical separation. Two long intense embraces, partial physical 
satisfaction. Long discussion of how to deal with L. K hints at her plan: he 
should "lead M on/' because K has a "beautiful plan/' which she does not 
reveal. He wonders why she will not "come" to him. The chapter is all about 
her plan. (15 pp.) 
VI.3: Inside MD. At Lowder dinner, watching the "drama" performed by L and 
K. A sustained account of gossip about M. Society mocked at length, as 
they turn M into a "Christian maiden, in the arena, mildly, caressingly, 
martyred" (42). L needles MD about his time in NY with M. He wonders 
how much K knows, "though it was not until much later on that he found 
himself, in thought, dividing the things she might have been conscious of 
from the things she must have missed" (42). MD's rising sympathy for M, 
friendship with S. More foreshadowing about what MD is to learn later: 
"These things were of later evidence" (46). (16 pp.) 
VI.4. Inside MD. After dinner. MD and K discussing M. (10 pp.!) "What you 
want of me/' MD says, "is to make up to a sick girl." MD meets Lord Mark 
(56), but we quickly are with MD and K alone as he puzzles through K's 
obliquities, for a full 7 pages. K: you and M are both my "victims." MD: 
"Then if anything happens, we [MD and M] can console each other" (63). 
(Thus an explicit promise of what's to come.) Briefly MD with S. (23 pp.) 
VI.5: Inside MD. Visit to M. MD's speculation about the rights and wrongs of 
what he's doing. (12 pp.!) Then conversation with M. She says she'd "do 
anything for K." He is stricken: "He was afterwards to say to himself that 
something had at that moment hung for him by a hair"—that is, he'd almost 
blurted out his secret (85). 
More conversation, more signs that MD finds M touching and charming. 
More introspection (2 pp., 88-89). 6 pages of talk between MD and K, 
culminating with his agreeing that everything must be left in her hands. 
(27 pp.) 
VII. 1: Inside M. Long retrospect to luncheon after the National Gallery (far back in 
V.5), and S's observations of K at that time, while MD and M were talking. 
What did the doctor say? S and M "fused" in loving understanding, 
supported by giving inside views of both and thus fusing point of view (103). 
S sees the "light"—M's chances with MD. (7 pp.) 
Inside S: (transition of point of view, 106) to scenes with L, plotting for M 
and MD. (13 pp.!) (total of 22 pp.) 
VII.2. Inside Sfor 3 pages, then insideM with the doctor. (8 pp.) Makes it clear the 
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doctor thinks her the best person in the world; foreshadoioing of Venice. (10 
pp. on this: It's puzzling why James spends so long within the doctor's perspective, 
even though this chapter is comparatively short.) 
VII. 3: InsideMD, settling into Venice, surrounded by women. Then the author's 
own voice for a bit, with K and M "putting off masks"—but not really. See 
pp. 116-19 above. 
Back to M's point of view, first alone, wandering, then with Lord Mark. (14 
PP-) 
VII.4: Inside M. Lord Mark's proposal and rejection (20 pp-0/ concluding with 
entry of MD. 
VIII. 1: Inside MD. An entire chapter of MD's moral musing: thoughts about 
what it means to take private apartments in order to make love to K, and 
about how she is manipulating him. (16 pp.) 
VIII.2: Inside MD. Resentful of getting nothing for all the fuss, he exacts from K 
her agreement to come to him for a night of love. His thoughts are packed 
with moral speculation: he knows he is becoming corrupt. (16 pp.) 
VIII. 3. Again Inside MD. MD's rising fondness for S, love for M. M's big party for 
the doctor. K for the first time is "wanting in lustre," in MD's eyes. M a 
dove. MD and K, with MD still dense about the plan, but he finally realizes 
"I'm to marry her" and get the money. He agrees, only if she'll "come." (28 
pp.!) 
IX.1: Inside MD, living with aftermath of the night of love. Musing on his daily 
visits to M. M (naively? subtly?) tries to draw him out about why he is 
staying—a fairly long scene between them. (8 pp.) He is visibly trapped 
between two motives. (16 pp.) 
IX. 2: Inside MD. MD is turned away by M after twenty days of conversation with 
her. Long speculations about his moral position. Sees Lord Mark in the 
square. After 3 days S comes to him. (18 pp.) 
IX.3: Inside MD. S pleads with him to rescue M by denying Lord Mark's claim. 
Scene entirely in direct conversation. MD "moans." (23 pp.) 
IX.4: Inside MD. The doctor comes, tells MD he should now visit M again, at her 
request; MD says he will. A great burden is lifted. (15 pp.) 
X.i: Inside MD, for whole of X. MD and K: Why didn't he lie? (350). He is 
stupefied. (20 pp.) 
X.2: Inside MD. He and L. (No clear function of this final time with LI) MD: 
"Something has broken in me." 6 pages with K, she thinking mainly of the 
cash, of their "success." 
X.3: Inside MD. Longing for news, goes to the doctor's. He has received M's final 
letter, but has not opened it. Scene with L, coming from the doctor. He goes 
to Brompton Oratory, to pray (361). 
X.4: Inside MD at K's sister's. Lord Mark is back living with L. MD challenges K: 
"How in the world did he [Lord Mark] know we're engaged?" (12 pp.) 
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X.5: Inside MD. Still at sister's, dusk falling, moving to showdown. K answers 
challenge: Lord Mark figured it out. K on her father. Though main attention 
is on MD's rising moral clarity, considerable sympathy is aroused for K, 
as in book I. K burns M7s letter, MD resists temptation to rescue it. (11 
PPO 
X.6: Inside MD. The inverted battle over the cash: his ultimatum, either me or 
the cash, not both. He'll marry her still, "as we were" but "We shall never be 
again as we were!" (14 pp.) 
Note that all of book X is from Densher's point of view. The novel has 
become his moral battle. 
POSTSCRIPT 
Such a summary, combined with Appendix A, provides only a 
beginning on the kind of appreciative analysis that would do 
justice to the full achievement of James's creation. But perhaps a 
comparison of the two appendixes will be enough to suggest my 
grounds for the following prediction: 
If, a hundred years from now, there is any sensitive historian of 
ideas still practicing, nothing about us will seem more absurd than 
our repeated undervaluing, with our reading-against, of what 
great authors do as they create their works. Here we have James 
working away month after month, at the height of his imaginative 
powers, making thousands of subtle, highly "personal" choices 
each day during the hours when he is most alive, most of those 
choices quite consciously directed to fulfill highly articulated and 
conscious intentions. And here on the other hand we find a fair 
number of half-baked critics, schooled in critical dogmas and 
unschooled in how to reconstruct the^ast created edifices built by 
the great, pronouncing their ostensibly egalitarian dogmas about 
there being "no such thing as intrinsic merit/' Every lover of the 
high achievements of any art—of classical music or jazz, of mystery 
writing or sci-fi, of painting or satirical cartooning—should rise up 
in anger about the debasement of the world that occurs when 
people pretend that it's all one great heap of equivalent stuff. 
• 131 • 
WAYNE C. BOOTH 
Notes 
1. Many readers have found The Wings of the Dove exasperatingly 
difficult. In this matter, though not in his rather lukewarm final evaluation, 
William James speaks for us all when he says, in a letter to Henry in the fall 
of 1902, that he had to read "many pages, and innumerable sentences twice 
over to see what the dickens they could possibly mean/' I must have 
encountered fifty moments when I had to stop, puzzled, and then choose 
for a pronoun the most likely antecedent (Norton 458; in my citations 
throughout, the first figure will refer to the Norton edition, the second to 
the New York edition). 
2. My pages here could be filled with quotations about "use" versus 
"living." Milly's story is in large part her gradual discovery of how Kate 
Croy, Merton Densher, Lord Mark, and Mrs. Lowder would use her. As she 
begins, for example, to experience the lionizing of the clever but vulgar 
socialite, Mrs. Lowder, "it came up for Milly that Aunt Maud [Mrs. Lowder] 
had something particular in mind. . . . Mrs. Lowder made use of the 
moment: Milly felt as soon as she had spoken that what she was doing was 
somehow for use" (161, NY 263-64). 
3. In James's works it's not easy to say which is worse, reducing people 
to objets d'art, as Gilbert Osmond in The Portrait of a Lady uses the wonderful 
Isabel, finding her "as smooth to his general need of her as handled ivory to 
the palm," or exploiting others for financial gain, as Kate and Densher use 
Milly here. I wonder whether my "use" of this novel would be more 
blameworthy, for James, if I were being paid a fortune for it. If the payment 
. entailed my saying what I knew would harm someone I would become one 
of his worst villains. 
4. Melvyn New has neatly exposed the self-contradiction exhibited by 
many a "proof" of unreadability. His central text is Tristram Shandy, and to 
me he succeeds in annihilating any interpretation that says: "Tristram 
Shandy wonderfully undermines all claims to a clear single reading—except 
mine" ("Sterne and the Narrative of Determinateness"). Of course there are 
some novels since Sterne's that do deliberately attempt to frustrate every 
attempt at a single interpretation, including the attempt to prove that they 
frustrate . . . , etc. (My favorite example is Nabokov's Pale Fire—see Peter J. 
Rabinowitz, 'Truth in Fiction: A Re-examination of Audiences") But their 
existence does not establish any ethical demand that we should read other 
works as totally indeterminate. 
5. In chapter 4 of The Company We Keep I present a detailed case for the 
inescapable potential powers of works themselves. In practice not even the 
most aggressive theorist denies those powers, just as I of course do not 
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deny that a novel's powers will fail with readers not prepared to discover 
them. 
6. Janice Radway, "Reading the Romance." The qualities and danger­
ous powers of popular fiction, when millions in a given culture "read-with" 
it, are explored by Claudia Roth Pierpont, in "A Study in Scarlett/' Her chief 
subject is Gone With the Wind, but she helps explain why other blockbust-
ers—Unde Tom's Cabin and Ivanhoe, for example, get themselves "read­
with" by so many, while yet others, aimed equally at a popular market, fail. 
7. By far the most devoted and persuasive reading of this kind I've 
encountered, addressed to one novel alone, is Gerard Genette's tracing of 
Proust's maneuverings, in Narrative Discourse. To me it is unfortunate that 
Genette for the most part protects himself from the task of direct evalua­
tion, but implicit in his loving attention is one grand judgment: Re­
membrance of Things Past is a great achievement. Even though his kind of 
detailed tracing is not today in the forefront of criticism, a fair number of 
"narratologists" are practicing the sympathetic attention to structural 
choices that it requires. I find even more interesting a variety of efforts to 
combine ideological interests—Marxist, Freudian, feminist, ethical—with 
the closest possible attention to authors' achieved forms; in other words, 
these studies have combined reading-with and reading-against without 
destroying the works considered. I document several of these—Barbara 
Foley's, James Phelan's, Peter Rabinowitz's, David Richter's—in the notes to 
my "The Poetics for a Practical Critic" (esp. nn. 15 and 29). But others are 
emerging, especially Mary Doyle Springer's work on the "feminist" proph­
ecies of Wallace Stevens (a book forthcoming); see also her "Closure in 
James: A Formalist Feminist View." Another group of scholars are moving 
from what might be called the opposite side: starting with ideological 
questions and finding them best answered by close reading. The most 
impressive volume I've found pursuing this direction, published since 
completing this essay, is Famous Last Words: Changes in Gender and Narrative 
Closure, ed. Alison Booth. All of the "feminist" essays Booth commissioned 
attend closely to intended forms, most of them in ways that might well have 
impressed James. The one most relevant here, however, is by Stephen D. 
Arata: "Object Lessons: Reading the Museum in The Golden Bowl" (199­
229). Many of Arata's points about the ethical effects of reading that great 
book could be incorporated here. But of course he does not mention the 
ethical effects on him of pursuing his critical task, or on 1/5 of reading the 
results. 
8. A first-class introduction to the conflicts between the ethical de­
mands of given genres and the ethical interests of implied authors is given 
by Peter Rabinowitz in "'Reader, I blew him away': Convention and 
Transgression in Sue Grafton," in A. Booth, Famous Last Words. 
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9. All quotations here from the The Complete Notebooks of Henry James, 
102-7,114-16. 
10. In 'The Younger Generation/' as quoted in Henry James and H. G. 
Wells: A Record of Their Friendship, Their Debate on the Art of Fiction, and Their 
Quarrel, 190-92. An excellent brief defense of James's silence in the palazzo 
scene is given by Mary Doyle Springer in A Rhetoric of Literary Character: 
Some Women of Henry James, 162-63, 165-66. 
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Picturing Spectatorship 
JUDITH MAYNE 
Textual analysis is one of the most important theoretical and 
practical legacies of 1970s film theory. Recent film theory has 
moved, as Kaja Silverman has argued, from semiotics to psycho­
analysis, with attendant shifts in the notion of the subject, and the 
changing dimensions of textual analysis in film studies reflect that 
shift. If Christian Metz's early semiotic analysis in Film Language 
was concerned with specifying the conditions of coherence in narra­
tive film, Raymond Bellour's notion of coherence had far more to do 
with the "subject7' of the film, the ideal yet always imaginary specta­
tor to whom coherence is addressed ("Le blocage symbolique"). 
Indeed, fictions about the film spectator have shaped the develop­
ment of textual analysis in film studies, and in that sense textual 
analysis engages centrally with spectatorship, with the various 
components of vision, identification, and pleasure that have char­
acterized the way film viewing is constructed. 
In the last decade, the field of film studies has undergone 
considerable shifts, and the theoretical pronouncements of the 
1970s, particularly those having to do with psychoanalysis, have 
been reexamined and sometimes ridiculed. It may well be true that 
textual analyses of the 1970s relied too exclusively on the formal 
and technological aspects of the cinema, and therefore gave exclu­
sive signifying authority to the individual film and ignored the 
complex nature of the cinematic institution. And by exploring in 
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exhaustive detail the signifying structures of the individual film, 
textual analysis created film texts that had only the most remote 
connection with the ways in which films are actually received (an 
issue which has not been ignored by practitioners of textual 
analysis; see Bellour, "Le blocage symbolique"). Textual analysis 
might also be criticized for resurrecting the old dichotomy of text 
and context, privileging the former and ignoring the latter. 
The textual analyses that have become "classics" of film theory 
are virtually all performed on classical Hollywood films: Stephen 
Heath's detailed reading of Touch of Evil ("Film and System")/ 
Raymond Bellour's analyses of a number of films by Hitchcock, 
especially North by Northwest ("Le blocage symbolique"), Thierry 
Kuntzel's analysis of The Most Dangerous Game ("The Film-Work"). 
While these analyses are different in scope, they share an emphasis 
on understanding a classical film narrative as a system of inter­
weaving oppositions, a system that is threatened and restored, 
corresponding to the overall movement of plot, narrative, and mise-
en-scene. Virtually without exception, the "threat" has something 
to do with Woman. The classical Hollywood system thus excavated 
by textual analysis is located at the intersection of structuralism— 
concerned with the various codes that make exchange possible, a 
privileged mode of which is the exchange of women; and psycho-
analysis—concerned with the various ways in which sexual differ­
ence is displaced, denied, or otherwise negotiated. 
At the same time, textual analysis in film studies is marked by 
the transition from semiotic studies of narrative, concerned with 
the overall modes of coherence and stability in the text, to post-
structuralist studies, concerned more with what exceeds or puts 
into question those very modes of coherence and stability. While 
this shift has influenced virtually all areas of contemporary theo­
retical endeavor, the changing status of textual analysis in film 
studies nonetheless represents a particularly important area of 
inquiry. For the classical Hollywood film, the preferred object for 
textual analysis, is the kind of dominant, transparently realist text 
which would, in a classical structuralist analysis, lend itself quite 
easily to the discernment of a series of predictable patterns. But 
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through the lens of poststructuralism, classical film puts into 
question the very notion of a dominant text, realist or otherwise. 
The influence of Roland Barthes' detailed analysis of "Sarrasine," a 
novella by Balzac, in SIZ, cannot be overestimated in this context. 
Just as the classical narrative cinema would appear, in structuralist 
terms, to be perfectly "readerly," so it would acquire, in poststruc­
turalist terms, a "writerly" status informed at the very least by a 
notion of "limited plurality." 
When described in the somewhat "classical" structuralist terms 
of opposition and resolution, one could assume mistakenly that 
textual analysis is concerned with form and structure in a purely 
aesthetic or thematic sense. In truth, textual analysis in film 
studies was linked with psychoanalysis, particularly insofar as 
theories of the subject were concerned; and to a lesser extent with 
Marxism, particularly insofar as the Althusserian notions of symp­
tomatic reading and interpellation were concerned. Despite the 
efforts of many theorists to separate absolutely the "subject" from 
the "viewer"; that is, the "position" from the "body/7 some slippage 
occurs, and as a result one of the legacies of textual analysis is a 
notion of the film viewer as held, contained, or otherwise manipu­
lated by the mechanisms of a cinematic institution which finds its 
most succinct expression in the various textual strategies of delay, 
resolution, and containment which engage the spectator. The psy­
choanalytic and ideological ramifications here are fairly obvious, in 
both cases connected to a concept of regulation. 
The legacy of psychoanalysis for textual analysis has been 
ambiguous, due in part to an unfortunate tendency to collapse the 
unconscious with ideology, to tame the unconscious and transform 
it into another predictable crisis of male subjectivity. Yet a far more 
pervasive and important psychoanalytic influence is the assump­
tion that whenever a structure is created or imposed, something is 
repressed. The process of textual analysis therefore is the attempt 
to retrace the evolution of structure and its attendant process of 
repression. The assumption is that the film text functions for the 
spectator in much the same way that Freud saw works of art, as 
particularly condensed instances of unconscious processes, de­
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sires, and fantasies. At the same time, this particular psychoana­
lytic influence was mediated by Althusserian Marxism, specifically 
insofar as "symptomatic readings" were concerned—for instance, 
the assumption that within any structure there remains a symptom 
of what has been repressed or marginalized. 
I note above the importance of the concept of spectatorship for 
textual analysis of the classical Hollywood cinema. There has been 
considerable debate in film studies about whether the "spectator" 
in spectatorship is the subject of the film, the viewer in the movie 
theater, or both (see Bergstrom and Doane). I find the notion of spec­
tatorship most productive when textual analysis attends to the 
spaces between the various "positions" one can deduce by analyzing 
the narrative patterns of a film, and to the hypothetical responses of 
viewers, which are never adequately understood as pure "positions/' I 
want to explore the relationship between textual analysis and specta­
torship by focusing on a particular case study, the trope of portrai­
ture and its narrative function in a 1945 film directed by Albert 
Lewin, The Picture of Dorian Gray. Like many of the films that have 
been immortalized (at least within film studies) through textual 
analysis, this film demonstrates a visible and foregrounded preoc­
cupation with spectatorship. To some extent, of course, all films do; 
the advantage, however, of analyzing a film so visibly preoccupied 
with spectatorship is obvious, since it is an opportunity to observe 
how the classical cinema creates a narrative about itself, how it en­
gages in self-reflexive myth-making. The Picture of Dorian Gray is 
also interesting in that in order to designate a space for viewing, it 
must engage with potentially controversial material, the most obvious 
being the gay persona of Oscar Wilde and the gay implications of 
the novella upon which the film is based. It is not my purpose here 
to enter into the question of censorship and the impact of the 
production code on this film, although it is worth noting that one of 
the most interesting developments in textual analysis of recent 
years is the exploration of the interaction between film texts and 
industry texts. Indeed, critics like Mary Beth Haralovich, Lea 
Jacobs, and Annette Kuhn have suggested that censorship was a 
dynamic, complex relationship, and not one of simple negativity. 
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The director of The Picture of Dorian Gray, Albert Lewin, directed 
only six films, and all of them demonstrate a peculiar blend of the 
Hollywood commonplace and the excessive (particularly true of 
Pandora and the Plying Dutchman [1951]). In his A Biographical Dictio­
nary of Film, David Thomson says of Lewin's films that "arty 
aspiration showed like a teenage slip" (347). The Picture of Dorian 
Gray is both exceptional and typical; exceptional in that it has 
obvious pretensions to artistic sensibility and upper-class mores, 
and typical in that it reflects a core structure evident across a wide 
range of classical Hollywood films. The question of typicality is a 
nagging one for textual analysis, although the question may have 
more to do with excessive claims for an analysis than with the film 
under scrutiny. The use of textual analysis to find "a" subject 
position that typifies "the" classical cinema is both futile and 
pretentious. Rather, individual films—which are always a blend of 
the typical and the exceptional—offer, through the lens of textual 
analysis, a series of hypotheses about the varieties of spectatorship. 
The Picture of Dorian Gray may lean a bit more toward the exceptional 
than the typical, but the figures of spectatorship drawn in the film 
find parallels in other films. 
It is not my intention to engage in a detailed textual analysis of 
the film. In any case, textual analysis is less a matter of exhaustive­
ness than of strategy—the recognition, say, that a detail which 
might initially appear insignificant provides a perspective from 
which other seemingly insignificant details suddenly emerge in 
another kind of coherence, or that within the large oppositions that 
form the overall structure of the film, there is nonetheless a pres­
sure, a sense of something always at the horizon or on the edge of 
the opposition. It would of course be ludicrous to assume that what 
I, in the name of film theory and academic film studies, see in my 
reading of an individual film is necessarily what any and all 
spectators will see. Unfortunately, ludicrous or not, some practi­
tioners of textual analysis do seem to assume that the critic uncov­
ers an unconscious of the text, and that the unconscious of the 
viewer is inscribed in the text. While the notion of a textual 
unconscious is crucial to the development of film studies, the 
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necessarily metaphoric implications of that assumption are fre­
quently lost. For texts may inspire unconscious responses, but they 
don't "have" an unconscious—only people do. 
In Oscar Wilde's 1891 novella, a triangle connects three men— 
Dorian Gray, a handsome aristocratic young man; Basil Hallward, a 
painter; and Lord Henry Wotton, an idle aristocrat who assumes a 
tutorial role of sorts in relationship to Dorian. The novella opens as 
Basil puts the final touches to his portrait of Dorian. In the presence 
of both Basil and Lord Henry, Dorian makes his fatal wish: "If it 
were I who was to be always young, and the picture that was to 
grow old! For that—for that—I would give everything!" (42). Influ­
enced by Lord Henry's philosophy, Dorian pursues pleasure for its 
own sake. During an outing to a London slum, he happens across a 
theater where Shakespeare is being performed. The star of the 
show is a young actress, Sibyl Vane. She possesses an uncanny gift 
for performance which is highlighted even more by the incompe­
tence of her colleagues. Dorian immediately falls in love. When he 
brings his two male friends to observe Sibyl's talents, however, she 
is wooden and dull. 
Sibyl later explains that since she found love with Dorian, she is 
no longer capable of performing well. That is, having found "art" in 
the realm of everyday life, she can no longer produce it. Dorian 
promptly abandons Sibyl. She commits suicide, after which Dorian 
begins to degenerate—-in several senses of the word. But the 
changes in Dorian's life are manifested not in his own body, but in 
Basil's portrait of him. Dorian eventually shows Basil the trans­
formed portrait, and then murders him. While attempting to 
destroy the painting, Dorian himself dies. His body finally records 
the changes previously visible only in the painting, while the 
painting is restored to its original state. 
Even though Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray is superficially 
about heterosexual love, it is widely recognized as gay in inspira­
tion and in its none-too-subterranean subtext. As Richard Ellmann 
writes, for instance, ''More than any other writer of his time in 
England, Wilde recognized that homosexuality was the great un­
dercover subject. . .  . To express his point of view as directly as he 
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could, Wilde wrote The Picture of Dorian Gray. . . . Wilde was 
attacked for immorality, but he had cagily left Dorian's sin unspeci­
fied, while clearly implying involvements with both sexes" (6). It 
comes as no great surprise that the most significant changes made 
in the adaptation of Wilde's novella to the screen involve the 
foregrounding of heterosexual desire as the motor force of the film. 
True, the relationship between Dorian and Sibyl (with Sibyl now a 
singer in a music hall) functions in the film as in the novella to 
render somewhat ambiguous the simultaneous identification and 
desire between Dorian and the two principal men in his life. But 
another female character is added to the film, Gladys, the niece of 
painter Basil Hall ward. Lewin's film begins, as does the novella, 
with the completion of the portrait of Dorian, but with the differ­
ence that a female signature is added to the painting—Gladys is 
portrayed as a small child who puts the letter "G" under her uncle's 
signature. After Sibyl's suicide (provoked in the film by Dorian's 
rejection of her, only now as a result of failing to refuse when 
Dorian invites her to spend the night with him), the passage of time 
allows Gladys to mature into a young woman whose childish 
devotion becomes adult love for Dorian, with somewhat incestuous 
overtones since Dorian is so closely affiliated with Gladys's uncle. In 
the film, Dorian asks Gladys to marry him in an attempt to reform 
and to atone for his guilt over Sibyl's suicide. The same desire for 
salvation motivates his destruction of the painting, and—as in the 
novella—he dies while the painting is restored to its original state. 
While the character of Gladys lends a more obvious heterosexual 
component to the film, there is a link between her and the Wilde 
novella. Two minor female characters in the novella—one actually 
named Gladys—have some connection with the film character; one 
is a hostess at a gathering attended by Dorian and Lord Henry, and 
the other is Hetty, a briefly mentioned "village girl" abandoned by 
Dorian to protect her from inevitable corruption through his influ­
ence. Most important, however, is the familial connection estab­
lished with Basil Hallward, since the character of Gladys is largely 
created by dividing the character of Basil in two. Thus Gladys, 
present at the portrait sitting and cosigner of the portrait, becomes 
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a figure upon whom is displaced any possible sexual attraction 
between Basil and Dorian. 
The addition of Gladys to the film divides the film into two 
distinct parts, the first dominated by Dorian's relationship with 
Sibyl, the second by his relationship with Gladys. As objects of 
Dorian's affections, the two women are not typed according to the 
virgin/whore dichotomy, but rather according to a dichotomy of 
class as well as of performance—Sibyl the performer, Gladys a 
perpetual onlooker. There is a symmetry as well in the representa­
tion of the two women, particularly insofar as their male protectors 
are concerned—Sibyl's brother James, who dies when he attempts 
to kill Dorian in revenge for his sister's suicide, and Gladys's 
sometime suitor David, who discovers the secret of Dorian's paint­
ing in an effort to obstruct their marriage by whatever possible 
means. 
In what has become known as typical of the classical cinema, 
then, The Picture of Dorian Gray is structured by a series of rhyming 
oppositions, and the restoration of order in the film occurs when 
the painting is restored to its original status, and Gladys and David 
are united in a relationship that is free of the somewhat incestuous 
overtones of a possible relationship between Dorian and Gladys. 
The most obvious and foregrounded oppositions in the film center 
on the representation of the portrait. While Dorian's portrait is 
described in Wilde's novella, it is not a description that is—to use 
Roland Barthes's term—''operable"; that is, much of the force of the 
portrait in the novella is a result of its status as a function of 
discourse. Not only is the portrait shown in Lewin's film, but its 
display introduces a striking opposition between black and white 
and color, for the display of the portrait at three crucial moments in 
the film occasions the use of glorious technicolor. The use of color 
gives the painting(s) a certain autonomy, and also makes the 
difference between the early and late versions of the painting all 
the more striking. 
In one of the most influential essays analyzing film narrative, 
"Narrative Space," Stephen Heath begins with an analysis of a 
scene in Hitchcock's Suspicion. Two policemen arrive at Lina's 
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(played by Joan Fontaine) home. A play is established in this scene 
between two paintings, one the realistic portrait of Lina's father 
which functions as a constant reminder of his law and authority, 
the other a somewhat abstract "modernist" painting hanging on 
the wall in the entry hall to the house, and toward which the 
puzzled attention of one of the policemen is drawn as he enters and 
again as he leaves. The scene in question demonstrates the con­
struction of narrative space, as a "perfectly symmetrical patterning 
[that] builds up and pieces together the space in which the action 
can take place, the space which is itself part of that action in its 
economy, its intelligibility, its own legality" (20). The tension 
between the two paintings, one traditional, one modernist, and the 
function of the modernist painting as "useless" serve "to demon­
strate the rectitude of the portrait, the true painting at the centre of 
the scene, utterly in frame in the film's action" (23). The implication 
in Heath's analysis is both that the classical cinema constructs a 
narrative space controlled by the order represented by the father's 
portrait, and that always at the edges of this construction are the 
possibilities, so forcefully demonstrated in the Hitchcock scene, of 
"missing spectacle: problem of point of view, different framing, 
disturbance of the law and its inspectoring eye, interruption of the 
homogeneity of the narrative economy, it is somewhere else again, 
another scene, another story, another space" (24). 
A common assumption about textual analysis, and about Heath's 
contributions to it, is that whatever ruptures, disturbances, or 
differences emerge are smoothed over and contained by the ho­
mogenizing force of classical film narrative. While this is true of 
some textual analysis, I do not think it is an accurate assessment of 
Heath's work. This analysis of the scene in Suspicion may demon­
strate how the articulation of space in classical film narrative 
marginalizes and relegates to "uselessness" figurations that threaten 
to upset its order. But the analysis suggests just as forcefully the 
way in which classical narrative engages in a constant process of 
negotiation, of flirtation with its own margins. To be sure, no film 
directed by Hitchcock can be taken as representative of classical 
Hollywood as a whole—despite claims to the contrary by those 
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who have analyzed the mechanisms of male desire in his films— 
and the whole painting episode could perhaps be described as a 
typical "Hitchcock joke/' as Heath suggests. But the scene an­
alyzed by Heath finds echoes in other classical Hollywood films. 
The portrait of Dorian Gray does not occupy the center of The 
Picture of Dorian Gray in the same way as the father's portrait in 
Suspicion; in Hitchcock's film, the portrait is a metaphoric conden­
sation of the authority that dominates Lina and the film, whereas in 
Lewin's film, the portrait is much more literally the focus of the 
film. Yet I find echoes of the scene analyzed by Heath in The Picture 
of Dorian Gray, specifically insofar as the articulation of narrative 
space is concerned. 
In the film, a mode of spectatorship is constructed in which 
there are clear and sharp divisions between innocence and corrup­
tion, yet those very divisions are more permeable than they first 
appear. Spectatorship as it is defined in the film operates on two 
levels. The first has to do with the portrait itself and the responses 
to it, with the narcissism of Dorian Gray and the nurturance it finds 
in Lord Henry, all defined as the excesses which the film must put 
right—all variations on the common theme of male specular iden­
tity, of men as mirrors for other men. The second has to do with 
how the film constructs a scenography that evokes certain codes 
and conventions of painting, but in ways more diffuse than merely 
using literal portraits within the film. Here the objects of such 
painting-inspired mise-en-scene are usually women. Put another 
way, portraiture in The Picture of Dorian Gray occurs on two levels, 
only one of which has to do with the actual portrait itself; the 
implications of framing and mise-en-scene united the two different 
levels. Yet the levels are separated by the difference between men 
and women. 
The Picture of Dorian Gray begins with Lord Henry in a carriage 
on his way to Basil's. While Lord Henry reads, a male narrator 
speaks in voice-over: "Lord Henry Wotton had set himself early in 
life to the serious and great aristocratic art of doing absolutely 
nothing. He lived only for pleasure, but his greatest pleasure was to 
observe the emotions of his friends while experiencing none of his 
• 145 * 
JUDITH MAYNE 
own. He diverted himself by exercising a subtle influence on the 
lives of others." The form of spectatorship sketched out here is 
situated immediately within the realm of an aristocratic aesthete's 
ideal pleasures. Once he has arrived at Basil's studio, to which he 
has come out of curiosity about the secrecy of Basil's current 
painting project, the three men who form the core of Wilde's 
novella are introduced. Each man performs the activity that will 
define his spectatorial role throughout the film: Basil creates, 
Dorian poses and eventually contemplates his own image, and 
Lord Henry chases and captures a butterfly—presumably yet an­
other metaphoric activity for observing the emotions of others and 
influencing (not so subtly in this case) their lives. An equivalence is 
established between these activities as well, since Lord Henry 
pursues his butterfly at the same time that Basil puts the finishing 
touches on his portrait and Dorian poses. A dissolve from the live 
creature, to the dead mounted butterfly, to the portrait makes a 
clear connection between killing a creature and immortalizing it 
through art. 
While Lord Henry does function in the film, as in the novella, to 
present a philosophy of pleasure to Dorian, he functions far more 
obviously in the film as a spectator, to the extent that the portrait is 
initially as shrouded in secrecy to the viewer as it is to Lord Henry 
Rarely if ever do such spectators within the film function unequiv­
ocally in the "positions" of address that spectators are assumed to 
adopt (see Browne). But that a voice-over narrator, never associated 
with any single character in the film, introduces and contextualizes 
Lord Henry makes it even more difficult to identify Lord Henry as 
an authoritative presence in any simple sense. Rather, the central 
terms of spectatorship in the film are defined by the two polarities 
which Dorian and Lord Henry represent: for Dorian, mesmerized 
absorption in his own image; for Lord Henry, somewhat distanced 
detachment. Basil's role as an artist combines both forms of spec­
tatorship without succumbing to either extreme—he is absorbed 
and obsessed by his painting, but with the image of another. 
While the display of the painting occurs early in the film, in 
Basil's studio, its appearance is accompanied by enough delay and 
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foregrounding to make the painting the central enigmatic object of 
the film. Our first sight of the painting coincides with Dorian's first 
look at the finished product. The portrait is thoroughly realist, an 
example of classical portraiture. The portrait also is a straightfor­
ward representation of what has been seen of Dorian, with two 
important exceptions —the painting is presented in technicolor, 
and whereas Dorian has posed for the final moments of his sitting 
before a painting depicting a group of women bathers, the back­
ground to his portrait is blank (figs. 1, 2). The other objects 
surrounding him—a highbacked chair, a statue of a cat, and a 
clock—remain in the painting, so that the only erasure is that of the 
painting. The finished portrait is, of course, entirely in keeping 
with conventional portraiture, but what remains a matter of some 
curiosity is the placement of the painting of the women bathers in 
the first place. This painting is not insignificant in the initial tnise-
en-scene of the studio, since it creates a rhyming structure, against 
which the still unseen portrait of Dorian is measured. 
The next view afforded of the painting occurs within the context 
of Dorian and Sibyl's relationship. Knowing that Dorian intends to 
marry Sibyl, Lord Henry has suggested that Dorian test her by 
FIGURE 1 
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asking her to spend the night. If she refuses, then she is truly the 
superior creature that Dorian believes her to be; if not, then Dorian 
will know not to marry her. But when Dorian asks her to spend the 
night, she agrees, and Dorian promptly rejects her. The rejection 
leads to her suicide, after which the portrait of Dorian is shown 
(again in technicolor) with a subtle change: the appearance of what 
the narrator, in voice-over, describes as a "cruel look about the 
mouth" (fig. 3). 
The painting is not seen again until it has been completely 
transformed, with Dorian portrayed as a grotesque old man whose 
image records the kind of life he leads. The style of the painting has 
also changed. It is now in an expressionist mode, with excessive 
strokes, bold colors, and a myriad of indistinguishable objects 
within the frame (fig. 4). The revelation occurs after Basil has seen 
the changes that have occurred in his painting, and Dorian mur­
ders him. Whereas Sibyl's death caused the "cruel look about the 
mouth" in the earlier painting, Dorian's murder of Basil causes 
blood to form on the hands of the deformed and deranged Dorian 
represented in the later version. Curiously, there is a change as well 
in the sexual quality of the transformed painting. While the 
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FIGURE 3 
evocation of aristocratic wealth in the film allows gay sexuality to 
be summoned and repressed simultaneously in the name of effete 
taste and effeminate behavior presumed to be characteristic of the 
wealthy, there is nonetheless a delicate androgyny in the figure of 
Dorian represented in the first version of the painting. If the 
women bathers have disappeared in the portrait, it would be just as 
easy to see them as having been absorbed into it. But in the final 
painting, Dorian has become a parody of deranged masculinity. 
The most striking changes in the painting, then, are the trans­
formation of a young, somewhat androgynous gentleman into a 
decrepit old man, and the shift in style from realism to expression­
ism. The painting changes location, as well. The first part of The 
Picture of Dorian Gray, concerned with the relationship between 
Dorian and Sibyl, and with the painting as an accurate projection 
of what we see, contrasts two radically different spaces, the aristo­
cratic home (whether Dorian's or Basil's) and the music hall where 
Sibyl Vane performs, and where Dorian is treated in awe as a 
gentleman. The second part of the film, taken up with Dorian's 
relationship with the grown-up Gladys, contrasts two spaces with­
in the house. When Dorian first notices, the "cruel look about the 
mouth" in the painting, he decides to hide it away in a room at the 
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top of the stairs. The narrator describes Dorian's decision: "It would 
be mayhem to allow the thing to remain, even for an hour. Even in a 
room to which only his friends had access. Henceforth he must 
always be on his guard. Against everyone. At the top of the house 
was his old schoolroom, which had not been used for years. No one 
ever entered it. . . ." The painting thus acquires an aura of secrecy 
that rhymes with the opening of the film, but transforms secrecy 
into a threat. 
Whereas Dorian negotiated comfortably the spatial opposition 
between two radically different class environments characteristic 
of the first part of the film, the tension generated between the two 
areas of the house initiates conflict heretofore absent, with the 
added component of temporal opposition as well—the schoolroom 
is virtually the only reference in the film to Dorian's childhood. 
While the room is not often shown, it acquires narrative impor­
tance. The narrator says, for instance, that "He could not endure to 
be long out of England or to be separated from the picture. It was 
such a part of his life." The self-absorption present in the first part 
of the film is here quite literal. The risk of homosexual implications 
is managed by drawing an imaginary line across the threshold to 
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the room, a line crossed only by men and never by women, thus 
identifying bonds between men with the past of childhood. 
If the problem generated by the play of the two paintings in 
Suspicion concerns the authority of the father under siege, in this 
film there is no such equivalence between the classical, realist 
portraiture of the painting and an authoritative order. Rather, the 
two versions of the painting are both threats to an implied order, an 
order which can only be set right by the realignment of reality and 
representation, and the emergence of that legendary resolution 
principle for which the classical Hollywood cinema is so famous 
and so derided—the happy heterosexual couple. For once the death 
of Dorian brackets the incestuous overtones of his relationship with 
Gladys, and once the restoration of the portrait to its original state 
and Dorian's accompanying death erase implicit homosexuality, the 
male-female couple, Gladys and her patient suitor David, can be 
united. 
What remain a matter of some curiosity in this relationship 
among male/female, homosexual/heterosexual, and incestuous/ 
nonincestuous pairs, however, are the different ways painting is 
evoked in the film to articulate narrative space. For while the 
portrait of Dorian and its changing status is the obvious center of 
the film, other devices of mise-en-scene partake of the conventions of 
painting. Particularly striking in this context is an opposition 
established early in the film between the portraiture of men and the 
framing of women. Basil's studio is defined as belonging to a 
community of men, with women framed in a literal and ostensible 
way. Before Dorian's arrival at the studio at the beginning of the 
film, Basil and Lord Henry are seated in the garden. In the 
background we see a woman sewing, framed in a doorway (fig. 5). 
The pose and the framing are familiar representations of women in 
Western oil painting, with the woman depicted as if she is ob­
served, unawares, while engaged in a solitary activity, and of 
which Jean-Honore Fragonard's "A Young Girl Reading" (1776) is 
one representative example. Men are defined in terms of how they 
"look," in both senses of the word, while women are defined in 
terms of how they look in only one sense of the word. That the only 
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FIGURE 5 
living, breathing female in this scene is the child Gladys empha­
sizes the rigid sexual hierarchy at work. And Gladys herself enters 
the scene of the studio through a doorway, while the construction 
of the shot echoes the scene outdoors. 
So far, this sounds like the standard "man looks, woman is 
looked at" argument—for instance, that painting establishes only 
an apparent equivalence between the male and female object of the 
look, one betrayed by the status of woman as only the object of the 
look (see Mulvey). The matter of curiosity to which I have referred, 
however, is that the mostly anonymous women who are framed in 
the film are done so in relationship to the position of the spectator, 
not in relationship to the three male figures whose spectatorial 
activities function so centrally. The composition of the woman in 
the doorway engaged in a solitary activity is repeated when the 
three men go to the "Two Turtles" to see Sybil Vane perform. We see 
Sibyl before them, singing in front of a trompe-l'oeil storefront. 
Behind the three men, at the opposite end of the theatre, is an 
office, where a woman is seen through the open door at work at a 
desk (fig. 6). At one point during the performance, we see the stage 
at such an angle that images of women, framed identically, are seen 
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FIGURE 6 
on three levels: Sibyl on stage, her mother backstage sewing, and a 
woman dressing before a mirror (fig. 7). Although these women so 
obsessively framed within doorways or stages are stereotypical 
objects of the presumably male gaze, there is a curious contradic­
tion. For the male "spectators"—Dorian, Basil, Lord Henry—seem 
to be less interested in the spectacle before their eyes, and more 
interested in each other. And while each of the women is, on her 
own terms, given a fairly straightforward "frame" of representa­
tion, the juxtaposition of the three levels creates an odd, asymmet­
rical effect. Between the first image of the woman framed in the 
doorway and the image of the three women, there is a relationship 
not unlike that between the original and transformed portrait of 
Dorian, between a conventional composition and a much more 
excessive one. 
It is also curious that while this element of framing has been 
written about extensively in relationship to gender in film, in this 
case social class is as much of a determination as gender; at the very 
least, the device of framing results from the intersection of class 
and gender determinations. For the woman framed in the doorway 
at the beginning of the film is a servant, and the women seen at the 
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FIGURE 7 
Two Turtles are defined not just by their sexual status but by their 
class status as well. While it is much more common for women to be 
represented as "framed/' there are some instances where men— 
either working-class men at the music hall, or servants—are 
framed in ways similar to that of the woman sewing. At several 
moments in the film, servants are portrayed standing stiffly at 
attention while the wealthy people they serve eat or converse, and 
the effect is quite similar to that of the woman-in-the-doorway 
motif. 
I am suggesting, then, that the trope of portraiture is a figure of 
spectatorship to the extent that, in each case, a mode of observa-
tion—from narcissistic self-absorption to detached mockery—is 
foregrounded. There is no single position authorized by each 
individual instance of portraiture, from Dorian's portrait to the 
framing of women and servants; rather, spectatorship takes shape 
as the possible relationships among these different views and their 
corresponding sites of observation. What seems to me most crucial 
about this particular example is that it puts into question the 
automatic equivalence some have assumed between spectatorship 
in the classical cinema and men possessing women. Not that men 
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don't possess women in this film, but here "possession" is a 
complex process involving the negotiation and denial of male 
homoerotic bonds. In addition, the intersection between gender 
and class in the film does not reduce in any obvious way to a "pure" 
example of sexual difference, since the notion of property is so 
excessively defined in class terms as well as gendered ones. 
As an instance of that ubiquitous entity, the classical Hollywood 
cinema, The Picture of Dorian Gray is both typical and atypical, as 
undoubtedly is any Hollywood film. Like many literary adapta­
tions of the 1940s, there is a self-aggrandizing quality about the 
film, and the numerous references to high art and aristocratic 
privilege serve simultaneously as windows to a fantasyland and as 
a self-promoting strategy Yet unlike other films of the 1940s which 
deploy opposing definitions of "realist" versus "modern" art in 
order to elevate the status of the former at the expense of the latter 
(Waldman), Lewin's film does not condemn any particular version 
of the aesthetic as inherently corrupt; rather, any and all forms of 
representation are susceptible to excess. Within the specularity of 
portraiture in the film is the suggestion that spectatorship involves 
the simultaneous erection and dissolution of boundaries. Does this 
therefore mean that The Picture of Dorian Gray is "subversive," the 
exception to the rule of classical cinema? I think not. That a film like 
The Picture of Dorian Gray sits so comforably within the classical 
cinema, while engaging with an undeniable homoerotic compo­
nent of spectatorship (at least as far as men are concerned), sug­
gests that textual analysis will perhaps always uncover forms of 
spectatorship that both conform to and exceed what is assumed to 
be typical. 
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"How Did You Know He Licked 
His Lips?": Second Person 
Knowledge and First Person 
Power in The Maltese Falcon 
PETER J. RABINOWITZ 
"What Do You Want Us to Think the Facts Are!" 
Epistemology and Detective Fiction 
Classification is an occupational hazard for any theorist of detec­
tive stories—in part because there are so many convenient but 
competing axes for sorting them out. You can, for instance, differ­
entiate novels according to the location of the guilt they uncover— 
say, between Hercule Poirot stories (where detective and criminal 
are kept rigorously separate) and Oedipal stories (where, as in 
William Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust or Raymond Chandler's The 
A very much shorter version of this essay was delivered at the International 
Conference on Narrative at Vanderbilt University in April 1992. Thanks are due 
to members of the audience whose questions helped me sharpen my argu­
ments. Thanks are due, as well, to Brian Richardson for aid in tracking down 
both second person texts and criticism about them, and to Barbara Andrews, 
James Phelan, Nancy Rabinowitz, Percy Walton, and Nancy Warren for detailed 
commentary on earlier drafts, and to Michael S. Rabinowitz for editorial 
assistance. 
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Big Sleep, a key discovery is a discovery of the detective's own guilt). 
Alternatively, you can organize them according to their treatment 
of time—between backward-facing stories (for instance, Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle's A Study in Scarlet) where the key events precede the 
detective's intervention, and stories where the primary events are 
those provoked by the investigation itself—say, Sara Paretsky's 
Bitter Medicine, It is also popular to distinguish stories stylistically, 
as between classical British and hard-boiled American. 
In this essay I want to work along another axis, looking at 
detective stories in terms of the way they conceptualize the nature 
of truth. Mikhail Bakhtin argues that "when the novel becomes the 
dominant genre, epistemology becomes the dominant discipline" 
(15), and from this perspective the detective story would seem one 
of the most novelistic of subgenres. Granted, this is complex terrain 
that engages a number of intersecting questions, both epistemo­
logical and metaphysical. Nonetheless, I think we can draw a 
crucial, if rough, dividing line between two sorts of texts. The first 
relies on what we might call the Fort Knox notion of truth, a phrase 
with a double resonance for connoisseurs of early detective fiction, 
since one of the first attempts to chart out the "rules" for classical 
detective novels was Ronald Knox's "A Detective Story Decalogue." 
Fort Knox novels, often embodying positions associated with em­
piricism, realism, and especially positivism (as Knox puts it, "all 
supernatural or preternatural agencies are ruled out as a matter of 
course" [194]), rest on the twin assumptions that the truth exists 
and that it can be found through rational procedures. That is, their 
plots are constructed on the belief that the truth value of a particu­
lar claim can be determined according to some external and tran­
scendent standard independent of the perspective or context of the 
individual making the claim, a standard that is available to the 
skilled detective. Most traditional detectives, from Oedipus and 
Sherlock Holmes through Mike Hammer and Travis McGee, take 
the Fort Knox position, assuming, as Michael Holquist puts it, that 
"the mind, given enough time, can understand everything" (141). In­
deed, Ellery Queen built the notion of an independent standard and a 
single solution into the very format of some of his best novels, offering 
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an explicit challenge to the reader at the point where all the necessary 
information to reach the one right answer had been provided. 
Even many of the traditional novels that appear to trifle with 
these conventions end up firmly wedded to them. Queen's Ten 
Days' Wonder, for example, reads in part as a subversion of the Fort 
Knox position, suggesting that more than one solution might fit the 
available facts. Still, in the end, the novel does not equivocate about 
what really happened: we may be tricked by false stories, but there 
is ultimately a difference between true and false accounts, and they 
can be distinguished in practice, if not always in time to prevent 
misfortune. Similarly, Anthony Berkeley's The Poisoned Chocolates 
Case, which multiplies the number of possible explanations, ulti­
mately determines one to be the true story. 
In contrast, such postmodern detectives as Jacques Revel (in 
Michel Butor's L'Emploi du temps [Passing Time]) or Witold (in Witold 
Gombrowicz's Cosmos) resist the siren call of positivism. Philo­
sophically, they're allied with what might be called the barter 
school of truth, a school often associated with what Katheryn 
Doran has aptly called the "seductive conflation of epistemological 
skepticism and metaphysical relativism."1 Unlike Fort Knox adher­
ents, champions of this position believe that perspective inevitably 
influences any account (or attempted account) of reality. As a 
result, what will "count as" truth is always a context-dependent 
construction.2 
As I have suggested, there are numerous variations within this 
broad grouping. In Les Gommes {The Erasers), for instance, Alain 
Robbe-Grillet surprisingly combines metaphysical realism with his 
epistemological skepticism, suggesting that there is a true narra­
tive of the events, although it is inaccessible to any of the characters 
in the world of the novel. Cosmos appears to be more thoroughly 
postmodern, suggesting that no transcendental narrative exists at 
all, although the novel's (probably coincidental) intertextual refer­
ences to the life and music of Alban Berg confuse the issue.3 Still, 
despite their differences, the novelists in this second camp reject 
the belief that we can determine the truth of particular claims; at 
most, we make truth discursively and rhetorically by telling stories 
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and negotiating among them, bartering truth claims in exchanges 
that are either taken up or not according to the needs of a particular 
social context (including its power relations).4 For these counter­
cultural detectives, the search is not for some empirically verifiable 
"truth" but rather for some coherent story "about" the world, 
preferably one with enough persuasive power to gain acceptance 
from whoever needs to be convinced. 
For the most part, these novels do not pursue their philosophical 
quarry all the way to the most radical skepticism (although Paul 
Auster, in his New York Trilogy, comes close). In particular, most do 
not deny the existence of brute material facts, and do not throw 
doubt on the possibility of direct observation of the present. But, 
much like Alain Resnais and Robbe-Grillet's L'Annee derniere a 
Marienbad (Last Year at Marienbad), they suggest that the past (even 
the immediate past) exists only in the form of present material 
objects. "History" (and any detective story necessarily involves its 
characters in some attempt at historical reconstruction) is conse­
quently a matter of inventing stories about those present objects. 
Any story that can account for those material objects has equal 
validity; whether or not it is accepted thus depends not on its 
fidelity to what is the case, but rather on its barter value for the 
particular context in which it is presented. 
"Tite Soft Grey Sheen of Lead": Clipping the Wings of 
the Maltese Falcon 
Traditionally, Dashiell Hammett's The Maltese Falcon has been read 
as a straight hard-boiled detective story, with little interest in 
erudite philosophical issues. This is not to say, of course, that the 
novel has not been widely read as a serious social critique. Liahna 
K. Babener, for instance, is typical in claiming that the novel's 
"target . .  . is the duplicity of the Horatio Alger myth" (78). But on 
the whole, there's been little interest in considering The Maltese 
Falcon as a philosophical novel fundamentally "concerned with 
stories and storytelling" (Schulman 400).5 
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There is good reason, of course, for the customary readings. The 
novel first appeared in the context of the early Black Mask school, 
and many of its surface features—its clipped, tough "masculine" 
dialogue; its complex, fast-moving plot; its cynical antisentimental-
ism—appear to invite the reader to apply the same reading strate­
gies demanded by other tough novels of the period, rather than, 
say, the strategies demanded by such then avant-garde contempo­
raries as Woolf or Pirandello, much less the strategies later de­
manded by Robbe-Grillet and Auster. Yet different features emerge 
as significant for readers of different historical periods. And as we 
grow accustomed to thinking and rereading in postmodern terms, 
the stability of Hammett is novel increasingly begins to dissolve, as 
Percy Walton and Kathryn Gail Brock's parodic readings have in their 
different ways demonstrated.6 From the arrival of Brigid O'Shaugh-
nessy in Sam Spade's office, it's a novel in which the plot consists 
not of events, but of continual acts of narrativizing and renarrati­
vizing about events that may or may not have taken place. Even Lieu­
tenant Dundy, the character most committed to meaning what he 
says (21), finds that he has to invent stories ("Nobody saw it, but 
that's the way it figures" [22]) and deal with the inventions of others: 
"What do you want us to think the truth is?" he asks Brigid O'Shaugh-
nessy with a scowl of aggravation (75). The characters are not 
centered subjects, but assume a dizzying series of self-conscious 
roles that cast doubt on traditional notions of identity: Brigid 
O'Shaughnessy's carefully choreographed transformations in par­
ticular, from the timid Miss Wonderly clasping her handbag to the 
teary, love-wracked beseecher of the final confrontation, confirm 
that this is a world in which the equation between who you are and 
what your story is is more than a dead metaphor (22). The stability 
of gender, too, is undermined, not only by the dynamics of the 
Gutman-Wilmer-Cairo trio or the fight between Cairo and Brigid 
O'Shaughnessy over the boy in Constantinople (68), but even more 
by Spade's boyish but femininely seductive secretary Effie Perine. 
Novelistic cliches—the reliability of women's intuition, the joviality 
of the fat man—are turned inside out. Messages—even a condo­
lence note to a lover upon her liberation from a husband she 
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detested—are severed from their senders. Clues—for instance, the 
hole in the newspaper that Spade finds in Cairo's hotel room—are 
often marked by absence rather than presence, just as Archer's 
murder in the San Francisco fog is celebrated by the erasure of his 
name from the door of the detective agency's office. 
To the extent that there is a story, it is a story of a search without a 
beginning. Spade's first words to Brigid O'Shaughnessy may be "Sup­
pose you tell me about it, from the beginning" (5), but since he 
doesn't expect "it" to be believable, he hardly expects that it will 
have a real origin. More important, the search is a search without 
an ending, except the promise of endless deferral. It's consistent, 
then, that in common with much postmodernist thought, the novelis­
tic acid eats away at the distinction between fiction and history. 
Indeed—and it came as a shock when I called up the OCLC catalog on 
my computer to check this out—the historical texts that Casper Gut-
man uses to buttress his story about the falcon turn out to be 
"actual" historical works, and the stories that he tells fit the facts 
that we know. Thus, although Ernie Bradford's version of the story 
puts into question the Knights' power and their undiluted enthusi­
asm for Malta (which apparently required them, in addition, to garri­
son Tripoli: "It is indicative of the desperate straits to which the Order 
had been reduced that they agreed to the Emperor's offer"), his 
account confirms the basic story of the "annual nominal rent of one 
falcon" (123).7 The assessment of Effie Perine's fictional historian-
cousin Ted ("the names and dates are all right, and at least none of 
your authorities or their works are out-and-out fakes" [139]) thus col­
lapses the distinction between the authorial and narrative audiences.8 
Money—the anchor of capitalism—is deconstructed as well. 
Gutman may claim that the cash he hands to Spade is "actual 
money, genuine coin of the realm" that somehow transcends the 
merely discursive: "With a dollar of this, you can buy more than 
with ten dollars of talk" (174). But the novel represents a world of 
counterfeiters, too (119), and even Gutman's apparently legitimate 
thousand-dollar bills can not only disappear, but even change the 
very nature of their being: at the end, the one remaining bill has 
been transformed from a payment into an "exhibit" (215-16). 
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Then, too, although the novel has sometimes been treated as a 
Hemingwayesque endorsement of a masculine code of honor and 
loyalty, the novel's intertextual links with Prosper Merimee's 1829 
short story "Mateo Falcone" serve to undercut that code, too, as 
well as traditional bourgeois notions of the family. Merimee's brutal 
little anecdote concerns a father who executes his own son out of 
devotion to a higher code of conduct—for the child, bribed with the 
promise of a silver watch, has turned a fugitive over to the govern­
ment authorities, becoming "the first of his line to have committed 
a betrayal" (Merimee, 65). Hammett twice inverts this scenario: 
when Gutman, who "feel[s] towards Wilmer just exactly as if he 
were [his] own son" (178), nonetheless agrees to turn him over to 
the police in exchange for the falcon, and again when Spade turns 
over Brigid O'Shaughnessy. 
Most striking, of course, is the falcon/phallus itself (what Sam 
Spade calls a "dingus"): for the transcendental signifier that osten­
sibly gives meaning and value to the world of the novel displays the 
"soft grey sheen of lead" (202), as it turns out to be just another 
counterfeit of a unique original that may or may not exist. No 
surprise, then, that in this novel, pistols—for instance, the "tools 
bulging [Wilmer's] clothes" (95)—keep multiplying and changing 
hands, a thematic ploy that reaches comically Ionesco-like propor­
tions when the guns are all (or nearly all) shut up in the closet 
during the long negotiation scene. No surprise, either, that the 
other variant of the phallus—the crucial fall guy—miraculously 
disappears from a crowded room. 
The Maltese Falcon, like most other postmodern detective stories, 
refrains from challenging the existence of an observable material 
present, although like them it rhetoricizes history. History be­
comes a matter of telling stories about present objects, and any 
story that can account for the material traces of the past—any story, 
as Spade puts it, that "seems to click with most of the known 
facts" —will "hold," as long as you have the power to persuade your 
listeners to go along with it (115). Nor does the novel confront the 
abyss by endorsing either despair or aesthetic free play. Rather, in 
common with such other macho preexistentialists as Hemingway, 
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Hammett seems to be trying to propose a way of controlling one's 
environment (and preserving "self/' in body if not in soul) in a 
world where truth is relative and where violence (whether in the 
form of gunshots or of beams falling from construction sites) 
erupts without warning. Spade's "way of learning is to heave a wild 
and unpredictable monkey wrench into the machinery" (86), and 
his refusal to "settle" into a "groove" (64) is, to a large extent, what 
ensures his survival and success, not to mention his status as a 
hero. 
"Wait Till Ym Through and Then You Can Talk": 
Power and Narrative Technique 
I do not want to overstate the extent of The Maltese Falcon's post­
modernism. As I pointed out, there are also numerous conven­
tional signals that invite us to read the novel as a traditional hard­
boiled text: this is a world of real violence and real corpses, without 
any of the ghostly ambiguities of perception that haunt Auster's 
trilogy, and without any of the nagging ambiguities of plot that 
make the world of Butor's L'Emploi du temps (where we never even 
find out whether or not there was a crime) such an unsettling 
experience. Still, the presence of these deconstructive counter­
forces fundamentally disturbs the equilibrium of the text; and the 
reader who picks up on the novel's questioning spirit is apt to be 
taken aback when the novel's postmodern unraveling itself falls 
apart in the paradoxically tight-knit ending. 
The clarity of the conclusion is no doubt partly a result of the 
pressures of genre: Hammett was apparently not yet ready to give 
us a detective story without an ending. But there's also a deeper 
sexual-political cause. If any poststructuralist interpretive doctrine 
has acquired general currency, it is the belief that texts assert what 
they're at most pains to deny. And if the clear epistemological and 
metaphysical structures of traditional realist detective fiction aim 
to deflect our attention from metaphysical and political aporias, 
what is being furtively asserted by this text when it so steadfastly 
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refuses to assert anything at all? What I'd like to suggest here is 
that, through its very rhetorical structure, the novel deconstructs 
its own postmodern refusal to take a stand—its own rejection of 
what Casper Gutman calls "plain speaking and clear understand­
ing" (105)—covertly reasserting precisely those traditional values it 
so ostentatiously undermines, and falling back on an unexamined 
myth of absence. And the novel does so because it reaches a 
rhetorical impasse where, in order to follow through on its own 
barter-school program, Hammett and Spade would be required to 
accept women as independent subjects. 
The novel turns into a self-affirming artifact most clearly through 
its treatment of embedded narratives, stories within stories. In 
order to explain how this happens, I'd like to introduce two distinc­
tions: one between two kinds of transmission as a story moves 
from one level to the next, the other among three types of narra­
tion. To begin with transmission: when light waves travel from one 
medium to another, one of two things can happen. If they hit 
perpendicular to the surface of the new medium, they continue on 
in the same direction, in a straight line; but if they hit obliquely, 
they are refracted, and move off at a different angle. Similarly, 
when a story moves from one medium to another, one of two things 
can happen. In straight line transmission, intervening levels of 
narration do not in any significant way deflect the story being told. 
In Voltaire's Candida, the Old Woman's tale has the same claim to 
authenticity as the narration that frames it. More elaborately, in 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Safie's letters are presented with four 
levels of embedding. We know them only from Walton's letters, 
which include Victor Frankenstein's narrative, which in turn in­
cludes the monster's story, which in turn includes the letters—or at 
least copies that he made of them, copies we're told of, but never 
shown (108). Nonetheless, as readers, it is as if we have direct access 
to the letters; the intervening levels don't interfere in any way with 
our rhetorical connection to the originals. 
In refractive transmission, by contrast, each intervening level 
bends the story, so that our attention as readers is necessarily 
divided between what is narrated and the twists introduced by the 
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act of narration itself. Indeed, such embedded stories are thus both 
refracted and refractory, in the sense that they resist easy inter­
pretation. Thus, for instance, in Mikhail Lermontov's Hero of Our 
Time, we learn about the characters as much from how they narrate 
as from what is said about them, and the differences between the 
accounts given by Pechorin and those given by Maxim Maximich 
are crucial to our sense of the novel. 
Now either type of transmission—straight line or refractive—is 
in principle consistent with a Fort Knox notion of truth: for while 
the Fort Knox doctrine hinges on the assumption that the truth is 
potentially available, it does not follow that a particular individual 
will be capable of (or interested in) actually finding it. Much of 
Poirot's detection, therefore, consists of sorting out conflicting 
refracted narratives, some consciously false, some simply mis­
taken, in order to discover the transcendent truth at their origin. 
But while the Fort Knox notion does not necessarily entail straight 
line transmission, straight line transmission does entail Knoxism. 
Straight line transmission inevitably involves both the possibility 
and the actuality of identity between two versions of a story—not 
merely a possible partial overlap (as in As I Lay Dying, where Cash 
and Darl may partially confirm each other's narrative of Jewel's 
past), but an absolute match between the telling and the told, as 
well as a way of determining that that match has occurred. Because 
of this, we can't have straight line transmission in a world where 
the very act of perception changes (in some versions, even creates) 
what is perceived. The barter notion of truth therefore necessarily 
requires refractive transmission. 
My second distinction is among first, second, and third person 
narration. Although this distinction is commonplace in narrative 
theory (enough so that as long ago as 1961, Wayne Booth called it 
"overworked" [150]), its value has been obscured by the grammati­
cal terminology, which encourages us to concentrate on the surface 
manifestations of the text. But surface does not always match 
significant structure: Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust uses third 
person grammar, but the narrative has all the characteristics of a 
retrospective first person novel. I would like to propose, then, that 
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we reconsider the terminology, and think of narrative person not as 
a grammatical category—nor even what Genette calls a "narrative 
posture" (Narrative Discourse 244)—but rather as a rhetorical situa­
tion embracing not only the teller but the audience as well.9 
To be schematic for a moment: let us assume that narrator A says 
to audience B that referent C did something. (I'm using the term 
"referent" here because the terms "subject" and "object" introduce 
too many ambiguities of meaning.) In the simplest type of what I'm 
calling third person narrative, the three positions (A, B, and C) are 
clearly distinct, and the third of them is, moreover, absent from the 
scene of reception. "A photograph of Mama Chona and her grand­
son Miguel Angel—Miguel Chico or Mickie to his family—hovers 
above his head on the study wall beside the glass doors that open 
out into the garden. When Miguel Chico sits at his desk, he glances 
up at it occasionally without noticing it, looking through it rather 
than at it." So begins Arturo Islas's The Rain God (3), and we know 
that Miguel Chico is neither telling nor being told the story. In first 
and second person narration, however, some of these positions are 
collapsed. In the simplest type of first person narration, it is the 
narrator and referent who are collapsed: "Last year, on the eve­
ning of March 22,1 had a very strange adventure" (Dostoevsky 1). 
And in second person narration, most often found in spoken 
discourse (or its novelistic representation), it's the distinction be­
tween audience and referent that's collapsed: "You are about to 
begin reading Italo Calvino's new novel, If on a winter's night a 
traveler. Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought" (Calvino 
3 ) . 10 
For the most part, these rhetorical categories overlap with the 
traditional grammatical categories. Thus most first person narra­
tives in my sense are composed in the grammatical first person. 
But as I've suggested, Intruder in the Dust is rhetorically a first 
person narrative, since narrator and referent are identical, despite 
the grammatical construction that describes Chick in the third 
person throughout. Likewise, we learn at the end of Albert Camus's 
La Peste (The Plague) that we've been reading a first person narrative 
in which the narrator refers to himself in the third person. 
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Despite such famous exceptions as Butor's La Modification and 
Calvino's If on a winter's night a traveler, second person is rarely used 
as the top—that is, the most inclusive—level of narration (I'm 
calling on this rather informal terminology in large part because 
the more familiar terms Genette uses in Narrative Discourse— 
extradiegetic, diegetic, metadiegetic—are so cumbersome).11 In­
deed, even some of the rare texts that are second person in 
grammar are not second person in rhetoric. For instance, Rex 
Stout's How Like a God (1929) is written, except for the brief inter-
chapters, in a grammatical second person. But, as the third person 
interchapters make clear, it's really a variant of first person narra-
tion—an internal monologue that we might call narcissistic narra-
tion—in which the narrator is speaking to himself about himself.12 
This relative scarcity of complete second person texts, coupled 
with the popularity of Genette's homodiegetic/heterodiegetic dis­
tinction (which seems to remove second person narration as a 
serious option [but see Narrative Discourse Revisited 133-34])/ has 
resulted in a widespread tendency to brush second person narra­
tion aside. But while second person narration is rare on the top 
level of narrative organization, it's found widely in smaller narra­
tive units. In particular, as Robyn Warhol has shown, it's found in 
direct address to the reader, especially in eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century fiction; and it is frequent in embedded narration— 
where it is a dramatized narratee rather than the narrative or 
authorial audience of the text as a whole that's being narrativized. It 
certainly occurs at a crucial juncture in The Maltese Falcon. 
What is useful about this reconception of person is that by 
stressing the relationship not only between narrator and story but 
also between narrator and audience, we get a handle not only on 
epistemological issues (the questions about what the narrator 
knows stressed by so many traditional studies of point of view) but 
on issues of power as well. In particular, this analysis underscores 
that second person narration, especially second person refractive 
transmission, opens up the possibility of feedback—feedback not 
in its current trendy meaning, as when a Dean tells faculty or 
students to provide some "feedback" on the latest course evalua­
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tion form, but in its more precise acoustic/electronic meaning, the 
screech that occurs when an infinite loop is created between a 
microphone and a speaker that is simultaneously serving as both 
the input and the output of the microphone. That's because in 
second person narration, the referent of the story, being also the 
audience, is present at the site of reception, and thus always has the 
potential to insist on retelling his or her story in his or her own way, 
a further act of narration that can itself become embedded in the 
story that the original narrator is telling, and so on ad infiniturn. In 
contrast, a third person narration, even when refracted, has an 
absent referent, and hence closes down the possibility for feed­
back. When Spade tells Brigid O'Shaughnessy the Flitcraft story, 
for instance, his transmission is clearly refractive. The curve be­
tween Flitcraft's own story and Spade's story about that story 
shows up in Spade's ironic stance toward the story he tells, in the 
judgmental element introduced through the act of telling: "I don't 
think he even knew he had settled back naturally into the same 
groove he had jumped out of in Tacoma. But that's the part of it I 
always liked" (64). But the feedback potential in that ironic distance 
never drowns out the present rhetorical situation, for Flitcraft—if 
he exists—isn't present, and hence has no opportunity to provide 
commentary on the tale. 
It is more difficult, however, to reduce feedback in second person 
refracted narrative. There are two primary ways of silencing a 
referent-audience: conversion and coercion. Conversion has sev­
eral variations. One can, for instance, seduce the audience into 
accepting the narrator's version of the story by offering pleasure. 
That kind of seduction forms the central intrigue in Marienhad, as X 
tries to persuade A that his stories about what happened to them 
last year are worth believing. In a very different way, we see the 
same kind of technique when Spade tries to create a story that will 
work with the District Attorney: "He's more interested in how his 
record will look on paper than anything else. . .  . To be sure of 
convicting one man he'll let half a dozen equally guilty accomplices 
go free. . . . That's the choice we'll give him and he'll gobble it up" 
(180).13 Alternatively, one can mediate between conflicting stories 
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until some mutually acceptable version is found: that's what hap­
pens, for instance, in the conversation between Violet Stoke and 
Charles Watkins in Doris Lessing's Briefing for a Descent into Hell, or 
between Spade and Gutman when they negotiate a trade of the fall 
guy for the falcon. 
But whether in the form of seduction or mediation, conversion-
generated silencing places the audience in a subject position—a 
position to make choices. One can avoid that necessity through the 
second alternative, sheer force—-what Spade resorts to when cast­
ing Wilmer as the fall guy. When dealing with men, these two 
alternatives seem adequate—even when dealing with gay men, 
although Spade (and Philip Marlowe, too) seems to prefer violence 
as an alternative to offering subjecthood. Violence is especially 
characteristic of his dealings with Wilmer. He alternately beats up 
and negotiates with Cairo, but he never extends the option of 
serious negotiation to Wilmer, who seems to get more deeply under 
his skin—perhaps because his "hard masculine neatness" (93) 
casts more doubts on the meaning of Spade's own masculinity than 
does the effeminacy of Cairo, with his smell of chypre. Spade beats 
up Wilmer before he tells him, 'This will put you in solid with your 
boss" (121), and Spade's brief second person narrative before Wil­
mer is chosen as the fall guy ("Two to one they're selling you out, 
son") is similarly accompanied by silence rather than feedback 
("The boy did not say anything" [184]). 
Something quite different, though, happens in his final scene 
with Brigid O'Shaughnessy. There's certainly no literal violence at 
this climax of the plot (perhaps some residue of chivalry makes him 
squeamish about knocking her out—although it's significant that 
he's willing to force her to strip in his quest for the palmed 
thousand-dollar bill). But neither is Spade willing to give her the 
freedom to negotiate her future. This refusal is all the more 
strikingly noticeable because of its jarring contiguity with the 
lengthy give-and-take with Gutman. One cannot, of course, be 
absolutely sure of Spade's (or Hammett's) reasons for this: Spade 
may feel (although the prior events in this novel would hardly 
support this belief) that she is more duplicitous than Gutman. It 
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may be, as I've suggested earlier, that Hammett feels an aesthetic 
need to close off the infinite possibilities of his text. 
Still, it's hard to ignore Spade's uncharacteristically obsessive 
insistence that he "won't play the sap" for her (212-15). He's told her 
earlier, half in jest, that "You don't have to trust me, anyhow, as long 
as you can persuade me to trust you" (65), and there is good reason 
to believe that, because of her sexual allure—because it's "easy 
enough to be nuts about" her (214)—her powers of persuasion are 
more than Spade wants to handle. Certainly her sexual power has 
been deadly for Thursby, Captain Jacobi, and especially for Miles 
Archer. Spade, of course, considers himself less "dumb" (208) than 
Archer ("You've got brains, yes you have" he tells his leering partner 
sarcastically when he starts to make his move on Brigid O'Shaugh-
nessy [10]), and less of a "sucker for women" than Thursby (207). 
But there's evidence that Gutman's claim "We mere men should 
have known better than to suppose ourselves capable of coping 
with her" (192) applies to Spade more than he would sometimes 
like to believe. After all, Gutman requires drugs to shut Spade up, 
but Brigid O'Shaughnessy manages to shut him up by simply 
putting "her open mouth hard against his mouth" (89). 
In the final scene, Spade is intensely aware of this power as he 
reviews his past with Brigid O'Shaughnessy: "You came into my 
bed to stop me asking questions" (212). And he's well aware of the 
way that the continued presence of her body, always an embarrass­
ment in an act of narration, makes the outcome of a life-threatening 
seduction or negotiation doubly doubtful ("Last night you came 
here with them and waited outside for me and came in with me. 
You were in my arms when the trap was sprung" [212]), especially 
since she is fully aware of both the danger of the situation and the 
source of her power ("God damn you—you've counted on that" 
[215]). There is much to be said about the reasons for and implica­
tions of Hammett's and Spade's attitudes toward women—it's sig­
nificant, for instance, that both Brigid O'Shaughnessy and Effie 
Perine are consistently objectified by the author's (although not the 
characters') insistence on calling them by full name, first and last.14 
But for my purposes here the effects, not the causes, are of primary 
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concern. For finding himself unwilling to have Spade either batter 
Brigid O'Shaughnessy or let her negotiate, Hammett silences her 
with a rhetorical, rather than a physical, coercion, a sleight of pen 
that reinscribes what Percy Walton has called the "dominant colo­
nizing norm," a "singularizing effort . . . that . . . ignores differ­
ence when it accepts its own desires as more important than the 
desires of the space it seeks to dominate" ("Paretsky's VI." 203-4). 
Specifically, in their famous final confrontation, second person 
narration is treated as a third person narration. That is, although 
Brigid O'Shaughnessy is literally both audience and referent of the 
discourse, Spade's account of her story is made definitive, as she is 
rhetorically objectified as absent and hence silent (her few remain­
ing snippets of dialogue do nothing to challenge the narration). 
What makes this rhetorical sleight-of-hand possible? She says 
nothing because she has nothing to say: no feedback loop is started 
up because—and both Brigid O'Shaughnessy and Spade know 
this—no dissonance is registered between her perception and his. 
"How did you know he—he licked his lips and looked—?" she asks 
(209), and in asking this question, she affirms the consonance of 
their stories, and consequently affirms the straight line of his 
transmission. On the surface, perhaps, the potential for dialogue 
continues: "Wait till I'm through and then you can talk," he tells her 
(214). But because she has already accepted the congruence of the 
stories, she can do nothing but confirm the correctness of his 
version of her story; she tries one last barter—with body, rather 
than text (215)—but it's a futile gesture, and the doorbell rings just 
as she puts her arms around him. 
It's worth distinguishing between Hammett's and Spade's per­
formances here. It's Spade who tells the story, but it's the implied 
author who creates Brigid O'Shaughnessy's assent. That assent 
serves to end the story and contain the woman without violence, 
and its sheer dramatic power makes it easy for the reader to accept 
without question. But under the surface, the ending comes at 
tremendous epistemological cost. For in order to guarantee that 
assent, Hammett has to resort, at this key moment, to a straight-
line embedded narrative. And in this apparently purely formal 
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choice, Hammett smuggles in precisely the Fort Knox conception 
of truth that his novel has been at such pains to resist. It grounds 
Spade's story as true, but it deconstructs the patient deconstruction 
of foundationalism that forms the very basis of the novel's epis­
temological project. 
No wonder, then, that Effie Perine seems so depressed at the 
end—refusing to let Spade touch her—when she has to go along 
with this epistemological turnaround. As I've suggested, this 
"lanky sunburned girl" with a "boyish face" (3) has had gender-
crossing license throughout the novel—as Spade says, "You're a 
damned good man, sister" (160). (No doubt her name, with its 
echoes of "peregrine," gives her some falcon/phallic privileges.) 
But when she says, "I know—I know you're right" (217), she re­
alizes that there's no longer any opening for the kind of dialogue 
that has enlivened their relationship up until now. For most of the 
novel, Spade has given her the choice of siding with Brigid O'Shaugh-
nessy, even against him ("You're sore because she did something on 
her own hook," she argues; "Why shouldn't she?" [153])—and Effie 
Perine has belied the cliches about women's rivalry by remaining 
steadfast in her loyalty to Brigid O'Shaughnessy, even though 
they're both sexually attracted to the same man. But the ending of 
the novel proves that female bonding has been a mistake—that 
there is, in fact, a right and wrong to the situation, and that Effie 
Perine has simply been wrong. 
Spade's situation is no more upbeat than Effie Perine's. Through­
out the novel, he has prided himself on his flexibility and unpre­
dictability. But although he enters his office with cheerful lines on 
his face and clear eyes, the superficially bland final sentences strike 
a very different note. Effie Perine enters Spade's inner office to 
announce that Iva Archer, the indefatigable mistress Spade has 
been trying to elude for the entire novel ("I wish to Christ I'd never 
seen her" [27]), has arrived once again at the office. "'Yes/ he said, 
and shivered. 'Well, send her in'"-(217). The echo of his decision to 
turn Brigid O'Shaughnessy in to the police ("I'm going to send you 
over" [211]) underscores the connection between Spade's rhetorical 
victory over Brigid O'Shaughnessy and his philosophical defeat. 
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For in the wake of the Knoxian solution has come a chilling kind of 
return to things as they were—and while sentimental readers may 
want to see that final shiver as a sign of despairing romantic loss, 
it's more likely that it comes from a resigned recognition that he has 
forfeited his philosophical decenteredness and that, like Flitcraft, 
he has found himself trapped once again in the same groove that he 
has been trying to jump out of for the entire novel. 
Notes 
1. Personal communication. 
2. This distinction, of course, has close connections to Steven Mail-
loux's distinction between foundationalist accounts of interpretation and 
rhetorical hermeneutics in Rhetorical Power. There is, as well, a link to the 
two ways of conceptualizing truth often classed as correspondence theo­
ries (where statements are deemed "true" according to their correspon­
dence to some determinable external state of affairs) and coherence theo­
ries (where statements are deemed "true" according to internal standards 
that include such things as consistency, inclusiveness, and logical rela­
tions). The distinction, of course, has been important for literary theorists 
as well, especially for the New Critics. See, for instance, Brooks and Warren 
(27). I am warned by my philosopher friends, though, that I do not want to 
wander through the thickets of this distinction. Special thanks to Elizabeth 
Ring and Katheryn Doran for their invaluable assistance on these issues. 
3. For a fuller discusison, see my Before Reading, 178-83. 
4. In defining the subgenre in this way, I am taking a substantially 
different route from that of Holquist, in his discussion of "metaphysical" 
detective stories. He sees postmodern detectives' recognition of chaos 
("they dramatize the void" [155]), but does not discuss the novels in terms 
of the way they create a truth. 
5. For the most part Schulman, too, views the novel from a social 
rather than an epistemological perspective, since those stories are moti­
vated by "a market society world that systematically demands improvisa­
tion, acting, and the manipulation of appearances, people, and feelings." 
Still, he is one of the critics who recognizes the philosophical issues as well. 
See in particular 408-9. 
6. My thinking in this direction was begun through conversations 
with Kathryn Gail Brock nearly a decade ago, and the influence of her 
"parodic" reading on the following paper is enormous. Walton's argu­
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ments, in "You're in My Burg/' similarly stress parodic elements in the text; 
and although she is less interested in determining an authorial reading 
than I am, the overlap between our essays is considerable. 
7. See, for instance, Carutti: "Gli abasciatori di Malta vennero a 
rendere omaggio al nuovo Re e offerire il falcone, annuo tributo che Carlo V 
avea imposto all'Ordine dei Cavalieri gerosolimitani in ricognizione della 
movenza dell'isola dalla corona di Sicilia" [The ambassadors of Malta came 
to render homage to the new king and to offer the falcon, the annual tribute 
which Charles V had imposed upon the order of the Knights of Jerusalem 
in recognition of his granting of the island from the crown of Sicily.] (391). 
Thanks to Maureen Miller for help with historical research. 
8. For fuller discussion of the difference between authorial audience, 
narrative audience, and narratee, see Before Reading, chapter 3. 
9. See also Genette's discussion of the problematic nature of gram­
matical categories, Narrative Discourse Revisisted 104 ff. See also Bal 121 ff. In 
refusing to discuss grammatical difference, though, Bal skims over other 
differences that, as we shall see, really matter. 
10. Of course, there are any number of possible variants. For instance, 
we might want to distinguish between "normal" third person and what I 
call third person private, where the narrator and audience are identical, as 
when someone writes a note to him- or herself, or a secret diary entry about 
someone else. And when we introduce the distinctions between implied 
author and narrator, or between authorial audience and narrative audience, 
the possible permutations increase radically. 
For valuable discussions of second person narration in particular, see 
also Kacandes, Morrissette, McHale, Richardson, and Bonheim. McHale's 
"calculus" of "possible communicative situations" (96) provides one useful 
way of sorting out texts; Richardson's distinction among three different 
types of second person narration—which he conceptualizes in a way quite 
different from mine—is likewise illuminating. Bonheim's approach is, in 
places, similar to my own in its attention to which narrative positions have 
been collapsed; and his numerous distinctions, too, are often valuable in 
charting out this hazy area. But especially toward the end of the essay, he 
puts more stress than I do on grammatical surface. He also minimizes the 
importance of brief second person interpolations, as well as cases where 
"the use of the second person is . . . more a matter of rhetoric than of point 
of view" (71). Although he is here using the term rhetoric in a narrower 
sense than I am, his essay avoids treating rhetoric in the broader sense too, 
and hence the issues of power that are central to my argument. 
11. For an excellent discussion of Calvino's techniques here, see Phelan, 
chapter 5. Camus's La Chute seems to begin as second person narrative, but 
it's not really sustained, as much of the novel reverts to first person. 
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12. See also McHale's discussion of this sort of narration as "self­
addressed interior dialogue" (101-4). 
13. On the surface, this seems a third person narrative, and at least with 
respect to its past tense aspects, it is. But there's a double story here, and the 
main story is intended to narrate to the DA what his role will be: it is hence 
a future tense second person narrative—or, since the story is never actually 
told, a hypothetical future tense second person narrative. A Greek term 
would be useful to describe this kind of narrative situation. 
14. Hammett uses a similar technique to create distance in The Glass 
Key, although there is it not tied to gender. For further discussion of 
Hammett and women, see, for instance, Marling. 
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Naturalizing Molloy 
T H O M A  S G  . PAVEL 
In contrast with Beckett's own dissident writing, criticism about 
him is comfortably consensual. Most critics who write on Beckett 
treat his works as ideal units, assuming that each of them, and 
perhaps the entire set too, proposes a metaphysical statement 
about the human condition. Virtually all critics insist on Beckett's 
antitraditionalist writing and gloomy worldview. Early reviews of 
Molloy exemplify this tendency well. "Beckett settles us in the 
world of Nothing where some nothings which are men move about 
for nothing/' Maurice Nadeau writes shortly after the publication of 
the novel.1 At the end of an enthusiastic article, Georges Bataille 
strikes a similar chord: "Thus, literature gnaws away at existence 
and the world, reducing to nothing (but this nothing is horror) these 
steps by which we go along confidently from one result to another, 
from one success to another."2 Later academic criticism belabored 
these themes at great length. To take only two better known 
examples: Wolfgang Iser defined Beckett's art as representing 
subjectivity in the act of canceling itself,3 that is, as dealing not 
with events, but with interpretations, and dubious interpretations 
at that; Leo Bersani proposed an eschatological account, arguing 
I wish to thank James Phelan, Peter Rabinowitz, and Donald Brown for their 
generous criticism of an earlier version of this paper. 
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that Beckett brings about the end of literature.4 I would call such 
views the "apocalyptic" approach. 
Taken as an evocation of the Beckettian atmosphere, the apoca­
lyptic view is certainly on target: not only do Beckett's characters 
make us think of figures in Callot or Goya, but the former's 
dereliction is somehow deeper than the latter's, in fact deeper than 
anyone else's since the Book ofJob- But at the same time, the efforts to 
describe Beckett's art with the help of totalizing concepts such as 
"the death of the author,'7 "the end of literature," or "the deconstruc­
tion of subjectivity" paradoxically go against what Beckett, the 
prose writer, quite obviously tries to do on every page of his novels: 
to tell us stunningly concrete stories, which capture the real before 
and outside its subordination to conventional thought categories. 
Totalizing concepts like "the end of literature" and "the deconstruc­
tion of subjectivity" certainly address questions Beckett's nar­
rations themselves seem to address, especially when examined 
in isolation from other literary texts. Yet, it is equally true that 
Beckett's stories are, above all, prose narratives embedded in a long 
generic tradition, without reference to which their complicated 
games cannot be fully grasped. 
The interpretation of Beckett's narratives thus raises two larger 
issues: first, the contrast between hermeneutics and poetics; sec­
ond, the relation between tradition and innovation. The apocalyp­
tic reading of Beckett's narratives assumes that each of these texts 
incorporates a kernel of wisdom that the critic must recover by 
attentive contemplation of the text in its unicity. A poetological 
reading, in contrast, assumes that placing the text within its partic­
ular family of literary artefacts precedes and helps interpretation.5 
Placing a literary text within, say, a group of generic and thematic 
relatives highlights not only their common generic features, but 
also the specificity of the text under consideration. In particular, 
placing a text helps us get a clearer sense of what is innovative and 
what is traditional. Since innovation depends as much on following 
some established codes as it does on breaking some others, a 
completely revolutionary text is simply unthinkable. It follows that 
even texts like Beckett's narratives, which have been hailed as 
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radically innovative, might in fact depend on well-established 
generic and thematic traditions. 
Interpretations of Beckett's prose which link it to the European 
narrative tradition have occasionally been defended. Christine 
Brooke-Rose and John Fletcher, who hold a moderate historicist 
view, see Beckett's prose as belonging to a lineage of antinovelists 
that includes Cervantes, Furetiere, Swift, Sterne, and Diderot.6 For 
Hugh Kenner, Beckett is a "stoic comedian" belonging to the same 
lineage as Flaubert and Joyce.7 Other critics, balancing the apoca­
lyptic and the historicist view of Beckett, relate his work to a 
pessimistic tradition going from Schopenhauer to Proust.8 Indeed, 
Beckett quotes somewhere a revealing passage of Schopenhauer, 
who defines art as "the contemplation of the world independently 
of the principle of reason."9 
The present paper will defend a poetological view of Molloy, and 
attempt to position this text within a set of related literary texts. I 
will analyze Molloy's monologue, arguing that thematically Molloy 
relies on Beckett's immediate French predecessors, in particular on 
Sartre's existentialism, while generically it incorporates many ele­
ments of quest-romances and ordeal narratives. In contrast with 
the apocalyptic view, I will conclude that Molloy presents a spirited 
defense of human dignity. 
Like most of the "nouveaux romanciers" of his generation, 
Natalie Sarraute, Michel Butor, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Claude Simon 
(all discovered and promoted as a group in the early and mid-1950s 
by Jerome Lindon at the Editions de Minuit), Beckett writes in a 
style which challenges both existing narrative conventions and 
conceptual thought. The peculiar punch of his and his fellows' 
prose comes from blending two powerful modern traditions: the 
vitalist and existentialist affirmation of human reality as irreduc­
ible to concepts, a favorite theme throughout twentieth-century 
French philosophy and prose; and the modernist narrative, brought 
to prominence by Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, and William Faulkner. 
In France, the suspicion expressed by philosophy and art toward 
conceptual thought originates in the wave of vitalist and anti­
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intellectualist trends at the turn of the century. Their most success­
ful proponent, Henri Bergson, defended instinct against intel­
ligence and creative energy against rational analysis. Under his 
influence, Marcel Proust's Remembrance of Things Past painstakingly 
showed how conceptual knowledge hinders both artistic and emo­
tional experience. After World War I, following the example of 
Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger, the French 
existentialist thinkers Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre built 
sophisticated anticonceptual stands. They certainly did not dis­
pense with concepts entirely, since one cannot advocate anticon­
ceptualism without relying on some concepts. Yet their writings 
emphasized the freedom and immediacy of human consciousness, 
in direct opposition to the neo-Kantian and Hegelian interest in 
abstract concepts. As a novelist, Sartre was fascinated by the same 
theme. His early novel Nausea narrates the struggle of a young 
historian, Antoine Roquentin, to get rid of the inherited concep-
tual—and, by implication, social—system and grasp existence in 
its dazzling concreteness. 
Proust and Sartre both wrote first person narratives, narratives 
of consciousness. But with all its opposition to conceptual knowl­
edge, Proust's Remembrance of Things Past is stylistically rooted in 
French classicism as well as in nineteenth-century realism. Like­
wise, with all its modernist rage against the intellectual and moral 
status quo, against conventional thought and bourgeois society, 
Sartre's Nausea is told in a perfectly conventional, even bourgeois 
style: transparent, realist, sensitive, often sentimental. And while 
Proust's character turns in the end to art, Sartre's rejection of 
abstract ideas in favor of concrete existence does not free his 
character, Roquentin, from dependence on abstract categories: 
after experiencing a quasi-mystic state, during which he becomes 
one with viscous, incomprehensible reality, Sartre's character comes 
back to conceptual thought as usual, or almost. To be sure, in his 
existentialist despair he casts off his daily routine, stops writing 
history, and dives into the unknown. But when, at the end of the 
novel, he believes he has found a ray of hope, it consists in a piece of 
music written, he tells us, by a "Jew" and sung by a "Negress": no 
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individual names given, just social concepts. Could it have been 
otherwise? As long as we use language, can we ever escape 
abstraction? In a powerful critique of Sartre's philosophy, Brice 
Parain argued in 1945 that individual consciousness never frees 
itself from the spell of language and, through it, from the power of 
universality.10 
Dependence on language notwithstanding, Beckett's prose rep­
resents a further step in the resistance to conceptual thought.11 
Only that instead of talking against general categories and abstract 
concepts, instead of pleading for concrete existence, Beckett's prose 
enacts the flight from abstract concepts and the immersion into 
immediacy. Not that Beckett would eliminate from his prose all 
reference to socially accepted categories. Full rebellion against 
concepts can only lead to silence, a silence which Beckett, as a 
modern disciple of Geulincx, approaches to some degree.12 Some 
categories are present in Beckett's prose, but the narrators never 
use them in a uniform, reliable way. Moreover, resistance to con­
cepts inevitably breeds hostility to social institutions. Beckett's 
characters not only doubt the stability and universality of lan­
guage; like Sartre's Roquentin, they also turn their backs to the 
world of social conventions. 
Take as an instance of the meeting point between language and 
social stability, identification by profession in Molloy. Some charac­
ters have a clear profession, but no name: thus the various police­
men who haunt the first part of the novel. Others have both a name 
and a profession: Father Ambrose, for instance, in Moran's mono­
logue. Yet others, endowed with a name, are involved in unclear, 
ambiguous professions: Gaber, we are told, is a messenger, work­
ing for Youdi, the head of a mysterious agency. The nature of the 
agency is never made explicit: Gaber and Youdi could be either 
private detectives or members of a sect or a secret society. Moran, 
the narrator of the second part, works as one of Youdi's agents, yet 
rather than give us any clue about the aims of the agency, he gradually 
turns away from his professional duties, and ends up as a vagabond. 
The same mischievous play with categorical borders occurs 
elsewhere in the story, and Molloy's relation with his mother is a 
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telling example. Nothing should be easier to define conceptually, it 
would seem, than the kinship between mother and son. But in 
Molloy's case, the relation is blurred by several factors. One is the 
leveling effect of the protagonists' age: "we were like a couple of old 
cronies, sexless, unrelated, with the same memories, the same 
rancours, the same expectations" (17). Mixed with the ensuing 
indifference, there lurks an enduring hostility. Molloy, for one, 
could not bear to be addressed as "son." His mother, in turn, calls 
him Dan, which is not his name, but, perhaps, his father's. In 
Molloy's terms, "I took her for my mother, she took me for my 
father." The relation thus rests on a false symmetry between two 
people who half-forget who they are, and resent the half they still 
remember. Appropriately, Molloy calls his mother Mag: Ma for 
Mother, and the guttural g sound canceling the sweet syllable Ma. 
To communicate with his mother, Molloy uses a simple, though 
not elegant, semiotic system: "I got into communication with her 
by knocking on her skull. One knock meant yes, two no, three I 
don't know, four money, five goodbye" (18). Even these minimal 
conceptual distinctions are too difficult for the two characters to 
remember: "That she should confuse yes, no, I don't know, and 
goodbye, was all the same to me, I confused them myself." Only 
requests for money are important—four knocks, yet the mother 
"seemed to have lost, if not absolutely all notion of mensuration, at 
least the faculty of counting beyond two." Since by the time Molloy 
reaches his third knock, his mother has already forgotten the first 
two, she interprets a request for money as a two-knock message, 
which, as Molloy noted earlier, can be indifferently understood as 
yes, no, I don't know, and goodbye. To be more effective, Molloy 
replaces "the four knocks of my index-knuckle by one or more 
(according to my needs) thumps of the fist on her skull." Commu­
nication gives way to violence: "That she understood." Notice, in 
passing, the irony of "according to my needs": these could well 
be financial, but might also be understood as the need to be vio­
lent, to act out one's rage and resentment, a capricious resentment 
which is sometimes satisfied with one thump and sometimes 
requires more. 
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Endowed with an uncertain professional status and muddled 
family links, Beckett's characters seem to lack, or gradually lose, 
any features that define them as members of an organized commu­
nity. Their country and cities have no names, their lives have little 
or no symbolic consistency Instead the text highlights physical 
traits and events: the fragility of the flesh, illness, invalidity. In the 
mother's episode, we learn that, being deaf, she lacks the ability for 
symbolic interaction. Her vision is barely functioning: "Not that 
seeing matters, but it's something to go on with," Molloy com­
ments, emphasizing how little humanity was left in his mother. 
(The French vesion adds an ironic touch: "Non pas qu'il importe de 
voir, mais c'est un petit commencement"; a "little beginning," as if 
at his mother's age one could still care about beginnings.) Among 
bodily functions, her aged body is best at excreting. She recognizes 
Molloy by his odor, the least codified, least symbolic of all senses, 
and feels an animal joy: "She knew it was me, by my smell. Her 
shrunken hairy old face lit up, she was happy to smell me" (17). 
To the same polemic against concepts and conventions we can 
attribute the contrast between Molloy's obsession with his body 
and Moran's obsession with duty, profession, manners, and exter­
nal appearance. Endlessly, happily, Molloy speaks about his legs, 
his declining knees, his vision, his testicles, his anus. Moran, in 
contrast, is a compulsive respecter of status, duty, and manners. He 
judges Father Ambrose severely for flattering himself "with being a 
man of the world and knowing its ways" (100). By implication, 
Moran knows these ways better. Strict with his son and servant, 
Moran has at his disposal a rich moral vocabulary. On the priest's 
face, Moran notices "how shall I say, a lack of nobility" (102). Later, 
he advises his son: "There is something . . . more important in life 
than punctuality, and that is decorum. Repeat." He describes with 
precision the clothes his son must take for their common journey: 
the school suit, his toiletry, one shirt, one pair of socks, and seven 
pairs of drawers. Notice the worry for anal cleanliness, a compul­
sive feature in Moran and a relaxed one in Molloy 
Moran's obsessiveness is far from making him happy At home 
before embarking upon the journey to find Molloy, Moran com­
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plains about virtually every detail of his domestic life: "The stew 
was a great disappointment. Where are the onions? I cried. Gone to 
nothing, replied Martha. I rushed into the kitchen, to look for the 
onion I suspected her of having removed from the pot, because she 
knew how much I liked them. I even rummaged in the bin. 
Nothing. She watched me mockingly" (102). It is as if a rule-
governed life, a life which respects norms, conventions, and social 
symbols inevitably leads to bickering about their fulfillment. Wher­
ever there is a norm, there also is the probability that it will be 
infringed. To live by the concept means permanently to witness its 
neglect. Moreover, what if the rules are themselves mistaken? 
"Thus to my son I gave precise instructions. But were they the right 
ones? Would they stand by second thoughts? Would I not be 
impelled, in a very short time, to cancel them?" (103). In contrast, 
Molloy's invalidity, by keeping him close to his own body and far 
from the rule-governed world, makes him a more dignified, even 
happier character. Neither Molloy nor Moran ever complain about 
their growing infirmities. The decay of the body (decay of function 
and structure) is perceived as a liberation. 
We certainly are a long way from the subtle vitalism of Bergson 
and Proust, as well as from the overtly articulated Angst of Sartre's 
Roquentin. Nevertheless, the same suspicion toward concepts that 
informs Proust's and Sartre's narratives gives Molloy its bite. The 
difference between the latter and the former is that while in Proust 
and Sartre the message is safely conveyed in the crystal-clear 
language of representational narrative, Beckett speaks a more 
recent and disturbing idiom. 
Born as a reaction against conventional narrative techniques, the 
modernist narrative counters the objectivist bias of these tech­
niques and their insensitivity to the spontaneous, meandering 
stream of the individual consciousness. The creators of modernist 
prose felt that conventional narratives fail to challenge the sophisti­
cated modern reader; in contrast, texts which use the numerous 
varieties of modernist techniques make a special effort to puzzle 
the reader. In opposition to realist and naturalist prose, modernist 
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writing resists naturalizing. Autonomous monologues,13 for in­
stance, do not bother to depict the outside world too faithfully. 
Technical details such as lack of paragraph division and punctua­
tion suggest the free flow of thoughts and images and force the 
reader to pay much more attention to every twist and turn of the 
text. Hence the reputation for difficulty of many modern texts, 
Molloy included. 
Yet just as the most difficult of Faulkner's novels can be analyzed 
in components involving scenes, dialogue, memories, and impres­
sions, Molloy's monologue doesn't forever resist naturalization. It 
can, for instance, be divided into three parts, each made up of 
small narrative episodes, and each involving a journey (successful 
or not) to the city14 The episodes, about fifteen, none shorter than 
two pages and none longer than ten pages, narrate a long quest, 
and are permeated by the main theme of the story, resistance to the 
world of concepts. Once the disorienting effect of typographical 
innovation (continuous printing) is dispelled, some of the episodes 
begin to sound surprisingly close to the tone of traditional quest-
romances and ordeal narratives.15 
The beginning, for instance, with its gloomy irony and its 
allusion to bodily decay, is strikingly modernist. Yet looked at more 
closely, it appears to follow an age-old framing technique, and 
achieves an effect comparable to the beginning of, say, Defoe's Moll 
Flanders or Emily Bronte's Wuthering Heights. Compare "I am in my 
mother's room. It's I who live there now" with "My true name is so 
well known in the records, or registers, at Newgate and in the Old 
Bailey . . . that it is not to be expected that I should set my name or 
the account of my family to this work" (Moll Flanders), and with 
"1801.—I have just returned from a visit to my landlord—the 
solitary neighbour that I shall be troubled with" (Wuthering 
Heights).16 Beckett's and Bronte's narrators start by naming the 
place where they are or have just been, Defoe's by warning the 
reader that she shall hide her true name. The simplest and most 
matter of fact of all is Molloy. His lines look like a conventional 
autobiography, narrated by a character who, after a life of adven­
ture and sin, has reached a haven of peace. 
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The three major sections making up the body of the story are: first, 
Molloy's adventures before he meets Lousse, a sequence of six short 
episodes; second, his sojourn at Lousse's house, another six epi­
sodes; finally, his wanderings toward the beach and back to the city, 
wanderings which become more and more arduous as his infirmities 
worsen dramatically. Each section narrates a part of Molloy's quest, 
shedding new light on his idiosyncracies and phobias, in particular 
on his distrust of human communities and their conventions, 
linguistic or social. And while the monologue certainly cannot be 
reduced to a mere replay of traditional techniques, we should not 
neglect the features which emphasize the readability of Molloy. 
The episodes containing Molloy's initial journey between open 
country and the city begin with Molloy watching two vague charac­
ters, called A and C (modernist innovation? Moll Flanders too was 
stingy with her names) walking toward each other. Next, Molloy 
meets one of the two characters, a gentleman with a cigar, sand-
shoes, and a dog. Molloy expresses his doubts about the world of 
appearances and the words depicting them: "But was not perhaps 
in reality the cigar a cutty, and were not the sandshoes boots, 
hobnailed, dust-whitened, and what prevented the dog from being 
one of those stray dogs that you pick up and take in your arms . . ." 
(12). Soon the character disappears, and Molloy, alone, reflects on 
how his infirmity prevents him from getting closer to the man, 
checking his cigar, his shoes, finding out whether these objects 
correspond to Molloy's impressions about them. He then takes off 
his hat, wisely attached at his buttonhole by a long lace and sighs: "I 
am still alive then. That may come in useful" (14; in French: "Je vis 
done toujours. C'est bon a savoir."),17 as if his own existence were 
somehow open to doubt. 
A short transition, ironically presented as a pause during a 
musical performance ("An instant of silence, as when the conductor 
taps on his stand, raises his arms, before the unanswerable clam­
our" [15]), leads to Molloy's visit to his mother, a good opportunity 
for the character to show his contempt for rational planning of 
action: "I needed, before resolving to go and see that woman, 
reasons of an urgent nature, and with such reasons, since I did not 
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know what to do, or where to go, it was child's play for me, the play 
of an only child, to fill my mind until it was rid of all other 
preoccupation and I seized with a trembling at the mere idea of 
being hindered from going there, I mean to my mother, there and 
then" (15). Is this conscious self-deception? Is it a parody of moral 
reasoning, with the choice being made first, and the deliberation 
simulated later? As adverse to conventional moral hypocrisy as 
Proust's narrator and Sartre's Roquentin, Molloy does not trust his 
own impulses either, albeit he never quite resists them, as we shall 
see. Such quirky deliberations make the reader doubt the transpar­
ence of the story, increasing its resistance to naturalization. 
Leaving his mother's place, Molloy gets in trouble with the police 
and the law (fourth episode). He alludes in vain to his invalidity 
and learns (or pretends to learn) from the policeman that in the 
threatening world of social abstractions, there are not two laws, 
"one for the healthy, another for the sick, but one only, to which all 
must bow, rich and poor, young and old, happy and sad." The 
policeman's rhetoric being lost on Molloy ("I pointed out that I was 
not sad"), the representative of authority turns hostile. "That was a 
mistake. Your papers, he said" (20). While enjoying the policeman's 
speech ("He was eloquent"), Molloy is unable to grasp the part that 
specifically refers to him ("there are not two laws, one for the 
healthy, another for the sick"), presumably because the second part 
of the policeman's sentence ("but one only to which all must 
bow . . ") omits to refer again to health and sickness. Like his 
mother, Molloy has a limited memory for abstract terms; moreover, 
he has trouble in seeing himself, the concrete, real Molloy, as the 
instantiation of a general concept. The request for papers rein­
forces the gap between social abstraction and Molloy's humble, 
bodily worries. While by "papers" the policeman refers to some­
thing as exalted as identity papers, Molloy takes the word in its 
everyday sense, as meaning any piece of paper. And since "the only 
papers I carry with me are bits of newspapers to wipe myself, you 
understand, when I have a stool," the idea of papers as symbolic of 
social identity is in comic contrast with Molloy's interest in the 
cleanliness of his anus.18 
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More opposition to social symbols occurs in the next episode, 
during which Molloy is taken to the police station. Scared by 
authority, Molloy is unable to answer questions: "I am so little used 
to being asked anything, that when I am asked something, I take 
some time to know what. And the mistake I make is this, that 
instead of quietly reflecting on what I have just heard, . . . I hasten 
to answer blindly, fearing perhaps lest my silence fan their anger to 
fury" (21-22). His life is so remote from rules, symbols, and 
concepts that he fails to remember the most routine information, 
his own family name and his mother's address. His knowledge is 
bodily, nonverbal: "As to her address, I was in the dark, but knew 
how to get there, even in the dark" (22). And when society comes to 
him in the form of well-organized benevolence, Molloy not only 
rejects it violently, but also warns his reader against society's 
intrusions into some of the most intimate bodily acts, swooning 
and vomiting: "Let me tell you this, when social workers offer you, 
free, gratis and for nothing, something to hinder you from swoon­
ing, which with them is an obsession, it is useless to recoil, they 
will pursue you to the ends of the earth, the vomitory in their 
hands" (23-24). 
Happiness comes back only when, free again, Molloy rides his 
bicycle to the open country (sixth episode). "Inside me too, some­
one was laughing" (26). He sucks one of his pebbles to find peace: 
'A little pebble in your mouth, round and smooth, appeases, soothes, 
makes you forget your hunger, forget your thirst" (26). Thus Molloy's 
first attempt to find his mother, and the first section of his monologue, 
comes to an end: lying in the ditch "at full stretch, with outspread 
arms," Molloy, appeased, plays with the grass. 
But not for long. In the next episode, the character is on the move 
again. Molloy's second journey opens with a rural prelude: out of 
his ditch, he sees a shepherd and his dog, hears the sheep bleating, 
muses about the countryside, confesses his love for the northern 
climate, counts his farts. In winter, he tells us, under his greatcoat 
he wraps his body in swathes of newspaper. "The Times Literary 
Supplement was admirably adapted to this purpose, of a neverf ail­
ing toughness and impermeability" (30). The terms "neverfailing 
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toughness and impermeability/' which the author undoubtedly 
intends as an ironic description of the journal's intellectual faults, 
become physical advantages in Molloy's world. 
Back in the city, Molloy has trouble identifying its name. Yet he is 
well aware that in his province there is only one town, his native 
town, "the only one I knew, having never set foot in any other" (31). 
Although he claims to be clumsy with words, Molloy's aphasia 
extends to proper names: "I had been living so far from words so 
long, you understand, that it was enough for me to see my town, to 
be unable, you understand7' (31). He has doubts about all words, to 
be sure: "even my sense of identity was wrapped in a namelessness 
often hard to penetrate," because between words and things, the 
links fade too easily: "there could be no things but nameless things, 
no names but thingless names." But saying is not inventing either, 
for "You invent nothing, you think you are inventing, you think you 
are escaping, and all you do is stammer out your lesson" (32). 
Although Roquentin's flight from routine is mirrored in Molloy's 
antisocial nature, the Sartrean hero's self-righteousness would 
have made no sense to Molloy. 
The core of the second part of Molloy's story is his strange, 
initially incomprehensible, affair with Lousse, a woman whose dog 
he kills by running over it with his bicycle (eighth episode). 
Showing no anger, Lousse asks him to help her carry the dog home 
and bury it. He complies, although his sarcastic tone suggests he is 
quite aware of the dangers of Lousse's benevolence: "that she found 
me likeable enough in spite of my hideous appearance and would 
be happy to hold out to me a helping hand, and so on, I've forgotten 
the half of it. Ah yes, I too needed her, it seemed" (34). But Molloy, 
with his customary dignity, makes "no bones about telling her I 
needed neither her nor anyone." Which, he scrupulously adds, 
"was perhaps a slight exaggeration, for I must have needed my 
mother/' (34) toward whom, as it becomes clear toward the end of 
his monologue, he is pushed by an irresistible impulse. 
At this point, Molloy inserts one of his affable commentaries 
about his problematic relation with language: "I always say either 
too much or too little, which is a terrible thing for a man with a 
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passion for truth like mine/7 He again sounds like an eighteenth-
century narrator, pondering the tact and transparency of his deliv­
ery: "And I shall not abandon this subject [notice the decorous 
tone], . . . without making this curious observation, that it often 
happened to me, before I gave up speaking for good, to think I had 
said too little when in fact I had said too much and in fact to have 
said too little when I thought I had said too much." The tone is 
classicist in the first half of the sentence, only to turn Molloyan— 
that is, dry and punctilious—in the second half. The modern 
themes: inexpressibility, the gap between intention and utterance, 
between subjectivity and conventions, are couched in a style that 
mixes conventional elegance with modernist flatness. None of 
Faulkner's self-indulgent narrators display such irony and self-
control. 
The next few episodes, which take place at Lousse's house, 
humorously narrate Molloy's captivity. Because of his infirmity, 
proudly recounted, Molloy cannot help Lousse bury the dog; his 
uselessness leads him to considerations about his leg and his 
testicles, "dangling at mid-thigh," and from which "there was 
nothing to be squeezed" (34). After the dog's funeral, Lousse feeds 
him good things—a gesture which, like the policeman's eloquence, 
is lost on Molloy, for the sour visitor doesn't "much care for good 
things to eat" (37). In the living room the parrot—an ugly mirror of 
human speech—from time to time utters "Fuck the son of a bitch!" 
and "Putain de merde," perhaps as an indication about Lousse's 
habits of speech and the reasons for her attraction to Molloy. 
(Generously, he thinks that the parrot must have belonged to 
French and American sailors before being acquired by Lousse.) 
Next morning, Molloy wakes up in a bed, naked: "They had 
carried their impertinence to the point of washing me, to judge by 
the smell I gave off, no longer gave off" (38). The room is locked. 
The episode, perhaps intended as a parody of Proust's La Prison­
niere, reiterates Molloy's revulsion for civilized life. His intermin­
able musings on various topics include an irreverent spoof on the 
beginning of Goethe's Faust: "yes, I once took an interest in astron­
omy, I don't deny it. Then it was geology that killed a few years for 
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me. The next pain in the balls was anthropology and the other 
disciplines, such as psychiatry . . . Oh I've tried everything. In the 
end it was magic that had the honour of my ruins" (39). Needless to 
say, Molloy inherits Faust's disgust with acquired knowledge but 
shares none of his enthusiasm for public works. 
The clash with Lousse becomes inevitable when Molloy is told, 
in the next episode, that his clothes have been burned. As he takes 
revenge by hitting the furniture with his crutches the clothes are 
brought back, with only his hat's lace and the pebbles missing. 
Lousse attempts to keep him in the house, but Molloy does not even 
listen carefully. Convinced that his benefactor is slowly poisoning 
him, Molloy, after a long meditation on true love, leaves Lousse's 
house and hides in the city. To be again free, again alone on his 
crutches, gives Molloy a sense of rapture: 'There is rapture, or there 
should be [ever prudent Molloy!], in the motion crutches give. It is a 
series of little flights skimming the ground. You take off, you land, 
through the thronging sound in wind and limb" (64). 
Freedom and joy at the end of the second stage of Molloy's quest 
bring back the zany theme of the pebbles, as if the intimate contact 
with the mineral realm would protect Molloy from the attempts of 
humankind to take him prisoner. The long section on sucking 
stones (69-74) is the happiest of the entire monologue: it represents 
Molloy's peak of calm, maturity, effectiveness, and humor. System­
atic reason, the episode seems to say, is at its best when taken away 
from human purposes and put in the service of pure futility. 
Again, however, solitary happiness (this time in a cave on the 
seashore outside the city) cannot last: Molloy embarks on his third 
journey to the city. By now both his legs are paralyzed, though not 
in a strictly symmetrical way: "For the old pain, do you follow me, I 
had got used to it, in a way, yes in a kind of way. Whereas the new 
pain, though of the same family exactly, I had not time yet to get 
adjusted to it" (JJ). Molloy's detailed, compulsive description of his 
paralysis harbors no complaint. Molloy speaks about his body in an 
affectionate, yet detached way, as if the discomfort of pain were 
fully atoned for by the pleasure of being alone with one's own 
organism. Molloy suffers decorously, because his body, suffering 
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included, is his only source of dignity: like Iphigenia on the altar 
modestly covering her body before death, Molloy wraps his head in 
his coat "to stifle the obscene noise of choking" (79). Under an 
impulse that comes from his muse (Molloy dixit, 79), he rein­
terprets his anus as "the true portal of our being/' as an exalting 
image of rebellious autonomy: "Almost everything revolts it that 
comes from without and what comes from within does not seem to 
receive a very warm welcome either" (80). 
His advance gradually becomes more arduous, with the image of 
the Calvary in the background: "I was therefore obliged to stop 
more and more often, I shall never weary of repeating it, and to lie 
down, in defiance of the rules" (82). A brief encounter with a 
charcoal-burner who offers Molloy his hut to share turns sour: the 
ever independent Molloy hits the stranger with a crutch, leaving 
him for dead. In the two concluding episodes of his last sortie, 
Molloy crawls through the woods at a rate of barely fifteen paces a 
day, turning in circles, vainly trying to catch forest murmurs. At 
times he would prefer to stay in the forest, for "physically nothing 
could have been easier" (86). But Molloy turns out to be a moral 
creature: "I was not purely physical, I lacked something, and I 
would have had the feeling, if I had stayed in the forest, of going 
against an imperative, at least I had that impression." The "impera­
tives," only now explicitly mentioned, are the only things Molloy 
submits to: different from the conventional symbols he despises so 
much, Molloy's imperatives come from inside, nearly all bearing 
"on the same question, that of my relations with my mother, and on 
the importance of bringing as soon as possible some light to bear 
on these and even on the kind of light that should be brought and 
the most effective means of doing so" (86). 
Thus, once the resistance of the text to naturalization is over­
come, Molloy's journeys to the city turn out to be a series of 
attempts to break out of his loneliness and establish intelligible 
relations with another human being. Yet strong as the imperatives 
initially are, their fulfillment always falters: they soon go silent, 
"leaving me there like a fool who neither knows where he is going, 
nor why he is going there" (86-87). It is not only the rule-governed 
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world of policemen, social workers, and intrusive altruists that 
prevents MoUoy from achieving his quest: his own inner impulse 
goes astray. With this realization, his quest comes to an end. At the 
ridge of the forest, unable to move forward, he detaches himself 
from all longing: "There seemed to be rain, then sunshine, turn 
about. Real spring weather. I longed to go back into the forest. Oh 
no real longing. Molloy could stay, where he happened to be" (91). 
The plot oi Molloy (part I) thus involves the hero's quest for some 
form of transparent relations with his mother, a quest that ends, as 
it were, in failure and transfiguration. As a coda to my reading, I 
would like to add that the story's rigorous spatial structure high­
lights the hero's predicament. Molloy meanders through two kinds 
of spaces: the outdoors and the city.19 Freedom is to be found 
outdoors, in the open space, for even the woods are too crowded 
for Molloy. Yet Molloy cannot stay forever in the open, because 
his "imperatives" force him back to his quest: he must go back to 
his mother, in the city. But he cannot stay for a long time in the 
city either: his oppressors (the police) as well as his unbearable 
benefactors (the social worker, Lousse) subject him to various 
ordeals, from which he escapes only thanks to his unabashed 
misanthropy. 
The population of characters is neatly divided into homoge­
neous sets of individuals who behave in similar ways.20 Only 
Molloy crosses the boundary between the city and the open spaces. 
The others are confined either to the city or to the open country. In 
the city Molloy interacts quite peacefully, if brutally, with his 
mother, a character who appears to be helpful from the financial 
point of view, but entirely insensitive otherwise. The representa­
tives of order (the policemen) terrify Molloy, while the intrusive 
helpers (the social worker, Lousse) merely repel him, encouraging 
him to behave deviously. The open country is not free of intrusive 
helpers either (a group of women on the beach, the charcoal-
burner), but it at least contains a few characters who pay no 
attention to Molloy and his troubles: the two travelers (A and C) at 
the beginning, and the shepherd in the third part. 
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The above analysis supports John Fletcher's view that Molloy 
displays a remarkable ''firmness of structure" (Novels of Samuel 
Beckett 135). The monologue narrates Molloy's three journeys to his 
mother's house in the midst of a dangerous city and, on the way, the 
hero's efforts to protect himself from both oppression and intrusive 
help. It tells us how the hero's infirmities invariably bring him 
trouble from the police—an openly hostile group—as well as from 
aggressive well-wishers. Molloy finds peace only far from society, 
in loneliness and open spaces. This story embodies something of 
an ordeal novel and of a quest-romance. A traveler between oppo­
site worlds, Molloy goes through severe tests and cyclic adven­
tures. Those who want to harm him miss, and those who want to 
help can only harm him: Moran's failure to reach Molloy, in the 
second part, is in a sense the best way to find him. 
Molloy's first person narrative patiently recounts the character's 
opposition to the world of conventions as well as his move away 
from and back to happiness. It reveals Molloy's variegated inner 
life, his failed quest, and, foremost, his self-sufficiency. The alli­
ance between the theme of resistance to concepts and the modern­
ist narrative technique gives new life to an old topos: the solitary 
hero, struggling to maintain his sense of dignity. 
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Faulkner's Quentin (in the second section of The Sound and the Fury), Molloy 
seems to control his thoughts quite well. For the expressive potential of the 
autonomous monologue, see Dorrit Cohn, 232 ff. 
15. Accordingly, I disagree with those critics who read Beckett's Trilogy 
as a set of nonchronological texts. Charlotte Renner ("The Self-Multiplying 
Narrators" in Bloom) argues that "the trilogy is not only, like most multi­
vocal fictions, nonchronological; it is in fact anti-chronological. In other 
words, it reverses the traditional order of artistic composition. In most 
fictions, the implied author is understood to be the prerequisite to the 
invention of narrating characters . .  . in Beckett's trilogy, however, the 
'author' . . . has no existence prior to inventing its mutable incarnations" 
(99). But since in first person narratives the existence of the implied author 
is, as the term "implied" indicates, only inferred from the text, it is difficult 
to determine whether or not it preexists the narrating characters. For a lucid 
analysis oiMolloy's use of first person narration, see Dina Sherzer, 115-22. 
16. Bernal, 44-45, compares the beginning of Molloy with that of 
• 196 • 
Naturalizing Molloy 
several nineteenth- and twentieth-century novels. In a short memoir about 
his first meeting with Beckett, his publisher remembers the spellbinding 
effect oiMolloy's first sentence: Jerdme Lindon, "Premiere rencontre/' 
17. Among the critics who wrote on Beckett's quite intriguing transla­
tions, see the perceptive remarks of Brian Fitch, "L'intra-intertextualite* de 
Beckett," 91-112, and the chapter "The Trilogy Translated" in Leslie Hill, 
Beckett's Fiction in Different Words. 
18. This interest is more indicative of personal dignity than of hygiene, 
as Molloy rushes to make clear: "Oh I don't say I wipe myself every time I 
have a stool, no, but I like to be in a position to do so, if I have to" (20). For a 
study of Beckett's comic vein, see Ruby Cohn, Samuel Beckett: The Comic 
Gamut. 
19. For the remarks on Beckettian space, I am indebted to Michael 
Sheringham, Beckett: Molloy, and to Ludovic Janvier, "Place of Narra-
tion/Narration of Place" in Ruby Cohn, Samuel Beckett: A Collection of 
Criticism. 
20. In "Narrative Domains," I argue that narratives can be divided into 
domains of characters who act or react together. 
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Travel Narrative and 
Imperialist Vision 
M A R  Y LOUIS  E P R A T  T 
Hand in hand with the Industrial Revolution, the late eighteenth 
century brought a newly intensified period of European explora­
tion, commercial penetration, imperial expansion, and coloniza­
tion all over the planet. In the main, as we all learned in school, the 
expansion was a search for markets and raw materials, the two 
fuels needed by European capitalist economies whose productive 
capacity, and whose ability to produce surpluses, was rapidly 
increasing. This period of expansion is one in which we still find 
ourselves, albeit at a much later stage. All corners of the planet are 
now integrated to some degree into a global capitalist economic 
system, while that system itself confronts crises undreamt of two 
hundred years ago. In the beginning, this burst of expansion in the 
late eighteenth century was mainly British—Captain Cook's first 
voyage was in 1768, the same year that James Bruce began his 
search for the source of the Nile—but the French under Napoleon 
were not far behind. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
United States was on board with the Monroe Doctrine, while every 
major nation in Europe was participating in the notorious scramble 
for Africa. 
A few sections of this essay are revised from my works of 1986 and 1992 cited in 
the bibliography. 
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This process of capitalist expansion was (and still is) witnessed 
in thousands upon thousands of travel books. Travel literature 
played an extremely important role in the production of conscious­
ness and the making of ideology in connection with the expansion­
ist enterprise. Of particular interest is its role in producing what is 
now fashionably called alterity, the process by which certain peo­
ples and places get constituted as an Other positioned in varying 
ways with respect to a normative European self, and made know­
able only, or almost only, through those positionings. Quite often 
these travel books were written by direct emissaries and purveyors 
of European expansion: explorers, traders, settlers, missionaries, 
engineers, surveyors, soldiers, diplomats, and so forth. Sometimes 
they were written by people whose involvement was more margi­
nal or oblique, like naturalists, game hunters, thrill-seekers, or the 
wives of those explorers, traders, diplomats, and so on. Sometimes 
they were written by people who were vehement opponents of the 
expansion, or even fugitives from it. It is thus in a very rich and 
varied sense that travel literature has been the place where, as 
Daniel Defert says, "Europe took consciousness of itself, wrote 
about itself and read about itself more and more as the basis 
('principe') of a planetary process and not as a region of the world" 
(Defert 26). 
I propose to document a shift in the discourse of European travel 
narratives sometime during the first half of the nineteenth century, 
making accounts from the turn of the century (1790-1830) very 
different from those written sixty years later. I will be focusing 
mainly on British accounts of African exploration, but will make 
some reference to other materials as well. In the case of Africa, the 
two periods I am talking about correspond to the two major thrusts 
of British exploration, first the exploration of the Niger River by 
Bruce, Park, Clapperton, Lander, Oldfield, and others (few of 
whom survived to write at all). This first thrust, conducted mainly 
under the auspices of the Africa Association (founded in 1788), was 
so unsuccessful that exploration was virtually suspended until 
after 1850, when a whole series of envoys—Livingstone, Burton, 
Speke, Grant, Baker, Stanley, Du Chaillu, and others—successfully 
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crisscrossed the interior of the continent, and documented its 
major geographical features. This second period, the "opening up 
of Africa/7 is by far the best known. 
As with all exploration, the accomplishments of these travelers 
were constituted dually by the combination of travel and of travel 
writing. The opening up of Africa necessarily consisted not just of 
certain Europeans and North Americans journeying to certain 
geographical locations, but also and crucially of those Europeans 
and North Americans producing discourse about their journey­
ings, to be disseminated in Europe and North America. Put another 
way, the opening up of Africa to Europe was also the opening up of 
Europe to Africa, the process by which names like Burton, Speke, 
Grant, Gondokoro, Ujiji, Unyamwezi, and Matabele became house­
hold words. With exploration, and a great many other kinds of 
travel as well, the journey and the writing about it are inseparable 
projects—they presuppose each other and create each other's sig­
nificance. If you don't survive to tell the tale, you might as well 
never have gone, unless of course someone else survives to bring 
back your diary. Likewise, journey and account mutually deter­
mine each other's shape—what you say in the book has everything 
to do with what you experienced on your trip, but what you 
experience on your trip has everything to do with the book you are 
planning to write. For instance, African exploration was typically 
organized around the quest for specific, definable "prizes" like the 
source of the Nile. At least in part the project took this form 
because exploration books could then have the form of classic 
quests, in which the hero is finding and bringing home a treasure. 
As a rule, in the classic quest the hero is simply recovering for the 
community a missing treasure that rightfully belongs to it but was 
lost—an idea that fit well with European imperial designs. Indeed, 
the epic model of achievement might be said to have exerted equal 
influence on the shapes of the explorers' journeys and the shapes of 
their accounts. This paradigm, already firmly instilled in the con­
sciousness of every European who had ever heard a fairy tale, 
legitimizes exploration in a culturally and ideological powerful 
way, and lends it an air of reality that it might not otherwise have. 
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For of course the European "discoverer" doesn't really bring home 
anything at all, only the claim to having seen something with 
European eyes. 
The discursive shift in travel narrative that I propose to discuss 
is easily introduced by a pair of sample passages. Of the two texts 
quoted below, the first is from a very famous turn of the century 
travel book, Mungo Park's Travels in the Interior of Africa, which 
appeared in 1802. The second is from David Livingstone's Narrative 
of an Expedition to the Zambesi, which appeared in 1866. Both 
passages are representative of the discourse of their respective 
books, and were chosen because they are in no way exceptional. 
First the Park text (italics mine): 
About a mile from this place, I heard a loud and confused noise 
somewhere to the right of my course, and in a short time was happy to 
find it was the croaking of frogs, which was heavenly music to my 
ears. I followed the sound, and at daybreak arrived at some shallow 
muddy pools, so full of frogs that it was difficult to discern the water. 
The noise they made frightened my horse, and I was obliged to keep 
them quiet by beating the water with a branch until he had drank. 
Having quenched my thirst, I ascended a tree, and the morning being 
calm, I soon perceived the smoke of the watering place which I had 
passed in the night; and observed another pillar of smoke east-south-
east, distant twelve or fourteen miles. Towards this I directed my 
route. (163) 
Notice in this passage how everything is anchored in the narrator-
protagonist, in his immediate sensory experience, his judgment, 
agency, and desires (examples are italicized). Notice too how the 
relevance of everything that is said lies in its immediate bearing on 
the narrator and his journey. Now contrast the Livingstone passage 
(italics mine): 
Ten or fifteen miles north of Morambala staiids the dome-shaped 
mountain of Makanda of Chi-kanda; several others, with granitic-
looking peaks, stretch away to the north, and/orw the eastern bound­
ary of the valley; another range, but of metamorphic rocks, commenc­
ing opposite Senna bounds the valley on the west. After steaming 
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through a portion of this marsh, we came to a broad belt of palm and 
other trees, crossing the fine plain on the right bank. Marks of large 
game were abundant. Elephants had been feeding on the palm nuts, 
which have a pleasant fruity taste, and are used as food by man. Two 
pythons were observed coiled together among the branches of a large 
tree, and were both shot. The larger of the two, a female, was ten feet 
long. They are harmless, and said to be good eating. (102) 
Here everything is described without reference to a situated ob­
server (the italics show some of the ways this was done). The 
perceptual process by which someone observed some signs and 
deduced that elephants had been feeding on the palm nuts is not 
alluded to; neither is the experience by which it was ascertained 
that palm nuts have a pleasant fruity taste. We will never know who 
observed the two pythons, who shot them, who measured them 
and ascertained their sex, who said they were good eating, and 
who found that out by experience. Syntactically, observations and 
claims are given as detached facts rather than anchored in a 
speaker by such devices as verbs of perception or mental process. 
Things happen without happening to anybody or being brought 
about by anybody. The pronoun I is about as welcome as a case of 
dropsy. In contrast with Park, only a fraction of the information 
Livingstone asserts bears immediately upon the participants and 
their journey. Here the specifics of the journey mainly function as a 
pretext for introducing information whose origin and relevance 
apparently lie elsewhere. The actual elephants and pythons en­
countered, for instance, are used as pegs on which to hang general 
information about palm nuts and pythons. The landscape is simply 
there (described mostly in compass terms which are not deictic to 
the speaker) with no bearing on the travelers. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, one could sum up the difference by saying that 
here everything is conveyed as information, while in the Park text 
everything is conveyed as experience. 
These characteristics hold not only for Park's and Livingstone's 
writings, but for much of the production of their contemporaries. 
Throughout Park's text, and those of many of his contemporaries, 
the specific episodes and adventures of the journey are the main 
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things to be made known to the home audience. Consequently 
these are often dramatized at great length, producing texts that 
sound very novelistic to modern readers. In the mid-century texts, 
there is very little narrative elaboration or dramatization. The 
vocabulary of the emotions is also virtually dispensed with, as is 
the convention of elaborating one's emotive responses to important 
events or sights. The autobiographical is minimized; writers either 
abandon or, in Livingstone's case, complain about the opening 
sketch of the author's life which is conventionally found in earlier 
texts, often at great length. Clearly two different kinds of authority 
are at work—for Park, subjectivity and perspectivism are the 
anchors of textual authority; for Livingstone, impersonal knowl­
edge is what counts. At the same time, Livingstone is obviously not 
trying to speak the language of science. His text is full of judg­
ments, evaluations, and opinions, and it is unquestionably narra­
tive, not descriptive. 
I have pointed out that in Livingstone's writing, the relevance of 
what is said does not lie in its connection with the immediate 
interests of the traveler himself. As it turns out, what does make all 
this detached and detachable information relevant is the imperial 
agenda itself, an agenda that he alludes to constantly in his narra­
tive, and elaborates on at length in his preface: 
This account is written in the earnest hope that it may contribute 
to that information which will cause the great and fertile continent of 
Africa to be no longer kept wantonly sealed, but made available as a 
scene of European enterprise, and will enable its people to take a 
place among the nations of the earth, thus securing the happiness 
and prosperity of tribes now sunk in barbarism or debased by 
slavery, and, above all, I cherish the hope that it may lead to the 
introduction of the blessings of the Gospel. (2) 
Notice that the term information appears here as the object of the 
enterprise, the thing to be acquired and brought home. The infor­
mation has power: it will cause Africa to become the scene of 
European enterprise. It is an intense orientation toward the future 
that led the mid-century explorers to value information (rather 
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than experience) in their discourse. They had a sense of participat­
ing in the beginning of a long-term planetary (to use Defert's term) 
process, which was ultimately going to transform every corner of 
the world. And they were right. 
Mungo Park, by contrast, never alludes to the commercial proj­
ect in his narrative proper. His preface, however, is as explicit about 
it as is Livingstone's. Perhaps more so, for Park makes no attempt to 
link commercial expansion with any interests other than the spe­
cific financial ambitions of himself and his backers. Here is what he 
says in his preface about his objectives and aspirations: 
If I should perish in my journey, I was willing that my hopes and 
expectations should perish with me; and if I should succeed in 
rendering the geography of Africa more familiar to my countrymen, 
and in opening to their ambition and industry new sources of wealth, 
and new channels of commerce, I knew that I was in the hands of men 
of honour, who would not fail to bestow that remuneration which my 
successful services should appear to them to merit, (ix) 
Again notice how everything is anchored in specific persons and in 
the immediate interests of the present. The forces at work are not 
abstractions like "information" or "European enterprise," but rather 
the ambition and industry of the specific persons ("men of hon­
our") who belong to the Africa Association. The sense of a global 
transformative project is absent, and probably for this reason there 
is also no attempt to construe any hypothetical benefits for the 
Africans. The notion of a benevolent civilizing mission comes into 
play later, one suspects, when there is a full-fledged imperial 
mission that needs mystifying. So it was with the Spaniards in 
America three hundred years before, and so it is today, in White 
House pronouncements where "democracy" and "freedom" re­
place "prosperity" and "salvation" as the goods equated with 
imperial intervention. 
And if the Spanish imperial enterprise in the 1500s emerged 
from the energies and appetites of a newly consolidated Spain, so 
the nineteenth-century enterprise is the project of the newly 
consolidated European nation states who are in the process of 
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forming that polity Livingstone refers to as "the nations of the 
earth." One of the great historical watersheds that separates David 
Livingstone and Mungo Park is the rise of the modern state. This 
watershed determines in part that what for Park is an immediate, per­
sonal enterprise is for Livingstone a long-term planetary process. 
I have underscored Livingstone's use of the term "information" 
in his preface, as an unwitting metacomment on his own discourse. 
There is another such term in that excerpt, namely scene. While 
Park talks about sources of wealth and channels of commerce (rivers 
form an apt source of terminology for him), Livingstone talks about 
Africa as the future scene of European enterprise (see quotation 
above). Mid-nineteenth-century travel accounts contain an enor­
mous amount of landscape description, which is likewise shaped 
by the expansionist project that so impinges on the consciousness 
of these writers. 
Three different modes of landscape description can be distin­
guished in these writings. The first, which I call the development 
mode, is illustrated by the first Livingstone text quoted above. The 
two characteristics that typify the development mode are, first, that 
it seeks a panoramic, totalizing sweep, and second, that it com­
bines everyday visual vocabulary with specialized—in this case 
geological—vocabulary that encodes the region's development po­
tential. The language is mildly aesthetic at times—Livingstone 
speaks of a fine meadow, for instance. The criteria for these aesthetic 
judgments is also the future use potential of the place. There are 
enormous amounts of this kind of development-oriented landscape 
description in the travel literature of mid-century, be it about Africa 
or any other place being "opened up" to European eyes (as Latin 
America was, for instance, after its independence in 1820). This 
discourse did not originate with the explorers of mid-century, but it 
has great prominence in their writings. 
The second landscape convention is in the picturesque mode, in 
which nature is portrayed as a garden replete with flowers and 
trees of all colors, among which myriads of insects, butterflies, and 
hummingbirds busily flit. I am being only partly sarcastic here. 
This conventional garden scene, which recurs innumerable times 
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on the pages of African travel books, invariably includes the flow­
ers, the butterflies, the hummingbirds, and the verb flit. Here is an 
example from a stunningly nondescript account by naturalist J. 
Leyland called Adventures in the Far Interior of South Africa (1866): 
On this route, and in many other parts of the Colony, the scenery was 
most enchanting and picturesque; the hills and mountains were 
adorned in wild profusion with flowers of various hues, and often of 
the most brilliant and gaudy colours, filling the air with their deli­
cious perfume. Most conspicuous were the geraniums, growing 
three and four feet high. When the flowers were most abundant, the 
various kinds of Sun-birds [hummingbirds] and Fly-catchers were 
seen, and thousands of butterflies flitting hither and thither, distin­
guished by an endless variety of colours. (72) 
Sometimes explicitly, though usually not, these garden scenes 
embody a privatized domestic fantasy of a locus amoenus in which to 
settle one's family. People familiar with children's literature will 
find a more recent version of such a scene in the first volume of the 
Babar books, where Babar, recently returned from his civilizing 
experience in Europe, selects just such a place on which to found 
the new city of the elephants. 
The third landscape convention, in the mode of the sublime, is 
the panorama seen from a promontory, a convention familiar to us 
from the prospect poetry of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. This convention is frequently used to textualize arrivals 
at major geographical discoveries or landmarks, such as Burton's 
discovery of Lake Tanganyika, or James Grant's arrival at the 
Victoria Nyanza. I have elsewhere called this the monarch-of-all-
I-survey convention ("Conventions"; Imperial Eyes), because so 
often in exploration literature these prospect scenes encode a 
relation of dominance of the seer over the seen. Often they include 
a prophetic vision of the future European domination of the region. 
For instance, in his description of arriving at Lake Victoria Nyanza, 
Grant literally sketches in such a prophetic vision (italics mine): 
The now famous Victoria Nyanza, when seen for the first time, 
expanding in all its majesty, excited our wonder and admiration. 
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Even the listless Wanyamuezi came to have a look at its waters, 
stretching over ninety degrees of the horizon. The Seedees were in 
raptures with it, fancying themselves looking upon the ocean which 
surrounds their island home of Zanzibar, and I made a sketch, dotting 
it ivith imaginary steamers and ships riding at anchor in the bay. On 
its shores are beautiful bays, made by wooded tongues of low 
land . . . (196) 
All three types of landscape description have at least one thing in 
common. All three, the development description, the garden de­
scription, and the promontory description, largely eliminate cur­
rent inhabitants from the environment. There are gardens but no 
gardener, meadows but no one tilling them, forests but no one 
hunting in them, resources but no one already using them. Land­
scapes are described as more or less virgin territory, not as human 
environments with histories, already inhabited from time imme­
morial by populations organized into societies, empires, and above 
all economies. No trace is registered of vast indigenous trade 
networks, often already linked up with Europe, even in regions 
that explorers were coming to for the first time. These were the 
societies, networks, and economies that Europeans were going to 
dismantle in order to establish their own hegemony, and which 
they did dismantle, in the end by the most brutal kinds of mass 
destruction, murder, and coercion. It is no accident that in the 
thrilling, heady period of exploration, the potential human compli­
cations were so often painted out of the future "scene of European 
enterprise." But in hindsight, one cannot help seeing in these 
depopulated verbal landscapes of the travel books the ideological 
preparation for the real depopulation that was to come. 
And there is perhaps another sort of depersonalization to be 
noted here, as Wlad Godzich has pointed out (personal communi­
cation). It is surely not a coincidence that the emissaries of the 
modern state most often position themselves as an invisible and 
passive eye looking out over a space, a conduit for information 
rather than a mediating agent. The reader is by their side, looking 
with them and not at them. These are not subjects who act in the 
name of the state—the state will act through them. 
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There are several points of contrast here with earlier travel and 
exploration writings. In 1790, a travel writer pausing on a promon­
tory was less likely to describe the sight itself than an emotive 
response to the sight. For example, when James Bruce in the 1780s 
describes looking down on one of the great cataracts of the Nile, 
what he ends up talking about is himself: 
It was a most magnificent sight, that ages, added to the greatest 
length of human life, would not efface or eradicate from my memory; 
it struck me with a kind of stupor, and a total oblivion of where I was, 
and of every other sublunary concern. . . . I was awakened from one 
of the most profound reveries that ever I fell into, by Mahomet and by 
my friend Drink, who now put to me a thousand impertinent 
questions. It was after this I measured the fall and believe, within a 
few feet, it was the height I have mentioned; but I confess I could at no 
time in my life less promise upon precision; my reflection was 
suspended, or subdued; and while in sight of the fail, I think I was 
under a temporary alienation of mind; it seemed to me as if one 
element had broke loose from, and become superior to, all laws of 
subordination . . . (162) 
The currency in which the sight is given textual value here is not its 
visual properties (as it would be for later writers), but the response 
experienced by the seer. Once again, as with Mungo Park, we have 
a sentimental discourse, stringently anchored in the subjectivity of 
the speaker-protagonist, a discourse in which experience rather 
than information is the principal matter to be conveyed. Notice 
further that the experience Bruce undergoes here is not one of 
domination or conquest; if anything, the landscape possesses him, 
rather than the reverse. Nor does he see a prophetic, civilizing 
vision—on the contrary, the landscape seems to be out of control, 
not under control. Moreover, Bruce represents himself as out of 
control, announcing limitations to his authority (notably his authority 
to gather information!). This is the kind of thing the mid-century 
writers almost never do. Their discourse minimizes reference to its 
speaking subject, and leaves little possibility for expressing limits 
to the speaker's authority. 
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In the earlier, experiential narratives, like those of Bruce and 
Mungo Park, there is little in the way of landscape and nature 
description of any kind. This is also true of novels of the period, 
such as those of Chateaubriand. What predominates overwhelm­
ingly is human and diplomatic drama. The "scenes of European 
enterprise" in these earlier accounts are dramatic scenes in which 
the traveler is an actor with a role. The narrative proceeds not by 
passage through a constantly changing ecology, but by passage 
from one human encounter to the next—meetings with local chiefs, 
robbers, benefactors, queens, slaves. These experiential, sentimen­
tal texts (other examples include Richard Lander and Gaspard 
Mollien in Africa, and such figures as John Stedman, John Davie, 
and John Mawe in South America) are adventure stories, tales of a 
thousand woes, full of captivities, holdups, narrow escapes and, 
above all, oh so delicate negotiations with local leaders for the 
permission and protection without which travel would mean cer­
tain death for the outsider. They are full of high melodrama and 
high comedy, the non-European other often seen as outlandish, 
bizarre, hilarious, or horrifying, the European self as pathetic, silly, 
or roguish. 
As I mentioned earlier, these late eighteenth-century experien­
tial texts strike the literary critic as extremely novelistic. Mungo 
Park is the picture of the sentimental hero, Richard Lander a pure 
picaresque rogue. John Stedman in his Narrative of a Five Years 
Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam (1790) builds his 
account around a (true) love story between himself and a mulatto 
slave, told in tear-jerking fashion worthy of Richardson's Pamela. 
As I have argued elsewhere, however ("Conventions"), it is not that 
these travel writers are imitating or borrowing from the novel. At 
this juncture, travel literature and the novel must be seen as sharing 
a common narrative discourse that is dramatic, experiential, and 
sentimental. Neither genre can legitimately be seen as the origina­
tor or proprietor of this discourse. 
In the experiential accounts, both European interlopers and local 
inhabitants get individualized as characters, and what gets elabo­
rated textually are the idiosyncracies and particularities of persons 
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and occasions. Consider for instance Mungo Park's rendition of one 
of his many encounters with a local king. Notice again the hero's 
portrayal of himself as vulnerable, inept, limited in power and 
understanding, innocently at the mercy of things, as Bruce was at 
the cataract: 
We reached at length the king's tent, where we found a great number 
of people, men and women, assembled. Ali was sitting upon a black 
leather cushion, clipping a few hairs from his upper lip; a female 
attendant holding up a looking-glass before him. He appeared to be 
an old man, of the Arab cast, with a long white beard; and he had a 
sullen and indignant aspect. He surveyed me with attention and 
inquired of the Moors if I could speak Arabic; being answered in the 
negative he appeared much surprised, and continued silent. The 
surrounding attendants and especially the ladies, were abundantly 
more inquisitive; they asked a thousand questions, inspected every 
part of my apparel, searched my pockets and obliged me to unbutton 
my waistcoat, and display the whiteness of my skin; they even 
counted my toes and fingers, as if they doubted whether I was in 
truth a human being. (234) 
This kind of scene is found all through late eighteenth-century 
travel narrative. Needless to say, such encounters with local leaders 
and inhabitants are just as frequent and essential to later travelers, 
but these encounters are seldom dramatized or elaborated in their 
accounts. Instead, what acquires prominence as a means of repre­
senting local inhabitants is the discourse of tribal features, in 
which the Other is described collectively as an inventory of traits 
and customs which exist abstracted from particular persons and 
experiences. In the passage from James Bruce (1790) quoted above, 
Bruce refers to his native companions by name and represents 
himself in dialogue with them. In the excerpt from James Grant 
(1864), o  n the other hand, Grant refers to his native companions by 
tribal labels—the Wanyamuezi, the Seedees—and characterizes 
them in terms of tribal characteristics and responses. Often, as in 
Richard Burton's classic Lake Regions of Central Africa (1861), local 
inhabitants are removed altogether from the journey narrative and 
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are discussed in separate chapters on the "geography and ethnol­
ogy" of the region. It is the discourse of "social science/' just 
beginning to consolidate itself in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Whatever the explanatory power of this discourse, there can be no 
doubt about its potential for reifying, dehumanizing, and distanc­
ing those whom it is used to characterize. You can't talk to a set of 
tribal features (though you might be able to organize them into a 
work force). By abstracting traits away from organized social and 
material life, this discourse verbally dismantles human societies. 
As with the kinds of nature description I mentioned above, it pulls 
people out of the landscape. 
It would be incorrect to say that this discourse of tribal features is 
absent from earlier travel accounts. It is not. But it is counter­
balanced there by the particularizing, experiential narrative. For 
instance, when Mungo Park offers some "general observations on 
the character and disposition of the Mandingoes/' his point of 
departure is the specifics of his own interaction with them. He 
says, for example, "Perhaps the most prominent defect in their 
character was the insurmountable propensity which the reader 
must have observed . .  . to steal from me the few effects I was 
possessed o  f (239). This account is anchored differently from, say, 
Richard Burton's description of the Wanyamuezi, which begins 
"They are usually of a dark sepia brown, rarely coloured like 
diluted India ink . . . the effluvium from their skin especially after 
exercise or excitement, marks their connection with the Negro. The 
hair curls crisply. . . ." (II: 20). 
There is a risk in this discussion of falling into a simple good 
guys/bad guys story. One does not want to say that the late 
eighteenth-century sentimental travelers were somehow less impe­
rialist than their successors at mid-century. If I have been con­
structing what looks like a moral tale, my objective has been not to 
idealize the earlier accounts, but to use them to make available to us 
aspects of the later ones. The difference is in the way the imperial 
enterprise is encoded in the travel narrative. In the mid-century 
writers, the tendency toward depersonalization and dehumaniza­
tion, the projection toward a future global transformation, the 
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positioning of the traveler as an invisible, passive observer, are all 
characteristic of imperialist vision under the modern nation-state. 
In the sentimental travelers, the expansionist enterprise is encoded 
largely in what Daniel Defert calls the language of universal 
diplomacy of pre-nineteenth-century Europe, a pan-continental 
code in which power relations are understood through courtly 
ritual and etiquette. As James Clifford has observed (personal 
communication), part of the appeal of these sentimental accounts 
today lies in the fact that this dramatic, diplomatic mode allows for 
dialogue, for power and personhood on both sides, in contrast with 
the reifying discourses of racism that were to follow. That sense of 
dialogue in turn lets Europeans think they won fair and square. 
Though it reads non-European peoples entirely in terms of Euro­
pean social hierarchy and mores, the discourse of diplomatic 
drama at least concedes their humanity and even allows them a 
little "class." (One recalls the similar treatment of the Aztec court in 
the accounts of the conquest of Mexico three hundred years earlier.) 
Indeed, one of the ways the experiential accounts mystify the imperi­
alist enterprise is by portraying the European travelers as less power­
ful, less clever, less ruthless than their opponents. Who can keep in 
mind that such hapless boobies as Mungo Park, always getting 
robbed, imprisoned, lost in the desert, poked at by ladies, or para­
lyzed by reveries, are the advancemen of European domination? Yet 
the appeal of these boobies today lies not just in their innocence, 
but also in their power of individual action. They do things, they 
don't just stand there looking or complaining. They are not circum­
scribed and immobilized in webs of social and ideological control. 
Defert says that this courtly, diplomatic code disappeared with 
the rise of the nation-state in the nineteenth century, and it be­
comes almost completely superseded in travel narrative by the 
mid-nineteenth-century conventions I have been discussing. But 
in the turn of the century texts the courtly code was already under 
attack, as indeed it was in Europe itself. For the traveler-heroes of 
the sentimental travel accounts are members not of European 
courtly aristocracies, but of the rising bourgeoisie who were in the 
process of replacing the aristocracy as the dominant class. (A 
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surprising number were physicians, interestingly enough.) The 
ideological struggle between court-based aristocracy and rising 
bourgeoisie has been examined at some length by Norbert Elias in 
his belatedly recognized masterpiece, The History of Manners. As 
this struggle developed in the late eighteenth century, it took quite 
different shapes in different countries (Elias in particular contrasts 
France and Germany). But in general the European bourgeoisies 
developed ideologies of their own in opposition to courtly values; 
these ideologies were in some cases absorbed into courtly life to a 
degree (as in France, Elias argues) while in others they and their 
bearers were rigidly excluded (as in Germany). In any case, Elias 
sees romanticism as an oppositional ideology, expressive of the 
bourgeoisie's sense that its interests, values, and lifeways were 
opposed to those of the court. Romanticism's stress on feelings 
stands in opposition to courtly values of reason over passion; its 
focus on individual, intrinsic self-worth and personal achievement 
stand in opposition to courtly emphases on lineage and externals 
like dress and manners; its chastity, naturalness, and simplicity in 
opposition to courtly unnaturalness and decadence. 
One thing late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century travel 
accounts do is dramatize this bourgeois struggle for hegemony on a 
displaced plane (plain?). In the courts of Arab and African kings 
and chieftains, the hapless, sincere, and passionate bourgeois 
emissary confronts the horrors of courtly decadence and immoral­
ity. Time and time again, these guileless arrivistes are robbed, 
imprisoned, left to die, only to be helped in the last instance either 
by Providence or by the spontaneous generosity of an invariably 
female slave. Time and time again, the court is satirized, ridiculed, 
or made an object of utter disgust. Consider, for instance, James 
Bruce's dehumanizing description of his work as court physician to 
the harem of one Ethiopian sultan: 
I must confess, however, that calling these the fair sex is not preserv­
ing a precision in terms. I was admitted into a large square apart­
ment, very ill-lighted, in which were about fifty women, all perfectly 
black, without any covering but a very narrow piece of cotton rag 
about their waists. While I was musing whether or not these all might 
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be queens, or whether there was any queen among them, one of them 
took me by the hand and led me rudely enough into another apart­
ment. . . . I shall not entertain the reader with the multitude of their 
complaints; being a lady's physician, discretion and silence are my 
first duties. It is sufficient to say, that there was not one part of their 
whole bodies, inside and outside, in which some of them had not 
ailments. . . . Another night I was obliged to attend them, and gave 
the queens, and two or three of the great ladies, vomits. I will spare 
my reader the recital of so nauseous a scene. The ipecacuanha had 
great effect, and warm water was drunk very copiously. The patients 
were numerous, and the floor of the room received all the evacua­
tions. It was most prodigiously hot, and the horrid, black figures, 
moaning and groaning with sickness all around me, gave me, I think, 
some slight idea of the punishment in the world below. (234-35) 
Unquestionably, part of the ideological force of these sentimental 
travel books lay in their representation of European class struggle 
in a way so dramatic and so congenial to the interests of their 
bourgeois readerships. And one can see the ideological force of 
representing capitalism's expansionist enterprise in the image of 
the class struggle at home, lending it a kind of glory and legitimacy 
(and a thrilling pathos), while mystifying its actual power and 
direction. By mid-nineteenth century, however, the struggle be­
tween courts and bourgeoisies was largely over. Both courtly idiom 
and the oppositional bourgeois idiom it conditioned had disap­
peared. Travelers were by this time entirely caught up in extending 
bourgeois hegemony under the aegis of the state and under the 
ideology of the civilizing mission, in whose name we have seen 
them gathering information and musing into the future from 
cliff tops. 
But here the risk of another oversimplification must be acknowl­
edged. For these generalized discourses I have been talking about 
never came even close to prevailing absolutely. We know that 
dominant ideologies only rarely appear in pure form, and that 
human subjects are not monolithic. While travel literature is cer­
tainly a place where imperialist ideologies get created, it is equally 
certainly a place where such ideologies get questioned, especially 
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from the realm of particularized and concrete sensual experience. 
In fact, travel literature is a particularly prominent instance of what 
discourse analysts like to call polyphony, because it is a genre that 
has never been consigned to professionals or specialists. Even 
today, it remains a place to which nonspecialist lay voices—an 
incredible variety of them—have access. You don't have to be a 
professional writer to write a travel book. Similar to call-in radio, 
travel literature is ultimately best seen as a genre not in the sense of 
a set of conventions, but in the sense of a discursive space which, 
like a street corner, is continually crisscrossed by all manner of 
people. 
To further complicate the picture I have been drawing, I will end 
with a couple of mid-nineteenth-century travel texts which do not 
adopt the detached and dehumanized code of the civilizing mis­
sion, and which in fact disrupt it. The first is Paul Du Chaillu's 
Explorations in Equatorial Africa (1861), and the second is Henry 
Morton Stanley's famed How I Found Livingstone (1872). Both were 
extremely popular books in their time, and both were much vilified 
by authorities and the British explorer elite. It is not a coincidence 
that both writers were naturalized Americans, though that is not 
why I picked them. 
In Du Chaillu's book, all the characteristics of both historical 
periods I have mentioned coexist, producing a hugely contradic­
tory, chaotic, and colorful text, a good deal of which, it turns out, 
was his pure invention. Like the writers of the 1790s, Du Chaillu 
describes his emotional states and constantly dramatizes encoun­
ters with local inhabitants. Yet he does not play the vulnerable 
sentimental hero, but the Great White Father revered by the na­
tives. Among his favorite scenes to dramatize is not the courtly 
encounter, but native ''atrocities" like ritual killings, witchcraft, 
trials by poison, and so on. Modern racism is present in his 
rhetoric. And like mid-century writers, Du Chaillu goes on ob­
sessively about the need and potential for capitalist development, 
constantly fantasizes about Africa's "civilized" future, and uses all 
the kinds of landscape description I mentioned earlier. But one 
often finds Du Chaillu playing conventions against each other, as 
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he does in the passage that follows. This starts out as one of the 
view-from-the-promontory scenes I mentioned earlier: 
From this elevation about 5000 feet above the ocean level, I enjoyed an 
unobstructed view as far as the eye could reach. The hills we had 
surmounted the day before lay quietly at our feet, seeming mere 
molehills. On all sides stretched the immense virgin forests, with 
here and there a sheen of a watercourse. And far away on the east 
loomed the blue tops of the farthest range of the Sierra del Crystal, 
the goal of my desires. (23) 
The relation of dominance over the terrain is clear here—the hills 
are now lying in quiet ("virginal") submission to the interloper. As 
with the Grant sketch quoted earlier, Du Chaillu's view now turns 
into a vision of a Utopian future when the imperial mission will 
have done its work (it's a particularly American vision, too): 
The murmur of the rapids below filled my ears, and as I strained my 
eyes towards those distant mountains which I hoped to reach, I began 
to think how this wilderness would look if only the light of Christian 
civilization could once be fairly introduced among the black children 
of Africa. I dreamed of forests giving way to plantations of coffee, cot­
ton, spices, of peaceful negroes going to their contented daily tasks; of 
farming and manufactures, of churches and schools . . . (23) 
It is obvious why this vision makes contemporary readers uncom­
fortable. But apparently it was intended to make Du Chaillu's 
contemporaries uncomfortable too, for this grand vision gets inter­
rupted by a concrete experience, quite a dramatic one at that: 
and luckily, raising my eyes heavenward at this stage of my thoughts, 
saw pendent from the branch of a tree beneath which I was sitting an 
immense serpent, evidently preparing to gobble up this dreaming 
intruder on his domains. My dreams of future civilization vanished 
in a moment. Luckily my gun lay at hand. (23) 
Obviously this serpent came here directly from the Garden of Eden, 
and has appeared to tell the reader among other things that the 
cozy pastoral-plantation fantasy is forbidden fruit which will lead 
eventually to expulsion from the garden. In the face pf this intru­
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sion of immediate experience, Du Chaillu abandons his role as ob­
server and becomes an agent, and what he does is grab the most fun­
damental real tool of the civilizing mission, his gun. Du Chaillu is 
unquestionably invoking the conventions of his contemporaries in or­
der to ironize them, and his means are very reminiscent of the earlier 
dramatic and experiential travel texts. One of the messages implied is, 
"Let's not always pretend that this pastoral fantasy is really what we 
are going to produce here"—as an American in i860 might well know. 
A much more direct challenge to the discourse of the civilizing 
mission came a decade later from the prolific Henry Stanley, author 
of In Darkest Africa. I believe Stanley can be credited with single­
handedly breaking up the mid-nineteenth-century British mode of 
travel writing, and founding quite consciously a new generation 
both of explorers and of exploration literature. He does this in part 
by incessantly challenging the mid-century writers on their own 
grounds. Over and over in his first blockbuster, How I Found 
Livingstone (1872) he indicts his predecessors, Burton, Speke, Grant, 
and others, for failing to provide him with INFORMATION that 
was accurate and useful to him. And he challenges them on 
sentimental grounds, for being detached and cold, for failing to see 
that negroes experience the same passions white men do. (This, 
archaically enough, is his criterion for seeing them as fully human.) 
Stanley describes landscapes, then breaks frame to ask, "Reader, 
why am I doing this?—Ah, yes, it is because you and I are looking at 
this place for opportunities" (italics mine). In his preface, he explic­
itly displaces the informational discourse by announcing that he 
has "used the personal pronoun first person singular, T,' " oftener, 
perhaps than real modesty would admit. But it must be remem­
bered that I am writing a narrative of my own adventures and 
travels, and that until I meet Livingstone, I presume the greatest 
interest is attached to myself, my marches, my troubles, my thoughts, 
and my impressions" (xxii). This is obviously a presumption that 
Mungo Park and the others shared two generations earlier, with the 
difference that they did not have to make it explicit. Stanley 
explicitly ridicules his predecessors' posture of emotional restraint, 
and repeatedly depicts himself unable or unwilling to adopt it. 
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But above all, Stanley portrays a whole, unflattering side of 
European travel experience in Africa which his predecessors un­
questionably shared but which they did not write about: its vio­
lence. Over and over again, almost obsessively, Stanley portrays 
himself beating his servants and bearers, horsewhipping them, 
putting them in chains, all manner of brutalities—often, he admits, 
with no justification other than his own irritability. He shows 
himself abusing his European companions, plundering indigenous 
communities for food, running roughshod over peoples' territory 
and customs and making up for it in violence, suppressing rebel­
lion after rebellion among his party without the slightest ear for 
grievances. Stanley, in short, does a journalistic expose on himself, 
and by implication on his decorous mentors. Small wonder he—an 
illegitimate working-class orphan emigrant who never even got his 
name till he was eighteen—was hated so by the Royal Society 
Fellows even as the attention of the world was focused on him. 
Of particular interest here is the way Stanley, in forging a new 
discourse, combines elements of the older, sentimental one (he 
even uses "thou" in his rendering of dialogues with local leaders) 
with elements of the new muckraking journalism (his first books 
were, of course, written for the New York Herald). It is also impor­
tant to note that, as with Du Chaillu, Stanley's critique is a "domes­
ticated" one, in the sense that the challenge occurs within the 
overall imperialist enterprise. In fact one could argue that, while 
doubtless alienating some sectors of the home public from that 
enterprise, the effect of Stanley's expose on others might have been 
simply a sense of relief and empowerment at finally knowing what 
has really been going on under all that detachment and decorum. 
As my colleague James Clifford puts it, if you want to give people a 
sense of power, you have to make them feel they are seeing behind 
the scenes. Who would know this better than Stanley the news­
paperman? 
In any case, that it was a domesticated critique is eerily borne out 
by Stanley's subsequent career. For of course it was he who, as the 
agent of King Leopold of Belgium, stood at the forefront of the 
infamous Scramble for Africa, the orgy of plunder, forced labor, 
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mass imprisonment, and genocide which in the years between 1890 
and World War I devastated Central Africa on the same scale that 
Central and South America were devastated by the Spanish inva­
sion in the sixteenth century. In the Congo alone—Stanley's partic­
ular field of endeavor—the loss of life in this period is conser­
vatively estimated at between 10 and 20 million people. Small 
wonder that at the end of the nineteenth century, the conventional 
view from the promontory gets replaced by a new trope, the 
terrifying jungle-at-night scene where Europeans find themselves 
immobilized and terrorized in a landscape they cannot see. Small 
wonder that the climax of those terrifying nights is their recogni­
tion that the source of the terror and evil is not Africa, but 
themselves. 
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Present Tense Narration, 
Mimesis, the Narrative Norm, 
and the Positioning of the 
Reader in Waiting for the 
Barbarians 
JAMES PHELAN 
The Simultaneous Present in Waiting for the Barbarians 
The elderly magistrate-protagonist of J. M. Coetzee's Waiting for the 
Barbarians narrates a painful and remarkable tale, the story of his 
complicity with torturers as well as his own experience of being 
tortured; of his attempts to expiate the pain of one tortured 
woman, attempts that actually perpetuate her pain and oppres­
sion; of his humiliation by the forces of his Empire and his 
continued complicity with the Empire. He is a man who is self-
reflective but not fully aware of what he is doing and why, who 
wants to have his heart in the right place but is very attached to the 
pleasures of the body. This character and these experiences would 
lend themselves very well to a retrospective first person narration 
in the manner of Great Expectations. The magistrate could occa­
sionally judge his former self from his perspective at the time of 
narration, and part of the narrative tension for the reader would be 
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the question of how the experiencing-I evolves into the narrating-I. 
Of course, Coetzee could still indicate that the narrator-I's under­
standing of himself and his situation is severely limited. Such a 
treatment of the narrative perspective would allow Coetzee, first, 
to use the magistrate's retrospection to highlight some of the 
thematic import of the narrative, especially concerning complicity, 
and, second, to involve the reader in seeing beyond the magistrate, 
building upon or even revising the narrator's conclusions. 
Coetzee, however, has the magistrate tell the story not retro­
spectively but "simultaneously." That is, the magistrate tells the 
story in the present tense—not the historical present after the fact, 
but the simultaneous present as events are happening. This narra­
tive strategy, the homodiegetic simultaneous present, places the 
reader in a very different relationship to the magistrate and to the 
events of his narrative than would any kind of retrospective ac­
count. The strategy takes teleology away from the magistrate's 
narrative acts: since he does not know how events will turn out, he 
cannot be shaping the narrative according to his knowledge of the 
end. Consequently, we cannot read with our usual tacit assump­
tions that the narrator, however unself-conscious, has some direc­
tion in mind for his tale. Instead, as we read any one moment of the 
narrative we must assume that the future is always—and radi-
cally—wide open: the narrator's guess about what will happen next 
is really no better than our own. In fact, our guess is better because 
we read with the assumption that Coetzee has shaped his novel, 
has given it some kind of teleology, and we habitually make 
tentative inferences about that as we read, inferences that remain 
subject to radical revision as the magistrate's narrative moves in its 
necessarily unpredictable direction. 
What kind of experience is it to read the account of a self-
reflective narrator who is unable to use that power of reflection to 
shape his tale? How does the present tense position and reposition 
the reader as the magistrate recounts his series of remarkable 
events, his year of change which brings him to a position very 
similar to the one from which he started? And why would Coetzee 
want to position his reader in these ways rather than in the more 
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common positions fostered by retrospective narration? These ques­
tions, I believe, are central to understanding the effects of Coetzee's 
remarkable novel, and they are the questions with which this essay 
is ultimately concerned. Before I address them directly, however, I 
want to situate them in the larger context of recent theoretical 
discussions of simultaneous (as opposed to historical) present 
tense narration because that placement will contribute to our 
understanding of the special quality of Coetzee's achievement. As 
we will see, some theorists have serious doubts about the efficacy 
of Coetzee's strategy. 
Mimesis and tlte Narrative Norm 
Suzanne Fleischman concludes her recent illuminating study Tense 
and Narrativity by building on Gerard Genette's discussion of the 
inherent instability of present tense narration. Fleischman argues 
that narrative, by nature, uses the past as the dominant tense. The 
presence of the present, then, moves a discourse toward the genres 
in which present tense is dominant—either the lyric or the drama. 
Fleischman concludes her discussion with her strongest claim: the 
"metalinguistic function" of the present tense is "to announce a 
language that cannot be narrative according to the rules of narra-
tive's own game" (310). Fleischman's position is well-argued, provo­
cative, and, I think, inadequate. It is inadequate because it does not 
take sufficient account of actual narrative practice, the way in 
which many recent narrative artists have experimented with the 
homodiegetic simultaneous present. Consider the range of styles, 
audiences, and interests in just this short list of experimenters: 
Coetzee, Bobbie Ann Mason in In Country, Margaret Atwood in The 
Handmaid's Tale, and Scott Turow in Presumed Innocent,1 
The gap between Fleischman's theoretical account and the prac­
tice of many storytellers suggests that we could profit from a closer 
look at her "rules of narrative's . . . game." From the perspective of 
these rules, the problem with present tense narration is that it 
violates a mimetic standard that says one cannot live and narrate at 
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the same time.2 But the critical and in some cases popular success of 
recent present tense narratives invites us to reexamine that stan­
dard. In the rest of this section, I will explore the relations among 
standards of mimesis, theoretical explanations of narration, and 
fictional practice. This discussion will lead to a new account of the 
relation between mimesis and fictional narration, which will serve 
as the backdrop for discussing my questions about Waiting for the 
Barbarians. 
Among the many important tasks Fleischman takes up, perhaps 
the most significant for my purposes is her attempt to make the 
production and comprehension of narrative part of adult linguistic 
competence. Just as competent speakers internalize rules about 
what constitutes grammatical and ungrammatical sentences, so 
too, Fleischman proposes, they internalize "a set of shared conven­
tions and assumptions about what constitutes a well-formed story'' 
(263). Fleischman calls this set of conventions and assumptions 
"the narrative norm/' and this set is what she means by the rules of 
narrative's game. The norm has four main rules or tenets: 
1. "Narratives refer to specific experiences that occurred in 
some past world (real or imagined) and are accordingly reported in 
a tense of the PAST" (263). Note here that the norm does not 
distinguish between fictional and nonfictional narrative. Note, 
too, that making past tense the norm means that present tense 
narration will be the marked case. 
2. "Narratives contain both sequentially ordered events and 
non-sequential 'collateral material' [such as description and eval­
uation] but it is the events that define narration" (263). Note here 
that this tenet reinforces the formalist-structuralist distinctions 
fabula/sjuzhet and story/discourse and that it privileges fabula as the 
defining element of narrative. 
3. "The default order of the sjuzhet in narratives is iconic to the 
chronology of events in the fabula they model" (263). Again the 
assumption is that fabula is the core of narrative. 
4. "Narratives are informed by a point of view that assigns 
meaning to their contents in conformity with a governing ideology, 
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normally that of the narrator" (263). This tenet gives the sjuzhet its 
due, reminding us that fabula alone does not determine the mean­
ing and effect of narrative. 
Throughout her book, Fleischman emphasizes that although 
''the tenets of the norm are commonly infringed, the rhetorical or 
stylistic effects produced by infringements are possible only be­
cause the norm is in place" (263). Thus, for example, breaking the 
default order of the sjuzhet does not make a narrative "ill-formed" 
but it does foreground the sjuzhet's role in creating a narrative's 
effects. Given this emphasis, we might expect Fleischman to apply 
the same logic to the use of the present tense and to argue that 
infringing the norm about the past tense might produce, say, an 
immediacy effect, rather than a move away from narrative. We need 
a closer look. 
Tenet 1 (narrative refers to a set of experiences in the past) and 
tenet 4 (a narrative has a speaker from whose point of view the 
story is told) allow Fleischman to emphasize that the narrative 
norm implies "two temporal planes, the present of the speaker (and 
hearer) and the past of the narrated events" (127). Present tense 
narration is "inherently unstable" for Fleischman because it erases 
this distinction between the two temporal planes, causing the text 
to move in one of two directions. Either the narrator will disappear 
and the events will be presented as if without a filter, thus moving 
the text toward drama; or the narrator will become supremely 
important and the events will be merely an occasion for the dis­
course, thus moving the text toward lyric. Fleischman uses Gen-
ette's commentary on the ambiguity of Robbe-Grillet's La Jalousie 
to demonstrate the rule: Genette argues that the novel can be 
read either as a wholly objective behaviorist account of events 
or as a completely subjective projection of the narrator's jealous 
perspective. 
On its own terms, this view is persuasive. If we think of 
narrative as requiring these temporal planes, then it follows that 
erasing the distinction between them will make narrative unstable. 
But ultimately the insistence on the distinction between the two 
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planes and this understanding of the interpretive options for 
present tense texts depend on an assumption about the way mimesis 
controls the occasion of narration. As noted briefly above, the present 
tense is such a problem because it violates the mimetic standard 
that says a speaker cannot tell her story and live it at the same 
time—"live now, tell later," as Dorrit Cohn puts it. Stipulating that 
texts which erase the distinction will be either unfiltered or com­
pletely subjective allows the mimetic imperative to be preserved. 
In the first case, we say that the form of the text means that it has no 
speaker, no narrator in the usual mimetic sense: the concept of a 
"narrative perspective" drops out and we seem to have the verbal 
equivalent to "objective" drama. In the second case, we preserve 
the strict mimesis by seeing everything as revealing a subjective 
consciousness. But what happens if we question the standard? Let 
me first give a warrant for this question by a look at some past tense 
homodiegetic narration that violates a different mimetic standard. 
When the two temporal planes are present, narratives that 
follow the third tenet of the norm (i.e., that the default order is for 
sjuzhet to follow fabula) establish a complicated relation between 
the "retrospective perspective" of the narrative and the "temporal 
orientation" of the events narrated. As Fleischman points out, the 
events remain in the past for the speaker, but the temporal orienta­
tion of the narrative is "prospective"—it traces the events as they 
happened. For the reader, this double temporal perspective means 
that she has a tacit awareness that the account is retrospective but an 
overt experience of the events as unfolding prospectively In homo­
diegetic narration, the double orientation leads to the separation 
between the experiencing-I whose acts are being retraced and the 
narrating-I who is doing the retracing. According to the mimetic 
standard that says "knowledge alters perception," whenever a 
narrating-I unself-consciously tells the story of his or her change in 
consciousness or understanding, the new understanding should 
inform the retrospective narration. 
For example, in Hemingway's "My Old Man" Joe Butler unself­
consciously recounts a series of events that suddenly lead him to 
give up his belief that his father was "one swell guy" and to 
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entertain the idea that his father was actually a "son of a bitch." 
According to the standard that knowledge alters perception, Joe's 
unsophisticated retrospective account should be informed by his 
present suspicions. But it is not. What's more, this apparent viola­
tion of the mimetic standard does not undermine but rather makes 
possible the effectiveness of the narrative for Hemingway's audi­
ence, because that effectiveness depends (in part) on the sudden­
ness of Joe's realization. The violation is not a problem because the 
reader's temporal orientation is always prospective. Since we do not 
know what Joe ends up learning (or suspecting) as a result of the 
experience he is narrating, we cannot know as we read that Joe's 
narration does not square with what he learns.3 
This example has three important implications for our under­
standing of mimesis and present tense narration. First, it suggests 
that mimetic standards may be violated without destroying a 
narrative's effectiveness or altering its generic status. More gener­
ally, it reminds us that mimesis is not a product of faithful imitation 
of the real (whatever that is) but rather a set of conventions for 
representing what we provisionally and temporarily agree to be the 
real. In other words, in this larger view Joe's narration violates a 
narrow standard of mimesis, one based only on imitation-of-the-
real ("knowledge alters perception"); but it is consistent with a 
broader standard of mimesis, one that looks both to the real and to 
conventions for imitating it. Second, the example of "My Old Man" 
suggests that these conventions are motivated in part by what they 
make possible: "My Old Man" is a much more powerful story as a 
result of its violation of the narrow mimetic logic. If Hemingway 
followed that logic by having Joe's doubts and suspicions inform 
the narrative, he would have eliminated the shock accompanying 
the suddenness of Joe's new understanding and the poignancy 
accompanying its arrival moments after Joe's father's death; he 
would, in short, have destroyed much of the story's emotional 
power. If Hemingway had respected strict mimetic logic by telling 
the story through a heterodiegetic narrator, he would have sacri­
ficed much of the intimacy between Joe and his audience, an 
intimacy crucial to the narrative's effect. 
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Third and most important, both the reader's judgments about 
mimesis and the sense of what is possible depend upon the reader's 
tacit awareness that she is reading fiction, that the characters and 
the events are what I have elsewhere called synthetic constructs.4 
Or, perhaps better, this example suggests that we may construct 
mimetic standards too narrowly because we do not allow for 
differences between fictional and nonfictional narrative. Despite 
all that recent experiments with nonfiction narrative by Tom Wolfe, 
Joan Didion, Hunter Thompson, and others have taught us about 
the permeability between fiction and nonfiction, some significant 
differences remain. If "My Old Man" were nonfiction, then one of 
three things would happen. (1) A real Joe Butler would not tell the 
story the way the fictional Joe does, but would have his knowledge 
inform his narration and, thus, give us a different text. (2) Joe's 
unreliability, which stems from the fact that his narrative is not 
informed by his knowledge, would undermine his telling—we 
would come to feel that the narrative stance was insincere and 
would therefore feel manipulated. (3) Alternatively, we would 
come to regard the narrative stance as a highly self-conscious 
performance by Joe, one that was so skillful he could brilliantly 
feign unself-consciousness. In each of these cases, we would have a 
very different relation to the story and its narrator than we do in 
Hemingway's ''My Old Man." 
Because we read Hemingway's version with the tacit knowledge 
that it is fiction, two consequences follow: (1) Joe's unreliability 
functions effectively as part of a dual communication from Hem-
ingway—a communication from Joe to a narrative audience, which 
is contained within Hemingway's communication to his authorial 
audience;5 and (2) the deviation from the narrow mimetic standard 
does not undermine the story's mimetic power. 
Something similar—but not identical—happens, I believe, in 
fictional homodiegetic present tense narration. The situation is not 
identical because the deviation is experienced differently. In "My 
Old Man," the deviation is not registered as we read, and therefore 
the synthetic remains in the background. In the case of present 
tense narration, the fictionality of the text is foregrounded, but this 
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foregrounding does not impede our mimetic engagement with the 
characters. 
These considerations lead me to question the adequacy of Fleisch-
man's formulation of the narrative norm on the grounds that it does 
not address our acquired competence with fictional narrative. I 
would like, therefore, to propose the following revisions of Fleisch-
man's first and fourth tenets: 
i. Nonfictional narratives refer to specific real experiences that 
occurred in the past and are accordingly reported in a tense of the 
PAST. Fictional narratives refer to imagined experiences presented as 
if they were real, sometimes through imaginary instances of narration. 
4. Narratives are informed by a point of view that assigns 
meaning to their contents in conformity with a governing ideology, 
normally that of the narrator. In fictional narrative, the relation of 
the narrator's governing ideology to that of the author is always a 
part of the narrative's meaning. 
Such revisions would recognize that the use of an instance of 
imaginary narration such as the present tense need neither under­
mine mimesis nor move a discourse away from narrative. 
These formulations are subject to the same caveats as Fleisch-
man's. They do not mean to rule out, say, the use of the simultane­
ous present in nonfictional narrative but rather to emphasize that 
such a technique will achieve its effect in part by its deviation from 
the norm—and to suggest that the effect is likely to be different 
from the effect of the present tense in fictional narrative.6 These 
formulations also do not address the question of the effects of 
present tense narration in fiction. To talk of effects, as we shall see, 
we also need to look more closely than Fleischman does—or, 
indeed, as I have done so far—at the audience who feels the effects. 
On Effects and Audiences 
Like many other critics, I have often discussed how technique X 
produces effect Y in "us." And like others, I typically have two bases 
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for the effects I claim "we" experience: (1) my own set of responses, 
and (2) the sources in the text I can point to that evoke those 
responses. Because I privilege the second basis over the first, the 
search for sources of response can—and often does—lead to a 
revision of response. Because of that hierarchy among these bases, 
I go ahead and claim that my sequence of responses, properly 
grounded in their textual sources, forms the "experience of the 
authorial audience." 
However, as anyone who has followed the reader-response move­
ment even in passing must already recognize, this mode of analysis 
depends on the repression of one crucial fact: different readers 
bring different subjectivities to texts and therefore sometimes have 
different experiences of the same textual phenomena. Once I 
acknowledge this fact, I have several directions in which to go. I 
may decide to establish a hierarchy among readers' experiences — 
some are more valid/true/legitimate than others. But this direction 
soon leads to a reproduction of the problem: How can I establish 
the hierarchy without injecting my own subjectivity into the 
decision and in effect claiming that it is superior to others'? 
Alternatively, I may decide to celebrate difference and argue for the 
incommensurability of different accounts of the reading experi­
ence: because you and I are different, we will of course read 
complicated narratives differently, and the best we can do is com­
pare notes. This solution, though it has the advantage of validating 
different responses, has the significant disadvantage of endorsing 
a prison-house of subjectivity. 
There are of course middle positions that are far more attractive 
than either of these extremes; Wolfgang Iser's notion that each of us 
fills in a text's gaps in her own way is the most well-known, and 
recently Robert Scholes has elegantly argued that effective reading 
must be both centripetal and centrifugal, that is, grounded in the 
text and spinning away from its center. But I would like to offer a 
model that tries less to compromise between the two extremes than 
to embrace their differing first principles. In embracing both, I 
realize that I am also necessarily modifying each; but the modifica­
tion is motivated less by the impulse to correct than by the desire to 
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maintain as much integrity toward each first principle as possible. 
To be specific, I want to insist on the effort to enter the authorial 
audience as a worthy-but-unlikely-to-be-achieved goal, even as I 
recognize and, indeed, celebrate the inevitable subjectivity of my 
reading self. Rather than trying to find either the objectively best 
reading or the subjectively most honest, I collapse the distinction 
between subject and object, intrinsic and extrinsic. The text is in 
the reader and the reader is in the text like the fish is in the sea and 
the sea is in the fish. More specifically, I maintain the concepts of 
authorial audience and authorial reading as a heuristic to allow me 
to question my subjective experiences; at the same time, I both 
recognize and value the subjectivity of my readerly experience 
because it opens up a two-way street between the life experiences 
that have gone into shaping my subjectivity (including my reading 
of other texts) and my experiences as a reader of this text. This 
model invites me as a reader to seek both comprehension and 
evaluation, sympathetic understanding and, where necessary, strong 
resistance. 
Perhaps the most striking consequence of this model is that it 
makes reading endlessly recursive. The more I study the text, the 
more I am able to interrogate and complicate my understanding of 
how it works on me; the more I have experiences that are in some 
way related to those in the text, the more my experience of the text 
will change. Furthermore, because I read within a community, my 
discussions with other readers can affect both ends of my transac­
tion; other readers may show me things in the workings of the text 
that I had not fully accounted for, or they may explain their 
subjective experiences in ways that allow or require me to reex­
amine mine.7 
Criticism based on this model of audience and effects might be 
presented in such a way that it resembles traditional accounts of 
"the way the text works" because the critic may regard the specific 
influences of her subjectivity—if indeed she is able to identify 
them—as things that she need not inflict on her reader. Alter­
natively, criticism based on this model might move in a "confes­
sional" direction, where the critic calls attention to his subjectivity 
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either to let his reader beware or to invite the reader into a more 
personal dialogue with himself and the text under consideration. 
My own subjectivity leads me to develop the rest of this essay in the 
first, more traditional direction. But I hope that what I have said 
here will serve as a reminder of the messy, complicated subjective 
and inter subjective responses compressed within my subsequent 
shorthand use of the first person plural. 
The Present Tense and Audience Experience in 
Waiting for the Barbarians 
In the light of the preceding discussion, I find it helpful to restate 
my initial questions. (1) How does the narration affect us if we seek 
to participate in the authorial audience's role in the dual communi­
cation of the narrative? How do we enter that audience and negoti­
ate our relation to the magistrate and to Coetzee as implied author? 
How, in other words, are we positioned and repositioned as we 
move through the narrative? (2) What does the imaginary occasion 
of narration in Waiting for the Barbarians make possible—that is, 
what does it allow Coetzee to accomplish that he could not accom­
plish with a realistic past tense narration? Let us begin with the 
opening of the narrative: 
I have never seen anything like it: two little discs of glass sus­
pended in front of his eyes in loops of wire. Is he blind? I could 
understand it if he wanted to hide blind eyes. But he is not blind. The 
discs are dark, they look opaque from the outside but he can see 
through them. He tells me they are a new invention. "They protect 
one's eyes against the glare of the sun," he says. "You would find them 
useful out here in the desert. They save one from squinting all the 
time. One has fewer headaches. Look." He touches the corners of his 
eyes lightly. "No wrinkles." He replaces the glasses. It is true. He has 
the skin of a younger man. 'At home everyone wears them." (1) 
It will be apparent, I think, that there is neither any plausible 
"occasion of narration'' here nor any violation of narrativity.8 This 
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narrator is doing the impossible—living and telling at the same 
time. Furthermore, his discourse locates us in the genre of narra­
tive: his subjectivity is obvious, and his account directs its audi-
ence's attention toward the other character and the dynamics of 
their interaction. The subsequent parts of the text strengthen this 
location, as the preponderance of criticism about it indirectly at­
tests: most commentators ignore the tense and focus on the the­
matic component of the narrative. 
Perhaps the most notable immediate effect of this imaginary 
instance of narration is that it accentuates the difference between 
the magistrate's relation to the text and Coetzee's. As noted earlier, 
because he is telling as he is living, the magistrate is not at all able to 
design his narration; the narrative situation puts teleology beyond 
his control. Yet we approach the narrative assuming that it has a 
teleology, that Coetzee has imposed a design upon this imaginary 
narration. For example, we read the magistrate's first paragraph as 
Coetzee's introduction of a thematic issue about vision and blind­
ness and expect that this issue will be prominent throughout the 
narrative, but we do not conclude that the magistrate is deliberately 
building this motif into his narrative so that he can do more with it 
later.9 
As the narrative progresses, Coetzee combines this effect of 
present tense narration with one of the magistrate's traits as a 
character-narrator to create a very powerful representation of the 
magistrate's dilemma—and to complicate the audience's position­
ing in relation to the magistrate. Coetzee creates the magistrate to 
be a reflective individual, but he puts the magistrate in a narrative 
situation that deprives him of the distance from his experience 
necessary for his reflection to make coherent sense of it. As a 
result, the magistrate's understanding comes in pieces and is 
always subject to revision. At the same time, the absence of any 
retrospective perspective—even the latent one of a Huck Finn— 
places the authorial audience's prospective experience of the narra­
tive very close to the magistrate's ongoing experience. This posi­
tioning has two very significant effects. First, just as the magis-
trate's understanding comes provisionally and in pieces, so too 
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does ours. Second, although our awareness of Coetzee behind the 
magistrate means that our understanding can exceed the magis-
trate's, we frequently must struggle to attain the necessary distance 
from the magistrate's views and actions. It is this second effect I 
will explore first. 
Our struggle to see beyond the magistrate becomes progressive­
ly greater because Coetzee makes the magistrate much more sym­
pathetic than Colonel Joll, Mandel, and the other officials from the 
Third Bureau, and because Coetzee shows the magistrate being led 
by his powers of reflection to oppose these representatives of the 
Empire and to make some progress understanding the situation in 
which he lives and acts. Indeed, near the end of the narrative the 
magistrate reaches conclusions that have the appearance of a final 
truth, a place of understanding where he and the audience can rest. 
Through the positioning provided by the present tense narration, 
Coetzee uses the authorial audience's reading experience up to and 
after this moment as a way to exemplify one of his major thematic 
points about complicity. This moment in the magistrate's under­
standing is so important because it is part of the development of the 
central instability of the narrative, his relation to his own complic­
ity in the Empire's oppression of the barbarians, especially as that 
complicity is reflected in his treatment of the woman whom he 
takes into his apartment. 
When the magistrate first invites the woman into his rooms he 
does not understand his motives and frequently describes his 
puzzlement at what he is doing. "For the time being, perhaps 
forever, I am simply bewildered. It seems all one whether I lie down 
beside her and fall asleep or fold her in a sheet and bury her in the 
snow" (43). But Coetzee asks us to see beyond that puzzlement and 
recognize that the magistrate's ritual washing of her body has a 
double significance. Especially in the early stages when the wash­
ing is restricted to the woman's broken feet, the ritual is the 
magistrate's attempt to atone for the woman's torture, and a tacit 
admission of the way his complicity with the Empire makes him 
responsible for what happened to her. Like Christ's washing of the 
feet of his disciples, it is an act of humility and respect, something 
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that arises out of his feeling for her pain and something that 
acknowledges her equality with him. At the same time, however, 
the magistrate's actions continue her oppression, an oppression 
that becomes greater as he washes more of her body: the woman is 
with him by his command—he is the official of the Empire; she has 
no choice but to submit—she is the "barbarian." Coetzee gives 
several signs that the magistrate is too close to his complicity with 
the Empire to recognize how his confused effort at expiation 
actually perpetuates her oppression. These signs include the mag-
istrate's shifting without comment from calling her "woman" to 
calling her "girl" as well as his protesting too much when he briefly 
thinks that he is trying to "move her" more than Joll did. "I shake 
my head in a fury of disbelief. No! No! No! I cry to myself. . .  . I 
must assert my distance from Colonel Joll! I will not suffer for his 
crimes!" (44). 
Moreover, the very manner in which he carries out the expiation 
derives from the habits he has developed in his easy life as magis­
trate during times of peace. That easy life is filled with sensual 
pleasure; his drive toward that pleasure leads him to move beyond 
the washing of the woman's feet toward the giving and receiving of 
erotic pleasure in his washing the rest of her body. She becomes an 
object for both his attempted expiation and attempted pleasure. In 
sum, the effort at atonement is corrupted by the magistrate's 
complicity—-and that very complicity prevents him from recogniz­
ing what he is doing. 
Significantly, however, after the magistrate has himself been 
tortured by the forces of the Empire, he is forced to move further 
away from it, and, as a result of this movement, he acquires a new 
understanding of his actions toward the woman, an understanding 
that Coetzee highlights by the length and occasional eloquence of 
its articulation: 
From the first she knew me for a false seducer. She listened to me, 
then she listened to her heart, and rightly she acted in accord with 
her heart. If only she had found the words to tell me! 'That is not how 
you do it/' she should have said, stopping me in the act. "If you want 
to learn how to do it, ask your friend with the black eyes." Then she 
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should have continued so as not to leave me without hope: "But if you 
want to love me you will have to turn your back on him and learn your 
lesson elsewhere." If she told me then, if I understood her, if I had 
been in a position to understand her, if I believed her, if I had been in 
a position to believe her, I might have saved myself from a year of 
confused and futile gestures of expiation. 
For I was not, as I liked to think, the indulgent pleasure-loving 
opposite of the cold rigid Colonel. I was the lie that Empire tells itself 
when times are easy, he the truth that Empire tells when harsh winds 
blow. Two sides of imperial rule, no more, no less. But I temporized, I 
looked around this obscure frontier, this little backwater with its 
dusty summers and its cartloads of apricots and its long siestas and 
its shiftless garrison and the waterbirds flying in and flying out year 
after year to and from the dazzling waveless sheet of the lake, and I 
said to myself, "Be patient, one of these days he will go away, one of 
these days quiet will return: then our siestas will grow longer and our 
swords rustier, the watchman will sneak down from his tower to 
spend the night with his wife, the mortar will crumble till lizards nest 
between the bricks and owls fly out of the belfry, and the line that 
marks the frontier on the maps of Empire will grow hazy and obscure 
till we are blessedly forgotten" Thus I seduced myself, taking one of 
the many wrong turnings I have taken on a road that looks true but 
has delivered me into the heart of a labyrinth. (135-36) 
This moment of insight is so powerful because in it the magis­
trate so clearly articulates the view of himself that Coetzee has 
asked his audience to adopt. Furthermore, in that articulation, the 
magistrate is fulfilling one aspect of our desire, a desire that 
develops out of several converging aspects of the reading experi­
ence. As noted above, because our prospective reading experience 
is so close to the magistrate's moment-by-moment lived experience, 
we frequently must struggle to see beyond his limited vision. At 
the same time, our fundamental sympathy for the magistrate 
moves us to want his vision to be as clear and honest as possible. 
Once the magistrate's struggle to see clearly leads him to a place 
where his vision matches ours, we take a certain satisfaction in his 
achievement, even as we recognize that the truth he voices is a 
chilling one. Indeed, because we are always positioned so closely to 
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the magistrate's developing consciousness, because we struggle to 
see beyond his vision, his articulation here is likely to advance our 
understanding of his situation: he expresses better than we could 
what we have been feeling. 
Strikingly, however, Coetzee does not leave his audience with 
the satisfaction of fulfilled desire very long. And here we can see 
the consequences of the way the tense positions us to make our 
understanding, like the magistrate's, provisional and partial. The 
magistrate's apparent breakthrough in understanding is not fol­
lowed by significant changes in his behavior. Once he is freed from 
his exile, once the forces of the Empire flee the town after their 
unsuccessful campaign against the so-called barbarians, the mag­
istrate steps back into the role he had before the arrival of Colonel 
Joll. "In all measures for our preservation I have taken the lead. No 
one has challenged me. My beard is trimmed, I wear clean clothes, I 
have in effect resumed the legal administration that was inter­
rupted a year ago with the arrival of the Civil Guard" (145). 
The precise nature of the magistrate's position relative to the 
Empire is not entirely clear, because the Empire's relation to the 
outpost is no longer clear. Mandel says that the forces will return in 
the spring, but there is also evidence that the Empire may be on its 
last legs (no merchant will take the coin of the Empire), that, 
indeed, we have been reading about the desperate actions of an 
Empire about to fall. The effect of this uncertainty is to shift our 
attention from the details of the political situation to the interior 
consciousness of the magistrate. And the manner in which he takes 
up his former role shows that he has maintained his complicitous 
consciousness. Once the magistrate reassumes his role, he returns 
to thinking of the woman as object. Once his sexual desire returns, 
he tries to "invoke images of the girl who night after night slept 
here with me. I see her standing barelegged in her shift, one foot in 
the basin, waiting for me to wash her, her hand pressing down on 
my shoulder . . . From the depths of that memory I reach out to 
touch myself" (149). That he is unable to arouse himself to orgasm 
does not alter the fact that he is once again objectifying the woman. 
His turning to Mai for sex is also a resumption of old habits, his 
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reassumption of his attitude of entitlement to sensual pleasure 
according to his desires. 
Coetzee also uses the magistrate's interaction with Mai to under­
line his failure to follow through on his understanding about the 
woman. Mai tells him, "Sometimes she would cry and cry and cry. 
You made her very unhappy. Did you know that?" Before defending 
himself to her, the magistrate tells us, "She is opening a door 
through which a wind of utter desolation blows upon me" (152). 
This glimpse of the woman's pain at his hands gives the magistrate 
pain—sorrow, emptiness, desolation—but he soon puts it aside 
and moves on. The force of our negative judgment becomes greater. 
But this account of the magistrate's falling back into his complic­
ity is incomplete. It leaves out a significant countervailing force in 
the reading experience, something that works against our recogni­
tion of the meaning of the magistrate's movement. That force is our 
own sympathy with the magistrate, and our responses to his 
situation as the prisoner who is tortured and made an outcast 
among his own people. While he is being tortured, we share his 
pain; while he is an outcast, we cringe at his humiliation. And the 
present tense heightens the effect because it contains no promise of 
any change; as we read, we recognize that the magistrate's subjec­
tion to torture could become a permanent condition. When this 
sympathetic, reflective magistrate conveys his pleasure and satis­
faction in resuming his place of consequence ("In all measures . .  . I 
have taken the lead"), we are inclined to share his satisfaction and, 
therefore, overlook or not fully register the perpetuation of his 
complicitous consciousness. In other words, we are inclined to be 
complicit with his complicity. Eventually, however, the evidence of 
that complicity becomes too great to ignore. 
Nevertheless, even as the evidence of complicity mounts, anoth­
er realization builds within us: in the magistrate's present situation, 
he cannot act otherwise. He can momentarily feel the woman's pain 
and his sorrow but he can no longer relate these feelings to his 
complicity with the Empire and its representative, Joll. To do that 
would mean that he could not return to his post without some misgiv­
ings about his possible relations to the Empire or its successor, and 
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that he could not so automatically resume his pursuit of the easy, 
sensual life he had before Joll's arrival. He does not experience such 
misgivings or give up the pursuit of sensual pleasure because his 
complicity cannot be so easily escaped. Nevertheless, he does 
register a vague sense of self-division—he feels some things that he 
cannot fully articulate. The penultimate section of the narrative 
ends with him telling his audience: "I think: There has been 
something staring at me, and still I do not see it'" (155). And the 
whole narrative ends with the sentence, "Like much else nowadays 
I leave it feeling stupid, like a man who lost his way long ago but 
presses along on a road that may lead nowhere" (156). 
These remarks actually serve a double function for the magis­
trate. While they show some awareness of his failing, some evi­
dence that he cannot completely eradicate the experiences of the 
last year, they also allow him to maintain his complicity. Like a 
white professor who admits to his black students that he is racist in 
ways that he might not always recognize and then does nothing 
else about his racism, the magistrate admits that a problem exists, 
but that admission substitutes for any effort to face it or to solve it. 
Again, however, because the magistrate has been complicit with 
the Empire for so long, we must recognize that he is in too deep to 
do otherwise. 
The relation of Coetzee's audience to these developments is 
extremely complicated. As I have indicated, Coetzee asks us to 
have a two-fold response to the magistrate's behavior: to recognize 
that the magistrate's inability to escape from his complicitous 
consciousness is a grim lesson about the power of complicity, 
something in the magistrate to be resisted rather than forgiven; 
and simultaneously to recognize that the magistrate, given who he is 
and how he has lived his life, cannot do anything else. Even more 
important, however, is that Coetzee asks us to turn the experience 
of our progressive relationship with the magistrate back upon 
ourselves. And here the present tense plays a crucial role. When the 
magistrate achieves his insight that he and JoU are two sides of 
Imperial rule, it is natural for us to believe that the intellectual 
knowledge of his complicity will translate into action to change 
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that complicity. But the later experience of the narrative asks us to 
go back and recognize that, however natural, the expectation was 
also unfounded. Similarly, when the magistrate resumes his posi­
tion of importance in the town, it is natural for us to share his 
satisfaction. But the accumulation of evidence of his complicity 
leads us to recognize our own complicity. 
In the first case, the satisfaction of our desire to have the 
magistrate recognize his similarity to Joll seduces us into believing 
that once the magistrate articulates his complicity he will be able to 
escape it. Our seduction depends upon our underestimating the na­
ture and power of complicity and the depth of the magistrate's. The 
subsequent experience of the narrative emphasizes that complicity 
works without the conscious awareness of the complicit individual 
and that the magistrate's whole adult life has been based on his com­
plicity If his moment of insight offers us the satisfaction of fulfilled 
desire, the subsequent events present us with the frustration of 
thwarted desire. But upon reflection, we can recognize that the frus­
tration we feel is partly at our own blindness, the underestimating 
or perhaps even forgetting that made our seduction possible. In the 
second case, when we feel some satisfaction in the magistrate's return 
to prominence, we have a very powerful experience of the insidious 
working of complicity: in feeling that satisfaction we unwittingly 
participate in the magistrate's complicity—but we do so from the 
best of motives, namely our sympathy and fellow feeling. 
Our double experience of complicity—in the events and in our 
activity of processing them—is, I believe, the most important effect 
that Coetzee's use of the present tense makes possible. It is above 
all the magistrate's own lack of perspective on his behavior and our 
immersion in that behavior as it happens that leads to our complic­
ity A retrospective narration with even a partially more enlight­
ened magistrate would interfere with our experiencing that com­
plicity. Furthermore, given the magistrate's habits of reflection, he 
would have to become either more enlightened or more clearly 
deluded: in either case, we would move further away from the 
experiencing-I and all his halting, faltering steps. Our own halting 
and faltering would not occur as effectively as it does here. 
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By the end of the narrative, we reach a complex judgment of the 
magistrate that combines resistance to his resumed complicity 
with an understanding of its inescapability However, because this 
judgment is only part of our double experience of complicity, we 
move away from the effort to achieve a final, definitive evaluation of 
the magistrate's actions and toward the unsettling recognition of 
the power of complicity. Because complicity is so insidious, and 
because we see it and experience it in our reading of this narrative, 
we must be very wary of adopting any stance based on our moral 
superiority to others whom we might consider complicit in the 
perpetuation of racism, sexism, or other dehumanizing ideologies. 
This wariness does not mean that we ought not make distinctions 
between, say, the Ku Klux Klan and the average white liberal 
academic; but it does mean that the average white liberal academic, 
rather than comforting himself with his moral superiority to mem­
bers of the Klan, ought to examine his life for evidence of his 
complicity in the perpetuation of oppression and then do some­
thing about it. Coetzee's narrative insists—and our experience of it 
leads us to agree—-that we all are complicit in some way or other. 
The narrative also insists that, despite the inescapability of com­
plicity, we must seek to eradicate it and the oppression it per­
petuates. To do anything else is, in effect, to be complicit with 
complicity 
Given what I have said earlier about the endless recursiveness of 
reading, I cannot (and do not wish to) claim anything like de­
finitiveness for this account of the present tense and the position­
ing of the reader. Indeed, as this examination of Coetzee's tech­
nique has led me into a discussion of the narrative's and the reader's 
ethical stances, I want to recognize that this discussion itself 
implies a particular ethical imperative: This reading of domination, 
oppression, and complicity in Waiting for the Barbarians cannot be 
presented as the truth that other readers should accept. Conse­
quently, I offer it to my readers as my current best effort at 
articulating the melding of my experiences as a flesh and blood and 
authorial reader of Coetzee's challenging narrative. I offer it with 
the knowledge that it is tentative and with the hope that it makes 
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some useful connections with Coetzee's text and with the experi­
ence of other readers.10 
Notes 
1. The "historical present'' poses no theoretical problem precisely 
because it implicitly (or even explicitly) acknowledges that the narrator 
actually has knowledge-after-the-fact even as it employs the present tense 
for the effect of immediacy. The heterodiegetic present, as employed, for 
example, in Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow, presents related but different 
theoretical problems from those of the homodiegetic present. When I 
discuss the present tense in this essay, I will be concerned with the 
homodiegetic simultaneous present. 
2. Fleischman is not alone in her assumption about the unsuitability of 
the present tense for narrative. See also Genette, Rimmon-Kenan, and 
others. After hearing a much abridged version of this paper as well as one 
on present tense narration by Dorrit Cohn at the International Conference 
on Narrative in Nice in 1991, Rimmon-Kenan said that she would "take 
back" her assertions in Narrative Fiction. 
3. For a fuller account of the reader's relation to Joe's narrative and of 
the workings of that narrative, see my "What Hemingway and a Rhetorical 
Theory of Narrative Can Do for Each Other: The Case of 'My Old Man'" 
(forthcoming). 
4. See Reading People, Reading Plots. 
5. I use the terms "narrative audience" and "authorial audience" as 
defined by Peter J. Rabinowitz in "Truth in Fiction: A Re-examination of 
Audiences," and discussed further in his Before Reading: Narrative Conven­
tions and the Politics of Interpretation. 
6. Of course a heterodiegetic simultaneous present (such as the broad­
cast of a horse race) is much more likely than a homodiegetic one in 
nonf ictional narrative, but I don't think we should categorically rule out the 
use of the homodiegetic simultaneous present for a particular effect. One 
of the lessons writers of the so-called New Journalism have taught us is 
how effectively many techniques of fictional narration can be employed in 
nonfiction narrative. 
7. I am drawing here on the concept of "coduction" developed by 
Wayne C. Booth in The Company We Keep. 
8. For a persuasive discussion of the impossibility of locating any 
plausible occasion of narration, see Neumann. At the same time, it is worth 
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noting that occasionally Coetzee moves from the simultaneous present to 
the historical present, as in this sentence: "Of the screaming which people 
afterwards claim to have heard from the granary, I hear nothing" (4-5). I 
take these moves to be deliberate rather than inadvertent, necessary for 
Coetzee to accomplish certain local tasks in the narrative. The dominant 
mode of narration, however, is the simultaneous present. 
9. For an extended and insightful discussion of vision and blindness 
in the novel, see Penner. 
10. Here I acknowledge the connections and help that other readers 
have already given me, especially Peter J. Rabinowitz, Jamie Barlowe, 
Elizabeth Patnoe, Robert Caserio, Nicholas Howe, and Miriam Clark. 
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Dialogue, Discourse, Theft, 
and Mimicry: 
Charlotte Bronte Rereads 
William Makepeace Thackeray 
ELIZABETH LANGLAND 
In enthusiastic praise of Vanity Fair, Charlotte Bronte wrote, "I 
regard Mr. Thackeray . .  . as the legitimate high priest of Truth" 
{Correspondence 243). Perhaps this reverence has confused critics 
who see in Bronte's subsequent novel Shirley an unsuccessful 
adaptation of Thackeray's techniques. But to revere is not neces­
sarily to imitate slavishly. And to speak, as have critics in the past, 
of women's texts as adaptations of men's texts corroborates notions 
of women's texts as belated, derivative, or secondary to the male 
tradition. Further, it forecloses in advance some of the most impor­
tant questions those textual revisions generate. I wish to engage 
here with a range of concepts under the rubric of intertextuality, all 
of which are related through their focus on language and its 
operations, and all of which are informed by the conviction that 
meaning is a process of differentiation and that every text, therefore, 
borrows from, echoes, imitates, mimics, parodies precursor texts.1 
I am interested in setting forth a more complete theory of textual 
relationships than has been implied by the term "influence." Influ­
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ence studies have tended to take a "tradition-bound position" 
which "regards literary influence as a benign, even reverential 
endorsement of humanism" (Renza 186). Textual imitation, in this 
light, reinforces rather than challenges traditional values. It also 
implies a hierarchical relationship between originary genius and 
derivative talent, and takes as foundational the notion of agency. In 
contrast, a theory of intertextuality is born with the death of the 
author; by focusing on what Clayton and Rothstein have called "the 
impersonal field of crossing texts" (3), such a theory challenges 
traditional concepts of humanism, hierarchy, and agency. So un­
derstood, influence and intertextuality are an antipodes of critical 
discourse, a conceptual opposition. 
But to insist upon the irreconcilability of that opposition jeopar­
dizes feminist analyses that hope both to engage the broader field 
of language relations implied by intertextuality and at the same 
time to stipulate a gendered subjectivity as origin of text. Feminist 
critics Nancy Miller and Susan Stanford Friedman have usefully ad­
dressed this apparent incommensurability. Miller proposes a meth­
od of reading as "arachnology": "a critical positioning which reads 
against the weave of indifferentiation to discover the embodiment 
in writing of a gendered subjectivity" (80). This method, she argues, 
"may allow us to refuse and refigure the very opposition of subject 
and text, spider and web" (97). Friedman helpfully develops this idea 
of "political intertextuality," insisting that "we must separate the 
concept of intertextuality from the death of the author," and adding 
that such a separation has been common among American critics, 
who "have resisted the inevitability of this connection" (159). Fried­
man grounds her own argument in the work of Julia Kristeva, who 
coined the neologism "intertextuality" in 1966 and has subsequently 
criticized readers for distorting the meaning she intended. As Fried­
man points out, the idea of intentional meaning makes ironic her dis­
course on anonymous intertextuality. Rather than indict Kristeva for 
inconsistency, Friedman uses this conflict to emphasize that "the 
discourses of influence and intertextuality have not been and 
cannot be kept pure, untainted by each other" (154). Inevitably, 
intertextuality has its own roots in the discourse of influence. 
* 247 ' 
ELIZABETH LANGLAND 
We must take the inevitable melding of these concepts, then, not 
as a pollution but as a productive fertilization. The concept of 
intertextuality as I will engage it here stipulates textual revision as 
a strategy for destabilizing the status quo, employing tactics that, as 
some have noted, have particular power for unsettling gender 
arrangements. Although my theory retains the political implica­
tions of influence and authorship, it welds that politics to a post­
modern methodology. The theories of Mikhail Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva, 
Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Luce Irigaray promise to 
produce a more adequate reading of Bronte's Shirley, both in its 
relationship to Thackeray's Vanity Fair and in itself, as well as a more 
sophisticated poetics of women's fiction in general. 
In its extreme form, the idea of intertextuality postulates an 
antimimetic contagion of writing and so puts paid to the notion of 
one text specifically imitating another. It raises the question of how 
I will legitimately engage Vanity Fair as a precursor for Shirley. Why 
choose one text over another? Why that particular text? I can give 
no fully satisfactory a priori rationale; Bronte's admiration for 
Thackeray, her evident close knowledge of his work, a similarity of 
technique and subject—such facts certainly invite the comparison. 
But a justification of the choice must lie in the fruitfulness of the 
enterprise itself: a study of the intertextual relationships between 
the novels yields impressive insights. At the same time, a general 
notion of intertextuality, such as I engage here, makes it possible to 
expand our discussion beyond the particular discursive intersec­
tions of these two literary texts to consider how Thackeray's and 
Bronte's novels interact with other discursive formulations of a 
culture, how they circulate within a broad network of political and 
social values. 
Mikhail Bakhtin develops his ideas of intertextuality within his 
broader theory of dialogism, or "double-voiced discourse," which 
has significant implications for notions of artistic creativity and 
which suggests a liberating relationship between "influence" and 
aesthetic production. In his fourth essay in The Dialogic Imagina­
tion, Bakhtin speaks of the "importance of struggling with anoth-
er's discourse, its influence in the history of an individual's coming 
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to ideological consciousness." He adds that "One's own discourse 
and one's own voice, though born of another or dynamically 
stimulated by another, will sooner or later begin to liberate them­
selves from the authority of the other's discourse" (348). The 
process of liberation receives further impetus from the constant 
competition of a variety of alien voices within any individual 
consciousness, any individual text. All language for Bakhtin is 
dialogized; that is, it bears within itself the history of its use, a 
"constant interaction of meanings, all of which have the potential 
of conditioning others" (426). His addendum—"the internal dia­
logism of double-voiced prose discourse can never be exhausted 
thematically" (324)—emphasizes the effect of dialogic language in 
unsettling established meanings. 
Julia Kristeva develops a concept of text as mosaic that borrows 
from Mikhail Bakhtin's formulation of text as "double-voiced dis­
course," and in the process of drawing from a powerful precursor to 
authorize her own voice, she enacts the very pattern that I identify 
in Bronte's response to Thackeray. Kristeva's theory conceives of 
"intertextuality" as a "mixture of textual signs, citations, and 
echoes." Writing in the context of Derrida and Lacan, as well as 
Bakhtin, Kristeva transforms Bakhtin's emphasis on the word to a 
focus on texts: "Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; 
any text is the absorption and transformation of another" (66). 
Bakhtin's dialogized word and Kristeva's intertext both pinpoint 
the inevitable incorporation of one work by another and the effects 
that textual appropriations may have for liberating an individual's 
own voice. Quite literally, Kristeva has incorporated Bakhtin's voice 
to liberate her own, a "self-authorizing strategy [that] she uses 
often" (Friedman 147). Friedman adds, "This 'misreading' . . . 
does not eliminate the other, but rather borrows his authority from 
the position of disciple. Intertextuality was paradoxically born 
under the guise of influence" (147). Just so, in her imitation of 
Thackeray's narrative omniscience, Bronte discovered a new capac­
ity to speak authoritatively. 
Michel Foucault's concept of discourse lies aslant the Bakhtinian/ 
Kristevan emphasis on the transformative/liberatory effects of 
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dialogism and mosaic. Foucault defines discourse as "the group of 
statements that belong to a single system of formation" (107). He 
continues, "thus I shall be able to speak of clinical discourse, 
economic discourse, the discourse of natural history, psychiatric 
discourse" (107-8). Foucault is less interested in the way one text 
revises another—all part of a literary discourse—than in the way 
different discursive formations operate and cooperate as a tech­
nique or "form of power which makes individuals subjects . . . 
subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his 
own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (212). Thus, al­
though Foucault's "discourse" is not specifically about literary 
intertextuality, it bespeaks the fundamental intertextuality of dif­
ferent discursive formations. Applying Foucault, we will conceive 
of intertextual relations between works not as transformative and 
liberatory, but as conservative, tending to a consolidation of certain 
powers. Foucault's concepts give us access to the way different 
discursive formations interrelate to create a certain kind of gen­
dered subject. However, by working to uncover the mechanisms by 
which we are subjected, an intertextual approach helps to destabil­
ize a traditional humanistic perspective and so frees us from its 
normalizing tendencies. 
Although Roland Barthes conjoins the death of the author with 
the birth of the text and so postulates a radical intertextuality 
where every text is potentially an intertext for every other, in 
practice Barthes's radical theory is constrained by his reading 
practice in SIZ, where the "interpretive results do not take one 
further than a highly skilled, subtle formalist might go" (Clayton 
and Rothstein 23). Barthes's practice, then, helps justify my prac­
tice in this essay, which remains focused on only two texts. Yet the 
theory remains highly suggestive and indicates a way of beginning 
to conceptualize the revolutionary potential in the woman's signa­
ture. That potential is encoded in Barthes' work as theft: "the only 
possible rejoinder . . . [is] neither confrontation, nor destruction, 
but only theft: fragment the old text of culture, science, literature, 
and change its features according to a formula of disguise, as one 
disguises . . . stolen goods" (10). Barthes's analogy of borrowing 
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to theft emphasizes the transgressive quality of intertextuality 
when one deliberately appropriates another's goods and disguises 
them for her own uses. Barthes's meaning remains playful and 
oblique, as is his style, which thus becomes an exemplification of 
his meaning. I will exploit his concept by focusing on theft as a 
technique to disrupt seemingly stable cultural encodings. Such an 
approach helps explain the way Bronte plays with the trope of tears 
in the Victorian novel. Tears serve as a primary Victorian encod­
ing of femininity. Tears both define and undermine the woman, 
signifying both sensitivity and enfeeblement. That old cultural 
text must be appropriated—that is, stolen—fragmented and dis­
guised, or re-presented. This process works to effect a transfor­
mation. 
Like Barthes, Luce Irigaray investigates deliberate, even staged, 
responses to another's prose, for the purpose of disrupting estab­
lished meanings. Irigaray identifies "mimicry" as an ''interim strat­
egy" for "destroying the discursive mechanism" which has op­
pressed woman. "It means to resubmit herself . .  . to 'ideas,' in 
particular to ideas about herself, that are elaborated in/by a mas­
culine logic, but so as to make 'visible/ by an effect of 'playful 
repetition,' what was supposed to remain invisible" (76). This for­
mulation addresses explicitly gender issues, as the other theories 
do not. Parody and mimicry are strategies in which "the woman 
deliberately assumes the feminine style and posture assigned to 
her within . . . discourse in order to uncover the mechanisms by 
which it exploits her" (220). Applying Irigaray's concepts, I argue 
that Bronte stages, or exaggerates, the stylization of woman as 
mermaid and the posture of woman as wife. 
Although these concepts of dialogue/mosaic, discourse, theft, 
and mimicry are related, they should not be conflated with each 
other, as each offers a unique angle of vision on intertextuality, 
particularly in Shirley, where Charlotte Bronte responds to one 
precursor text, Vanity Fair. Emphasizing as I do the liberatory 
effects of such intertextual relations, I wish to modify Nancy 
Miller's phrase "political intertextuality," which stresses a process 
of "overreading" to discern the woman's signature. I adopt instead 
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the phrase "strategic intertextuality" to suggest both the politics of 
signature and its transformative potential. 
The concept of strategic intertextuality opens the way for an 
enlarged poetics of fiction, one that shows more clearly how Shirley 
cites, absorbs, and transforms Thackeray's Vanity Fair. Bronte ac­
complishes these ends by adopting a third person narrator who 
echoes key passages of narrative commentary on the ideology of 
womanhood, by linking domestic and carceral discourses, by 
revising the Victorian trope of tears, and by parodying feminine 
paradigms and traditional plots. 
Text as Dialogue/Mosaic 
Thackeray is astute about the realities of that Victorian icon, "the 
Angel in the House." He conflates her fate in the home with that of 
other institutionalized beings like idiots and madmen confined to 
insane asylums. And he apparently caught Bronte's attention with 
this profound glimpse into women's lives, this perception of the 
discipline, the imprisonment, and the punishment. Thackeray writes, 
O you poor women! O you poor secret martyrs and victims, whose 
life is a torture, who are stretched on racks in your bedrooms, and 
who lay your heads down on the block daily at the drawing-room 
table; every man who watches your pains, or peers into those dark 
places where the torture is administered, must pity you. . . . (552) 
Bronte rewrites, 
You held out your hand for an egg, and fate put into it a scorpion. 
Show no consternation: close your fingers firmly upon the gift; let it 
sting through your palm. Never mind: in time, after your hand and 
arm have swelled and quivered long with torture, the squeezed 
scorpion will die, and you will have learned the great lesson how to 
endure without a sob. . . . Bitterness is strength—it is tonic. Sweet 
mild force following acute suffering, you find nowhere: to talk of it is 
delusion. There may be apathetic exhaustion after the rack. (128) 
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Despite thematic parallels, formal differences abound. Thackeray 
represents the feminine from the comfortable distance of an explic­
itly male narrator and narratee (e.g., "We are Turks with the 
affections of our women" [169], and "Oh, be humble, my brother, in 
your prosperity!" [552]). And, although he adopts an ironic stance, 
that same male narrator ultimately cannot resist reinscribing an ideol­
ogy of female selflessness that promises to make his own life pleasant 
when women "consent to remain at home as our slaves" (169). 
The imprisonment and secret suffering of idealized women 
which pass momentarily under Thackeray's sympathetic patri­
archal notice become a major agenda in Bronte's novel. Most 
notably, of course, she represents the feminine experience from a 
woman's perspective ("let [the scorpion] sting you through your 
palm," and "after your hand and arms have swelled and quivered 
long with torture"). The choice of the second person "you" is 
significant because it alludes both to the reader and, as a colloquial 
usage, to the writer. We are inside the experience rather than 
comfortably outside—-the narrator and narratee at this moment 
share the female position, together in the torture chamber of 
Victorian ideology, which dictates that "[a] lover masculine so 
disappointed can speak and urge explanation; a lover feminine can 
say nothing: if she did, the result would be shame and anguish" 
(128). 
A simple illustration of the difference emerges when we com­
pare the following two narrative generalizations, which echo each 
other. Thackeray's narrator writes: "The best of women (I have 
heard my grandmother say) are hypocrites" (165). Bronte's narrator 
responds: "All men taken singly, are more or less selfish" (183). 
Virginia Woolf called this capacity for generalization about the 
other sex "one of the good offices that sex can discharge for sex—to 
describe the spot the size of a shilling at the back of the head" (94), 
which neither sex can see for itself. 
Although Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar are right to say that 
Bronte adopts a third person narrator like Thackeray's, that claim 
is still too imprecise to tell us anything about how the text is actu­
ally working (373). In Gerard Genette's more precise terms, both 
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narrators are heterodiegetic (outside the story they narrate). But 
Bronte's narrator often resembles more closely the homodiegetic (or 
first person) narrator of Jane Eyre than she does the narrator of 
Vanity Fair. There is a difference in focalization. Genette reminds us 
of the crucial distinction between who sees and who speaks, that is, 
between mood and voice. Who sees in Bronte's Shirley is often an 
impassioned and angry woman who exhorts "Men of England/' 
"Men of Manchester/' "Men of Yorkshire," and "Fathers" to release 
their daughters from crippling custom. This focalizer/narrator 
usually stands at a great remove from the narratee she most 
frequently postulates, a comfortable and complacent patriarch. 
Consider this exhortation: "Men of England! look at your poor girls, 
many of them fading around you, dropping off in consumption or 
decline; or, what is worse, degenerating to sour old maids,— 
envious backbiting, wretched, because life is a desert to them. . . ." 
(378). Sometimes parodic, sometimes complacent, sometimes self-
righteous—the focalizer shifts and so testifies, as does her tenden­
tious tone, to the uneasiness of the narrator/narratee-as-patriarch 
relationship. 
The focalizer of Thackeray's novel is, in contrast, a comfortable, 
genial, and kind patriarch, who ultimately comprehends women's 
lives within the general tale of vanities he unfolds. Thackeray's 
novel charts a movement toward a normative position—the carni­
valesque atmosphere of a London fair that includes both Becky and 
Amelia—from which all human life, the generic man, is exposed in 
the folly of his vanity. The concluding vision is produced from a 
consonance of values between the focalizer/narrator and narratee: 
"Which of us is happy in the world? Which of us has his desire? Or, 
having it, is satisfied?" The third person plural bespeaks an ami­
able companionship that seems to be denied by the tendentious 
tone of Bronte's narrator. 
By shifting from Thackeray's companionable friendship between 
focalizer and narratee, Bronte also dramatically shifts the effects of 
her narrative; and it no longer seems adequate to conclude (as 
Gilbert and Gubar do in an otherwise insightful discussion) that 
Bronte was trying to create the calm objectivity and magisterial 
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omniscience of a Thackeray and thereby "becomes enmeshed in 
essentially the same male-dominated structures that imprison her 
characters" (373). Indeed, the case appears quite otherwise: Bronte 
wishes to expose "calm objectivity" as a by-product of ideological 
conservatism. Rather than enmeshing her in male-dominated struc­
tures and ideologies, her revision of Thackeray's calm objectivity 
becomes a wedge for exposing further the ideological gap that his 
irony has already opened between the idealization and the reality 
of women's lives. Thackeray's voice, which Bronte echoes, autho­
rizes her own more urgent tones, but her urgency, which cannot 
assume congruence with another, in turn lends authority to very 
different narrative ends. 
Text as Discourse 
Ideological issues focus on that idealized icon of womanhood in 
Victorian England, the Angel in the House. In nineteenth-century 
discourse, the home became an institution encoded as feminine. 
The celebration of home (with its presiding feminine angel) as a 
refuge from the harsh realities of the commercial world masked its 
status as a prison for women, enforcing the kind of self-discipline 
Foucault points to in Discipline and Punish. The disciplinary controls 
exerted by the home (controls which actually work on the mind as 
would those in Bentham's proposed Panopticon) are imaged by 
both Thackeray and Bronte as bodily tortures. Thackeray is com­
fortably explicit: "[Amelia's] life, begun not unprosperously, had 
come down to this—to a mean prison and a long, ignoble bond­
age. . . . How many thousands of people are there, women for the 
most part, who are doomed to endure this long slavery?" (552). 
Bronte picks up the echo of Thackeray's idea and extends its 
historical implications by critiquing the institutionalization and 
discipline of women's lives, the way in which the normative, the 
ideology of womanhood, becomes a straight] acket or prison. 
To demonstrate the breadth of her grasp and depiction, we may 
refer to Discipline and Punish and its discussion of the emergence of 
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new modes of discipline in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. These new modes include (1) an unseen but all-seeing 
surveillance, (2) a regime of the norm, and (3) various techniques of 
the self and its sexuality (summarized in Miller viii). In discussing 
the locus and operation of discipline, Foucault notes parentheti­
cally that it would be interesting one day to explore "how intra-
familial relations have become 'disciplined'" (215). Bronte, in fact, 
anticipates this provocative idea in Shirley. There she depicts the 
disciplinary action of the normative in women's lives, in both 
Victorian house architecture and domestic occupation. The house 
and its routines become spaces structured for the inculcation of a 
social ideology that proves particularly destructive for women. 
Foucault points out that the nineteenth-century prison depended 
on two major principles to enact its reform. The first is strict 
isolation. Without insisting on a rigid homology between the 
operations of prisons and the ideal upper-class home, we can still 
be struck by Caroline Helstone's extraordinary isolation in the 
novel. Mark Girouard, in Life in the English Country House, notes 
that nineteenth-century architecture began to enact rigid segrega­
tions: between masters and servants and between men and women. 
The essential quality of the Victorian home was privacy (285), but 
another word for privacy is isolation. In the Victorian house, rooms 
became encoded as masculine or feminine. For example, the dining 
room was a masculine space decorated in "massive oak or mahog­
any" to mirror "masculine importance," while the drawing room 
became a feminine space capturing "feminine delicacy" in "spindly 
gilt or rosewood, and silk or chintz" (292). 
Such historical details confirm the inscription of sexual differ­
ence and the disciplinary action of segregation and isolation in the 
home. They work on Caroline both to sap her energies and to 
preclude rebellion or dissent. The narrator tells us at one point, 
"Caroline was limited once more to the grey Rectory; the solitary 
morning walk by remote byways; the long, lonely afternoon sitting 
in the quiet parlour which the sun forsook at noon" (375), a routine 
which the narrator summarizes as the "solitude, the sadness, the 
nightmare of her life" (381). The preponderance of nouns, adjec­
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tives, and verbs suggesting isolation is noteworthy: "solitary," 
"remote," "lonely," "quiet," "forsook," "solitude." Rose Yorke de­
scribes Caroline's life as a "black trance like a toad's, buried in 
marble," and "a long slow death." The rectory is a "windowed 
grave," her life "monotony and death" (384,385). Caroline longs for 
a profession or a trade "fifty times a day" because labor can "give 
varieties of pain, and prevent us from breaking our hearts with a 
single master-torture. Besides," Caroline adds, "successful labour 
has its recompense; a vacant, weary, lonely, hopeless life has none" 
(235). But Caroline is already so well disciplined by her lady's life 
that she can take no effective action. 
The second principle that Foucault articulates as necessary to the 
regulatory action of prisons is work: "Work is defined, with isola­
tion, as an agent of carceral transformation" (240). Ironically, Fou­
cault cites the women's workshop at Clairvaux as "the perfect image 
of prison labour." He quotes from Foucher's 1838 text De la reforme 
des prisons: "on a throne, above which is a crucifix, a sister is sitting; 
before her, arranged in two rows, the prisoners are carrying out the 
task imposed on them, and, as needlework accounts for almost all 
the work, the strictest silence is constantly maintained. . .  . It 
seems that, in these halls, the very air breathes penitence and 
expiation" (243). I term this example ironic because anyone who has 
read Shirley will be aware of the prominence of needlework in 
Bronte's novel—where sewing is a disciplinary activity. 
Caroline first appears in the novel subject to just such a regimen 
as Foucher described. She is under the instruction of her cousin, 
Hortense, who is teaching her "fine needlework" (103): 
The afternoon was devoted to sewing . . . unnumbered hours [of] 
fine embroidery, sight-destroying lace-work, marvellous netting and 
knitting, and, above all, [of] most elaborate stocking-mending. . . . 
It was another of Caroline's troubles to be condemned to learn this 
foreign style of darning, which was done stitch by stitch so as exactly 
to imitate the fabric of the stocking itself; a wearifu' process, but 
considered by Hortense Gerard . .  . as one of the first "duties of 
woman." . . . No time did [Hortense] lose in seeking up a hopeless 
pair of hose, of which the heels were entirely gone, and in setting the 
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ignorant English girl to repair the deficiency: this task had been 
commenced two years ago, and Caroline had the stockings in her 
work-bag yet. She did a few rows every day, by way of penance for the 
expiation of her sins. (107-8) 
Bronte writing on domestic life, employing such terms as "con­
demned/' "penance," "expiation/' and "sins," echoes Foucher writ­
ing on prison discipline. At one point Caroline argues, "If I sew I 
cannot listen; if I listen, I cannot sew" (115), pointing to the way 
sewing curbs and regulates activity of the mind. 
When Caroline returns to her uncle at the rectory, he approves 
her day with the words, "Well, that will do—stick to the needle 
. . . and you'll be a clever woman some day" (122). At home, if she is 
not sewing for the Jew basket (134), she is making dresses for 
herself: "Some gloomy hours had she spent in the interval. Most of 
the time had been passed shut up in her own apartment [sewing]; 
only issuing from it, indeed, to join her uncle at meals. . . ." (243­
44). Again, Caroline's routine echoes Foucault's discipline of work 
punctuated by meals. Later, Caroline asks the logical question 
which is focalized through the narrator's satiric eyes: "What do 
[fathers] expect [daughters] to do at home? If you ask,—they would 
answer, sew and cook. They expect them to do this, and this only, 
contentedly, regularly, uncomplainingly all their lives long, as if 
they had no germs of faculties for anything else: a doctrine as 
reasonable to hold, as it would be that the fathers have no faculties 
but for eating what their daughters cook, or for wearing what they 
sew" (377). 
As assiduously as Caroline sews, Shirley avoids the needle. With 
heavy irony the narrator relates: "[Shirley] takes her sewing occa­
sionally: but, by some fatality, she is doomed never to sit steadily at 
it for above five minutes" (372). Or we are told, "After tea Shirley 
reads, and she is just about as tenacious of her book as she is lax 
of her needle" (373). Playing the transvestite Captain Keeldar— 
independent, wealthy, and parentless—Shirley can assume many 
male freedoms and prerogatives and so throws into relief the 
narrow disciplines of a woman's usual lot. 
Dialogue, Discourse, Theft, and Mimicry 
Of course, Victorian ladies did not spend all their time in 
isolation or at their needle. Their isolation might otherwise be 
enviable; one might see it as privacy, a room of one's own. The 
corollary discipline in their lives Caroline characterizes as "un­
profitable visiting"—the routine of morning calls and afternoon 
teas (377). I mentioned earlier that the drawing room became a 
feminine space in Victorian England. Mark Girouard adds that the 
"drawing room acquired two new functions in the Victorian pe­
riod, as a result of the inane ceremony of morning calls and the more 
genial celebration of afternoon tea" (293). Morning calls "(which by 
late nineteenth century took place in the afternoon) . . . involved 
carriage visits from one local hostess to another, and a quarter of an 
hour's polite conversation in the drawing room" (293). Such rituals 
virtually held mistresses hostage in houses, morning and after­
noon, giving and receiving these "inane" visits. 
These rituals function in ways similar to Bentham's proposed 
Panopticon, a prison designed so that the inmates would be con­
stantly under an unseen but all-seeing surveillance. Although 
ladies at home did not live in glass cells, there was the constant 
possibility that they would be visited at any moment. They had, in 
effect, to be always ready for the regulatory gaze of society. 
Morning calls and afternoon teas served as a continual check over 
their behavior. This control was further enhanced by a normative 
code of behavior set out in the etiquette books, a widely popular 
innovation in the Victorian age. 
The first view we have of Caroline Helstone at home presents her 
subject to just such a disciplinary regimen. The narrator relates, 
"When she had dined, and found herself in the Rectory drawing-
room alone, having left her uncle over his temperate glass of port, 
the difficulty that occurred to and embarrassed her was—How am I 
to get through this day" (130). The doorbell interrupts her thoughts, 
and curates join her uncle in the male space, the dining room. 
Caroline has a new worry "lest they should stay to tea." Her fate is 
sealed when four ladies are announced to her in the drawing room, 
and Caroline wishes herself "meantime at Jericho" (131). The social 
rituals are an agony to Caroline—her visit with the ladies is 
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punctuated, we are told, by silences of five minutes, and the ordeal 
leaves Caroline with a full sense of her "ignorance and incompe­
tency" The narrator is both savage and funny in the following 
comment: "Pause third came on. During its continuance, Caroline 
was feeling at her heart's core what a dreaming fool she was; what 
an unpractical life she led; how little fitness there was in her for 
ordinary intercourse with the ordinary world" (133). She can revive 
"the flagging discourse" only "by asking them if they would all stay 
to tea" (133). 
One form of discipline gives way to another as Caroline feels the 
pressure of the normative. Tea must be followed "in the natural 
course of events" by music. Caroline has opened the piano, we are 
told, "knowing how it would be" (140). For Caroline, the result of 
this discipline, called entertaining, is a "sort of brain-lethargy" and 
a "deadened spirit" (141). She escapes briefly to the dining room 
and "rested herself—rested at least her limbs, her senses, her 
hearing, her vision—weary with listening to nothing and gazing 
on vacancy" (142). This is a characteristically grim picture of 
institutional control, the power of the normative in women's lives. 
What began with Thackeray's metaphor for Amelia's imprisonment 
in "woman's lot" expands in Bronte's novel to become an explora­
tion of the connections and links between two seemingly different 
discursive formations: the domestic and the carceral. 
Text as Theft 
To turn from Foucault to Barthes is to take up a dramatically 
different idea, the notion of cultural revision, and thus to think 
about intertextuality in a very different way. The "old text of 
culture" undergoes a change of features, as in Bronte's "theft" of the 
Victorian trope of tears, a powerful signifier of femininity. Bronte 
appropriates metonymic associations of tears—sobs, sighs, weep-
ings—as attributes of a landscape, of nature, of fate. So person­
alized through a feminine trope, the destructive powers of nature 
and fate are read as woman-inspired, as a consequence of rage 
• 260 • 
Dialogue, Discourse, Theft, and Mimicry 
simmering below the surface of women's acquiescence in domestic 
arrangements that disempower them. 
Tears were the Victorian trope par excellence for femininity, 
ushered in with Victoria, the girl queen, and Barrett Browning's 
poetic paean to her: 
God save thee, weeping Queen! 
Thou shalt be well beloved! 
The tyrant's sceptre cannot move, 
As those pure tears have moved! 
The nature in thine eyes we see, 
That tyrants cannot own— 
The love that guardeth liberties! 
Strange blessing on the nation lies 
Whose Sovereign wept— 
Yea, wept, to wear its crown! 
In her portrait of a weeping monarch, Barrett Browning attempts to 
bridge the gap in the signifier ''tears" between strength of sensi­
bility and weakness of will. 
Why do "real" women cry? The multiple answers to this ques­
tion embed femininity simultaneously within cultural discourses 
of sensitivity and enfeeblement. Women cry because they feel 
deeply Because they sympathize. Because they love. Because they're 
tender. Because they're true. Because they're happy. Because they're 
sad. Because they're weak. Because they're dependent. 
Thackeray's genial irony reveals his relish for this feminine 
trope. In the opening pages of Vanity Fair, Amelia Sedley drowns in 
a rhetoric of tears. Everyone, including Amelia herself, cries at her 
departure from Chiswick Mall: "[S]he had a pair of eyes, which 
sparkled with the brightest and honestest good-humour, except 
indeed when they filled with tears, and that was a great deal too 
often; for the silly thing would cry over a dead canary bird; or 
over a mouse, that the cat haply had seized upon; or over the end of 
a novel, were it ever so stupid" (14-15). From introduction to 
farewell, Amelia's story is awash in tears: "Emmy's head sank 
down, and for almost the last time in which she shall be called 
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upon to weep in this history, she commenced that work" (658). 
Women's work. 
For Becky Sharp, Amelia's dark side, "Nobody cried," and the 
implied inversion also holds true: she cried for nobody (16). At her 
crisis, discovered by her husband with Lord Steyne, her schemes 
exploded, she sits "in the midst of her miserable ruins with clasped 
hands and dry eyes" (516-17). The narrative indictment implicit in 
her "dry eyes" anticipates Becky's textual reentry as the bewitch­
ing, yet treacherous "syren." Thackeray's negative interpretation of 
the opposing signifier "dry eyes" keeps women under the tyranny 
of the sign "tears." 
In contrast, Bronte pursues what was implicit in Thackeray's 
representation of Amelia, the way a woman's tears inscribe her 
within a cultural economy of prescribed suffering. Bronte's narra­
tor in Shirley enjoins women to short-circuit the signifying current 
so that dry eyes encode power. As the tears that image her sensi­
bility dry up, so does her susceptibility to disappointment, disease, 
death: "You expected bread, and you have got a stone, break your 
teeth on it, and don't shriek because the nerves are martyrized. . . . 
You held out your hand for an egg, and fate put into it a scorpion. 
Show no consternation: close your fingers firmly on the gift; let it 
sting through your palm. . . . the squeezed scorpion will die, and 
you will have learned the great lesson how to endure without a sob" 
(128). In Bronte, the answer to the question "Why not cry?" is plain: 
"[I]f you survive the test—some, it is said, die under it—you will be 
stronger, wiser, less sensitive" (128). 
Into the narrative spaces left blank because there are no tears to 
fill them pour the woman's questions, effectively silenced in Thacke-
ray's text: "How am I to get through this day?" (130). "What am I to 
do to fill the interval of time which spreads between me and the 
grave?" "What was I created for, I wonder?" "Where is my place in 
the world?" (190). 
It remains, then, for Bronte to fragment the old text of culture, 
tears, to change its features through disguise: "[Caroline] returned 
from an enchanted region to the real world: for Nunnely wood in 
June, she saw her narrow chamber; for the songs of birds in alleys, 
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she heard the rain on her casement; for the sigh of the south wind, 
came the sob of the mournful east" (189). Women may be dry-eyed, 
but the world weeps. Rain and winds, disguised sobs and sighs, 
imbue the world with a feminine sensibility that threatens to rend 
the fabric of existence. The sobs of the future sound an apocalyptic 
note: "The future sometimes seems to sob a low warning of the 
events it is bringing us. . .  . At other times this Future bursts 
suddenly, as if a rock had rent, and in it a grave had opened, 
whence issues the body of one that slept. Ere you are aware, you 
stand face to face with a shrouded and unthought-of Calamity—a 
new Lazarus" (399). What rough beast slouches toward Bethlehem 
to be (re)born? Is it woman? 
Text as Mimicry 
Bronte's narrator is often angry, only occasionally antic. Yet the 
playful impulse erupts at key moments. What confuses, perhaps, is 
the way Bronte's admiration for Thackeray's art coexists with criti­
cism of his perspectives. The letter in which she identifies the 
author of Vanity Fair as "the legitimate high priest of Truth" contin­
ues in a reverential vein: "He, I see, keeps the mermaid's tail below 
water, and only hints at the dead men's bones and noxious slime 
amidst which it wriggles; but his hint is more vivid than other 
men's elaborate explanations" (Correspondence 224). Bronte echoes 
Vanity Fair's narrator, who comments, "In describing this syren, 
singing and smiling, coaxing and cajoling, the author, with modest 
pride, asks his readers all round, has he once forgotten the laws of 
politeness, and showed the monster's hideous tail above water? 
No!" (617). Nonetheless, that narrator relishes a brief glimpse or 
two below the waterline, where the mermaid's tail is "writhing and 
twirling, diabolically hideous and slimy, flapping amongst bones, 
or curling round corpses" (617). 
Dorothy Dinnerstein identifies the mermaid's threat with the 
element in which she lives, "the dark and magic underwater world 
from which our life comes and in which we cannot live" (5). That 
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threat also lies in the oppositions she embodies: human/animal, 
charmer/destroyer. For all of his decorum, the narrator's alignment 
of Becky "shed-no-tears" Sharp with the mermaid reinforces a 
figurative economy in which woman's superficial charm conceals a 
deadly purpose: "They look pretty enough when they sit upon a 
rock, twanging their harps and combing their hair, and sing, and 
beckon to you to come and hold the looking-glass; but when they 
sink into their native element, depend on it those mermaids are 
about no good, and we had best not examine the fiendish marine 
cannibals, revelling and feasting on their wretched pickled vic­
tims" (617). Who are "they"? Who is "you"? Who are "we"? "They 
(mermaid/women) beckon "you" (men/the masculine narratee), 
and thus "we" (male narrator and readers—men/women?) must 
keep our bodies and minds above water. What happens to women 
caught and deformed in this syntax, as both third person ob-
ject/Other and first person subject? 
Staging the feminine—the stylization and parody of stereo­
types and norms which is Irigaray's recommended tactic—becomes 
Bronte's strategy as she, too, introduces in Shirley the figure of the 
mermaid. First the narrator inexplicably describes her pure, meek 
heroine, Caroline Helstone, "combing her hair, long as a mer-
maid's . . . enchanted with the image" in her mirror (123). In light 
of her own letter of praise, it seems unlikely that Bronte has 
forgotten Thackeray's description of mermaids "combing their 
hair." The point seems to be that this enchantress enchants only 
herself. The man she dreams of winning resolutely resists her 
charms and proposes to a woman with money 
The mermaid figure returns when Shirley and Caroline plan a 
tour to the Faroe Isles; Shirley promises "seals in Suderoe, and, 
doubtless, mermaids in Stromoe" (248). The world Caroline longs 
to leave, the world of her uncle's rectory (rather than the mermaid's 
element) is here associated with "remnants of shrouds, and frag­
ments of coffins, and human bones and mould" (248). Shirley spins 
out a fantasy of their nocturnal encounter with a mermaid: "an 
image, fair as alabaster" (249). Her features align her explicitly with 
Caroline: "The long hair . .  . a face in the style of yours [Car­
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oline's] . . . whose straight, pure lineaments, paleness does not 
disfigure" (249). She holds a mirror in her hand, and serves herself 
as a mirror. Shirley exclaims: "Temptress-terror! monstrous like­
ness of ourselves!" (249). Whereas a man would "spring at the 
[mermaid's] sign, the cold billow would be dared for the sake of the 
colder enchantress," the two women "Stand safe though not dread-
less." The mermaid "cannot charm," because they are like her, but 
"she will appal," again because they are like her. 
The conflict between Thackeray's "they" and "we" has been 
resolved in Shirley's identification of woman with mermaid. Car­
oline demurs; Mrs. Pryor protests: "We are aware that mermaids do 
not exist. . . . How can you find interest in speaking of a nonen­
tity?" (250). Shirley responds, "I don't know" (250), and the scene 
abruptly ends. It remains an unassimilable bolus, undigested by 
the narrative. 
Such is Bronte's game. She assumes the feminine style and 
posture to uncover the mechanisms by which it exploits her; 
introduces, in short, the "patriarch bull . . . huge enough to have 
been spawned before the Flood" (249). This creature—not in tradi­
tional mythology—takes his place alongside the mermaid. Shirley 
comments to Caroline, "I suppose you fancy the sea-mammoths 
pasturing about the bases of the 'everlasting hills' . .  . I should not 
like to be capsized by the patriarch bull." Isn't Thackeray just such a 
"patriarch bull" to Bronte, who defined his mind as "deep-founded 
and enduring," and who located in the concluding part of Vanity 
Fair "a sort of 'still profound' . . . which the discernment of one 
generation will not suffice to fathom" {Correspondence 224)? Isn't 
Thackeray just such a literary leviathan enjoying the authority of 
the patriarchal bull or, rephrased, the bull of patriarchal authority? 
He might, indeed, capsize Bronte's small craft. 
All parodies risk being recuperated: "Parody by itself is not 
subversive, and there must be a way to understand what makes 
certain kinds of parodic repetitions effectively disruptive, truly 
troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated and recir­
culated as instruments of cultural hegemony" (Butler 139). Bronte's 
revisions of the marriage plot signal a parodic repetition not only of 
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Thackeray's art but of novel conventions in general. Indeed, Thacke-
ray's own parody of marriage as fulfillment no doubt suggested the 
whole network of constricting codes, values, and beliefs distinctive 
to the culture that both he and Bronte inhabited; his iconoclasm in 
the face of those norms must have encouraged her further parody. 
At the same time, her novel's traditional conclusion, marriage, 
seems ultimately to recuperate the very values Bronte set out to 
parody. That is, we close with the romance we were initially 
advised to reject in favor of something "real, cool, and solid" (39). 
But the parodic impulse is still at play. Although Bronte has not 
altered the plots in which women's lives are to be circumscribed, 
she has done something equally radical. She has changed the 
meaning of that plot, has altered the way in which the women's 
lives are to be understood. If we return once more to Thackeray's 
Vanity Fair, we recall that he opens his novel with the departure of 
his female protagonists, Amelia Sedley and Becky Sharp, from 
Chiswick Mall. They will make their way in the world, where the 
route to success is, essentially, marriage. Becky immediately and 
typically queries, "If Mr. Joseph Sedley is rich and unmarried, why 
should I not marry him?" (25). The narrator ironically asks whether 
"once landed in the marriage country, all were green and pleasant 
there" (250). But Thackeray embeds this question within the larger 
vanitas theme informing his novel so that the question of women's 
fulfillment is not directly engaged. 
Bronte's Shirley expends one-sixth of its length before a major 
female character is even introduced. Yet the novel clearly focuses on 
two women: Shirley Keeldar and Caroline Helstone. Why does 
Bronte so structure her novel? One immediate and frequently given 
answer is that we are to see the women's lives within the mercantile 
world of men and masters, both women and workers suffering 
from "the dehumanizing effect of patriarchal capitalism" (Gilbert 
and Gubar 387). Such thematic observations are certainly valid, but 
the structure and events of the first several chapters also have the 
significant effect of beginning to unseat patriarchal ideologies of 
womanhood through mimicry, a process that intensifies when the 
women are actually introduced. 
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Bronte opens with a male world devoid of women, except as 
servants. Women are negligible, insignificant, and ignored. The 
male world of guns and machinery and power is inaccessible to 
women or to women's influence. Very subtly, the text raises a 
question: What meaningful role can women have in men's lives and 
in a patriarchal culture? We are early vouchsafed an answer: the 
fable of Mary Cave. Mary Cave was the site of a contest and conflict 
between Yorke and Helstone. Helstone won her, "a girl with the 
face of a Madonna; a girl of living marble/' "beautiful as a monu­
mental angel" (81). This bride is no sooner invested with her offices 
as Victorian angel in Helstone's house than she begins a decline 
that ends in her death. Mary's demise is "scarcely noticed" by her 
husband because "she is of no great importance to him in any 
shape" (82). The Victorian myth of woman's regenerative moral 
sensibility is here mimicked and exploded. 
This pattern is repeated when we focus on Robert Moore, the 
mill owner. He generally avoids his home where his sister, Hor­
tense, presides: "its air of modest comfort seemed to possess no 
particular attraction for its owner" (91). He prefers the snuggery 
and isolation of his separate quarters in his mill. After he is 
wounded by the would-be assassin's bullet, he is apparently trans­
formed, a transformation signaled by his confession to his sister, "I 
am pleased to come home" (555)- The narrator dryly comments, 
"Hortense did not feel the peculiar novelty of this expression 
coming from her brother, who had never before called the cottage 
his home; and to whom its narrow limits had always heretofore 
seemed rather restrictive than protective" (555). 
The narrator builds on this kind of observation by associating 
both Louis and Robert Moore, the prospective husbands of Shirley 
and Caroline, with rock or stone. Louis is described as "cool as 
stone" and like "a great sand-buried stone head" (575). Robert asks 
Caroline, metaphorically, "if that rose should promise to shelter 
from tempest this hard, grey stone" (595). The reader inevitably 
recalls the narrator's angry summary of women's lives: "You ex­
pected bread, and you have got a stone; break your teeth on it 
and don't shriek because the nerves are martyrized" (128). Is the 
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narrator suggesting that, in marrying Louis and Robert, the women 
have ingested stones that their "mental stomach[s]" must digest? 
That possibility recalls the metaphor of torture with which we 
began. The gap opened there has widened and exposed the Victo­
rian ideologies of womanhood as dangerous romances, which, in 
Mrs. Pryor's words, "show you only the green tempting surface of 
the marsh, and give not one faithful or truthful hint of the slough 
underneath" (366). 
Aggressively, the narrator entitles her final chapter "The Wind-
ing-Up," and opens, "Yes, reader, we must settle accounts now" 
(587). The chapter is full of metalepses, or moments when the 
narrator transgresses the boundaries of the narrative, speaking 
directly to her characters. "Are you not aware, Peter," she asks of 
one, "that a discriminating public has its crotchets: that the unvar­
nished truth does not answer; that plain facts will not digest?" 
(587). Plain facts that don't digest recall stones that the women 
receive in place of bread, another undigestible morsel. A page later 
the narrator gloats: "There! I think the varnish has been put on very 
nicely" (588). Is the narrator varnishing the truth for men who don't 
wish to digest plain facts? The tendentious tone continues—"you 
cannot know how it happened, reader; your curiosity must be 
robbed to pay your elegant love of the pretty and pleasing" (588). 
The narrator, in effect, tells us that the conclusion is varnish, put on 
to feed her narratee's love of "the pretty and pleasing." And 
Charlotte Bronte subverts our expectations that marriage can re­
solve the conflicts and fulfill our own narrative desires. The mar­
riages, too, are a varnish "put on very nicely." 
Thus, although the novel concludes with a pair of marriages, that 
ending should be read parodically. Bronte begins by promising us 
something called "reality" and concludes, laughingly, with some­
thing looking, at first glance, like "romance." But that romance 
turns into a "manufacturer's daydreams," something that looks 
very much like garden-variety industrialization. The fairies and 
ladies disappear. 
Thackeray, in contrast, begins with a puppet show—the Becky 
and Amelia dolls—and he concludes, ostensibly, with the same 
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"game," as we children are admonished to "shut up the box and 
puppets." But who can forget the closing injunction: 'Ah Vanitas 
Vanitatum! Which of us is happy in the world? Which of us has his 
desire? Or, having it, is satisfied?" (666)? An ex cathedra pronounce­
ment; a brilliant and pithy summa on the human condition; a 
magnificent moral gesture. One might want to argue, however, 
about whether Becky and Amelia have had their desires or have 
been had. Or, if one is Charlotte Bronte, one might want to try 
mimicry: "The story is told. I think I now see the judicious reader 
putting on his spectacles to look for a moral. It would be an insult to 
his sagacity to offer direction. I only say, God speed him in his 
quest!" {Shirley, finis). 
Summa 
This essay has employed a variety of critical concepts, from dia­
logue to discourse to theft to parody, in order to develop a theory of 
strategic intertextuality. Such a theory emphasizes not only the 
signature of the woman in the text, but also engages the transfor­
mative potential of woman, which it focuses by engaging the 
liberatory impulse implicit in certain concepts of intertextuality, as 
opposed to the conservative bent of influence. Even a Foucauldian 
emphasis on discourse works to uncover and so destabilize the 
mechanisms by which one is subjected. My analysis has neces­
sarily privileged Bronte's text over Thackeray's, yet I hope it has also 
engaged both texts in such a way as to make clear their currency 
within the general signifying practices of their culture. Assuming 
such currency provides the basis for any intertextual study, and it 
suggests the scope of Thackeray's own parodic impulse in the 
novel, which I have only minimally addressed. It also stresses 
the way influence and intertextuality become mutually entangled, 
the way one novel's engagement with another is not a simple pro­
cess of transmission, but a dynamic encounter with the cultural 
values that saturate any literary object. That contestation of word 
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with word, text with text, has the power to generate a productive 
friction that destabilizes the ground of meaning and so facilitates 
change. 
Notes 
1. In the concept of intertextuality with which I engage, readers will 
recognize the influence of Jacques Derrida. His memorable formulation— 
"11 n'y a pas de hors-texte" [There is nothing outside the text] (158) — 
challenges a traditional mimetic understanding of literature as referring 
both to world and to precursor works, and thus it opens up rich possi­
bilities for our understanding of narrative interrelationships. 
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